What did the Turkish Competition Authority Ignore in its First Hub-and-Spoke Cartel Decision?

Year 2023, Volume: 12 Issue: 1, 21 - 33, 26.01.2023

Emin Köksal Şahin Ardıyok

Abstract

Hub-and-spoke cartels have recently come under the spotlight of competition authorities. The Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) found five grocery retailers and a cooking oil supplier in breach of Article 4 of the Turkish competition act (the equivalent of Article 101 TFEU). In this article, we discuss some of the drawbacks and limitations of the TCA’s first hub-and-spoke cartel decision. We examine how failure to conduct a simple economic analysis misled the TCA in its theory of how the hub-and-spoke cartel was formed and in its treatment of retailers’ sequential price setting.

Keywords

Hub-and-spoke cartel, Turkish Competition Authority, Organized retail market

Rekabet Kurulu İlk Topla-Dağıt Karteli Kararında Neyi Göz Ardı Etti?

Abstract

Topla-dağıt kartelleri son zamanlarda rekabet otoritelerinin ilgi odağı haline geldi. Rekabet Kurulu (RK), beş perakendeci ve bir bitkisel yağ tedarikçisinin Rekabet Kanunu'nun 4. Maddesini (ABİHA'nın 101. Maddesinin eşdeğeri) ihlal ettiğini tespit etti. Bu makalede, RK'nın ilk topla-dağıt karteli kararının bazı eksiklik ve sınırlamalarını tartışıyoruz. Basit bir ekonomik analiz eksikliğinin, topla-dağıt karteli iddiasının değerlenedirilmesinde ve perakendecilerin sıralı fiyat geçişlerine ilişkin yaklaşımında RK'yı nasıl yanılttığını inceliyoruz.

Keywords

Rekabet Kurulu, Organize perakende pazarı, Topla-dağıt karteli

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