The Role of Intelligence Organizations in Proxy Wars: The Case of Quds Force

Abstract

While proxy war is characterized by two or more actors aimed at a common purpose, the relationship between the two actors is hierarchical, and the main actor is involved in conflicts through another actor (principal-agent relationship) in order to avoid costly and bloody wars and to achieve his political purpose. It is usually the intelligence organizations of the principal actor that ensure the principal-agent relationship between actors in proxy wars. Intelligence agencies are responsible for coordinating all stages, including organizing, training, arming and conducting operational activities of agent actors. These duties of intelligence organizations in proxy wars make them “quarterbacks”, but besides that, intelligence organizations are basically based on “reasonable deniability”, because of that it makes the proxy wars discussed at the point of violation of sovereignty even more controversial. This study will examine the activities of intelligence organizations that make them quarterbacks and controversial in proxy wars and relationship between intelligence organizations and agent actors will be analyzed in depth. For this purpose, case study was conducted in the study, which is one of the qualitative research designs. For in-depth analysis, the Quds Force and its activities in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen have been selected as cases.

Keywords

• PROXY WARS
• INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
• IRAN
• QUDS FORCE

Vekâlet Savaşlarında İstihbarat Örgütlerinin Rolü: Kudüs Gücü Örneği

Abstract

Vekâlet savaşı, ortak bir amaca yönelik iki veya daha fazla aktörle karakterize edilmekle birlikte, iki aktör arasındaki ilişki hiyerarşiktir ve ana aktör, maliyetli ve kanlı savaşlardan kaçınmak ve politik amacına ulaşmak için başka bir aktör (asil-vekil ilişkisi) aracılığıyla çatışmalara dâhil olmaktadır. Vekâlet savaşlarında aktörler arasındaki asil-vekil ilişkisini sağlayan genelde asil aktörün istihbarat örgütleridir. İstihbarat örgütleri vekil aktörlerin örgütlendirilmesi, eğitilmesi, silahlandırılması ve harekât faaliyetlerinin yürütülmesi dâhil her türlü safhayı koordine etmekle görevlidirler. İstihbarat örgütlerinin vekâlet savaşlarındaki bu görevleri, onları “oyun kurucu” konumuna getirmenin yanı sıra, zaten temelde “makul inkâr edilebilirlik” üzerine kurulu olan ve egemenlik ihlali noktasında sorgulanan vekâlet savaşlarını daha da tartışmalı hale getirmektedir. Yapılan bu çalışmada da istihbarat örgütlerinin vekâlet savaşlarındaki oyun kurucu rolü ve vekâlet savaşlarını tartışmalı hale getiren söz konusu faaliyetleri incelenecek olup, istihbarat örgütleri ile vekil aktörler arasında nasıl bir ilişki olduğu derinlemesine analiz edilecektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden birisi olan vaka çalışması yapılmıştır. Derinlemesine analiz için örnek vaka olarak İran Devrim Muhafızları Ordusu Kudüs Gücü ve bu örgütün Lübnan, Irak, Suriye ve Yemen’deki faaliyetleri seçilmiştir. 

Keywords

• VEKALET SAVAŞLARI
• İSTİHBARAT ÖRGÜTLERİ
• İRAN
• KUDÜS GÜCÜ

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