China's Strategies Towards Institutional Reform: Creation of the AIIB and Its Development Success

Abstract

While existing studies largely focus on the implications of China-led new multilateral institutions to international order, the question of underlying reasons for the establishment of those institutions and their future development success have received less attention. China’s strategies towards institutional reform are mainly based on its dissatiffaction with asymmetrical distributional gains within existing multilateral institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). By using bargaining theory in international relations, this article contributes to explain the main conditions and mechanisms of the creation of Asian Infrasturucture Investment Bank (AIIB). In creating AIIB, China aims to increase its bargaining leverage which provides itself direct and indirect benefits vis-a-vis the costs emanating from intensified strategic competition with the US. Thus, it is argued that China’s expectation of success reinforced by direct and indirect benefits for the development of AIIB reflects both the significant motivations underpinning its creation and also the possibility of extended institutional reform into other multilateral regimes. Within the context of power transition, the political bargaining process in reforming existing multilateral regimes is likely to be shaped by the tension between minilateralist strategies of rising powers and truly multilateral operations within newly emerging financial regime.

Keywords

• China,Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),Distributional Conflict,Institutional Reform,Bargaining

Çin’in Kurumsal Reforma Yönelik Stratejileri: AAYB’nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişimindeki Başarı

Abstract

Mevcut çalışmaların pek çoğu Çin’in liderlik ettiği yeni çok taraflı kurumların uluslararası düzen üzerinde yaratacağı etkilere odaklanırken, bu kurumların kuruluşunun altında yatan nedenler ve gelişimlerinde gösterdikleri başarı konusu yeterince dikkate alınmamaktadır. Çin’in kurumsal reforma yönelik stratejileri en temelde Dünya Bankası ve İMF gibi mevcut çok taraflı kurumlarda var olan asimetrik dağılımsal kazanımlardan duyduğu hoşnutsuzluğa dayanmaktadır. Bu makale uluslararası ilişkilerde pazarlık teorisinden faydalanarak Asya Altyapı ve Yatırım Bankası (AAYB)’nın kurulmasında etkili olan ana koşulların ve mekanizmaların açıklanmasına katkı sunmaktadır. Çin, AAYB’nin kurulmasına öncülük ederek ABD ile yoğunlaşan stratejik rekabetinden kaynaklanan maliyetler karşısında kendisine doğrudan ve dolaylı faydalar sağlayarak pazarlık gücünü artırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çin’in edindiği doğrudan ve dolaylı faydalarla pekişen başarı beklentisi, AAYB’nin kuruluşunun altında yatan ana motivasyonları yansıttığı gibi diğer çok taraflı rejimleri de içine alan daha kapsamlı bir kurumsal reform ihtimalini de gündeme getirmektedir. Ancak, güç geçişi bağlamında mevcut çok taraflı kurumların reforme edilmesinde yaşanan politik pazarlık sürecinin, yükselen güçlerin mini taraflı stratejileri ile hakiki çok taraflı uygulamalar arasında var olan gerilime dayalı olarak şekillenmesi kuvvetle muhtemeldir.

Keywords

• Çin,Altyapı ve Yatırım Bankası (AAYB),Dağılımsal Çatışma,Kurumsal Reform,Pazarlık

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