TÜRKİYE’DE BORÇ DÖNGÜSÜ: DÜŞÜK BORÇ – YÜKSEK KIRILGANLIK PARADOKSU

Öz

Öz Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin borçlanma dinamiklerini ekonomi ile siyaset arasındaki çift yönlü etkileşim bağlamında incelemektedir. 1980 sonrası dönemde kamu, özel sektör ve hanehalkı borçluluğunda gözlenen artış, yalnızca ekonomik göstergelerle sınırlı kalmamış; uluslararası sermaye hareketleri ve ülke içi siyasal stratejiler aracılığıyla doğrudan etkili olmuştur. Türkiye’de borç politikaları seçim ekonomileri, popülist maliye politikaları ve uluslararası finansal kuruluşlarla yapılan anlaşmalar aracılığıyla şekillenmiş; özellikle IMF ve Dünya Bankası gözetimindeki programlarla daha da kurumsallaşmıştır. Ülkelerin artan borçlanma gereksinimlerinin yalnızca borçluluk oranları değil, genel makroekonomik faktörlerle birlikte değerlendirilmesi gerekir. Bu amaçla, bu makalede borçluluk göstergeleri dışında kalan ama ekonomilerin genel durumu ve borçluluk hakkında fikir verebilecek değişkenler kullanılarak bir Borç Kırılganlık Endeksi (BKE) oluşturulmuştur. Bu endeks kullanılarak kamu dış borcu, hanehalkı borcu ve toplam borç oranlarına ilişkin kırılganlıklar ayrıntılı olarak değerlendirilmiş ve 2010–2023 dönemi uluslararası karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmiştir. Bulgular, Türkiye’nin görece düşük borçluluk oranlarına rağmen yüksek kırılganlık taşıdığını ve borçlanma döngüsünün ekonomik olduğu kadar siyasal bir strateji işlevi de gördüğünü ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Borç Döngüsü
• Türkiye
• Dış Borç
• Hanehalkı Borçluluğu
• Borç Kırılganlık Endeksi (BKE)

DEBT CYCLE in TURKEY: THE LOW-DEBT, HIGH-VULNERABILITY PARADOX

Öz

This study examines Turkey’s borrowing dynamics within the bidirectional interplay between the economy and politics. Since the 1980s, the rise in indebtedness across the public sector, private firms, and households has not been confined to economic indicators alone; it has been directly shaped by international capital flows and domestic political strategies. In Turkey, debt policies have been formed through election-cycle economics, populist fiscal policies, and agreements with international financial institutions, and have been further institutionalized under programs overseen by the IMF and the World Bank. Countries’ growing borrowing needs should be evaluated not only by debt ratios but also in conjunction with broader macroeconomic factors. To this end, this article constructs a Debt Vulnerability Index (DVI) using variables that lie beyond standard indebtedness indicators yet capture the general condition of the economy and provide insight into debt dynamics. Employing this index, we assess vulnerabilities related to public external debt, household debt, and total indebtedness, and conduct an international comparative analysis for the period 2010–2023. The findings indicate that, despite relatively low headline debt ratios, Turkey exhibits high vulnerability, and that the debt cycle functions as a political strategy as much as an economic one.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Debt Cycle; Turkey; External Debt; Household Indebtedness; Debt Vulnerability Index (DVI)

Kaynakça

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