Franchise Sistemlerinde Strateji ve Sözleşme Dinamikleri: İspanya Gıda ve İçecek Sektörü Üzerine Bir Analiz

Year 2021, , 243 - 262, 31.12.2021

Ahmet Rutkay Ardoğan

https://doi.org/10.38009/ekimad.999517

Abstract

Bu çalışma, işlem maliyeti teorisi ve vekalet teorisi argümanlarını dikkate alarak, franchising sisteminin stratejik ve sözleşme dinamiklerini ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Guia de Franquicias yayınından yararlanılarak elde edilen 2021 yılı İspanyol yiyecek ve içecek franchise sistemlerinin verisetine ilişkin havuzlanmış kesit verileri kullanılmış; ilk olarak franchise veren şirketlerin yaşının ve sistem büyüklüğünün verilen franchise oranı üzerindeki etkisine ilişkin keşif analizi uygulanmıştır. Sonrasında, franchise sistemlerinin yaş, sistem büyüklüğü, menşe ülkesi ve franchise verilen birimlerin oranı gibi karakteristiklerinin bir franchising sözleşmesinin finansal etmenleri – ilk yatırım bedeli, franchise bedeli, ciro payı, reklam payı – üzerindeki etkileri analiz edilmiştir. Verilen franchise birimleri oranının, hem yaş hem de sistem büyüklüğü karakteristikleriyle korelasyonunun ters-U şeklinde olduğu bulunmuştur. Son olarak, çoklu regresyon yöntemi uygulanmasıyla yaş, sistem büyüklüğü, menşe ülkesi ve franchise verilen birimlerin oranı karakteristiklerinin sistem büyüklüğü harici her birinin franchise bedeli ve reklam payı üzerinde rol oynadığı, ancak ilk yatırım bedeli ve ciro payı üzerinde etkisi olmadığı gösterilmiştir.

Keywords

Franchising, Girişimcilik, Yönetim Organizasyon, İşlem Maliyeti, Hizmet Sektörü

Strategic and Contractual Dynamics in Franchise Systems: An Analysis on Spanish Food and Beverage Industry

Abstract

This study aims to address strategic and contractual dynamics of franchising, in consideration of arguments of transaction cost theory and agency theory. By using pooled cross-sectional data on a sample of Spanish food and beverage franchise systems of year 2021, gathered from Guia de Franquicias manual, exploratory analyses on the effect of franchisors’ age and total size on their proportion of franchised units are conducted as a first step. Furthermore, the effects of characteristics of a franchise system - its age, total size, origin country and proportion of franchised units, on its franchising contract’s financial determinants – level of initial investment, entry fee, royalty rate and advertising rate, are hypothesized and analyzed. Proportion of franchised units’ correlations with both age and total size characteristics are found to be inverse U-shaped. By applying multiple regression method, it is shown that none of franchising characteristics, age, total size, being foreign and its proportion of franchised units, play a significant role on level of entry fees and royalty rates, but their effects on initial investment level and advertising rates are significant, except total size.

Keywords

Franchising, Entrepreneurship, Firm Organization, Transaction Costs, Services Industry

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