AB’DE KAMU YATIRIMLARININ FİNANSMANINDA “ALTIN KURAL”

Year 2009, Volume: 9 Issue: 4, 1591 - 1603, 01.11.2009

Abdulkadir Işık Metin Meriç

Abstract

Ricardo ile başlayan süreçte klasik iktisadın borçlanma ile ilgili önemli argümanları arasında yer alan ve son zamanlarda da tartışılan kamu yatırımlarının borçlanma ile karşılanması olarak da ifade edilen ―Altın Kural‖ın, artan bütçe açıkları nedeni ile azalma içerisine giren kamu yatırımlarının arttırılmasında etkin bir rol oynayacağı düşünülmektedir. Kamu yatırımlarının vergiler ile finansmanının, yatırımların gerçekleşmesinde uzun zaman aldığı genel olarak kabul edilmektedir. Kamu yatırımlarının vergi yerine borçla karşılanması durumunda, borcun faizi nedeniyle, vergi ile finansmana göre sosyal getirisi daha düşük olduğu belirtilmektedir. Diğer taraftan yatırımların finansmanında kısa süreli borçlanmaya gidilmesi durumunda, özel tüketimi arttırıcı etkisi daha belirgin olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır

Keywords

Avrupa Birliği, Yatırımlar, Finansman ve Altın Kural

PUBLIC INVESTMENT FINANCING AT EUROPEAN UNION “GOLDEN RULE”

Abstract

At this time I challenge the proposition that the golden rule of public sector borrowing is consistent with the principle of intertemporal allocative efficiency, in the sense that growth enhancing public investment justifies a structural public deficit. I demonstrate that in the long run the social opportunity cost of debtfinanced public investment exceeds the social opportunity cost of tax financed public investments. This result holds if the social rate of time preference is lower than the interest rate on government borrowing. Thus a benevolent government would use taxes to finance public investment. In the short run, debt financing is justified if public investment has a considerable growth effect on private consumption. This requires a corresponding initial undersupply of public capital

Keywords

European Union, Investment, Financing and Golden Rule

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