Evaluate the Existing Political Oversight Role of Turkish Parliament over the Public Finance and in This Context Analyzed the New Turkish Presidential Government System

Year 2018, Volume: 11 , 228 - 238, 01.12.2018

Mustafa Bıcer

Abstract

Turkey changed its 1982 Constitution
and adopted a presidential form of government in 2017. This constitutional
amendment changed the approval of the budget radically. Along with that,
debates may arise in terms of political responsibility for not approved the
budget by the Parliament, how the budget will accepted when the president and
majority of the Parliament are from different party, and there is not any
mechanism being in classical presidential system as public account committee to
enhance parliamentary supervision over the executive branch. In this study,

- we deliberate the concept of  political power in representative democracy
in terms of public decision-making and resource allocation process and then we
analyze the existing political oversight role of Turkish Parliament over the
public finance on the basis of 
democratic legitimacy of public decision-making process and political
accountability. 

- we focus on oversight role of
Turkish Parliament over the public finance at the point of using "power of
purse after the Constitutional Amendment adopted on April 16, 2017. Within the
context of this analysis, the new constitutional structure of Parliament's
budget approval and audit process in Turkish Parliament was evaluated.

Keywords

Political representation, Principal-agent theory, Political accountability, Governmental systems, 2017 constitutional amendment

References

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