Modern Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri Teorisi: Rasyonel Beklentileri İçeren Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri

Year 2005, Volume: 1 Issue: 19, 325 - 339, 01.12.2005

Levent Cinko

Abstract

Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri Teorisi taraftarlarına göre siyasal iktidarlar miyopik seçmenleri kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda yönlendirebilirler. Ancak rasyonel beklentiler görüşünün popüler olması ile birlikte bu iddia ciddi anlamda eleştiriye uğramıştır. Bu durum Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri Teorisi’nin gelişimini kısa süreli de olsa sekteye uğratmıştır. Ancak gerek gelişmiş gerekse gelişmekte olan ülke verilerini test eden ampirik çalışmalar rasyonel davranış varsayımının geçerli olması halinde de Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri Teorisi’nin açıklayıcı olabileceğine ilişkin pozitif bulgular elde etmişlerdir. Yeni dönemde yapılan çalışmalar literatürün modern yaklaşım olarak ifade edilen konumunda yer almaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı modern yaklaşım içerisinde yer alan teorileri sistematize ederek analiz etmektir

Keywords

Modern Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri Rasyonel Fırsatçı Model Rasyonel Partizan Model Ekonomi ile Siyaset Arasındaki İlişki

References

• Alesina, Alberto, (1988a), “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters”, The American Economic Review, 78/4, 796- 805.
• Alesina,Alberto, (1988b), “Macroeconomics and Politic”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Ed. by:Stanley Fischer, The MIT Press.
• Alesina, Alberto ve Sachs, Jeffrey, (1988b), “ Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984”, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 20/1, 62-82.
• Alesina, Alberto, (1989), “Politics and Business Cycle in Industrial Democracies”, Economic Policy, 8, 55-98 .
• Alesina, Alberto, Londregan John ve Rosenthal Howard, (1993), “A Model of the Political Economy of the United States”, American Political Science Review, 87/1, 12-33.
• Alesina, Alberto, (1995a) “Election, Party Structure, and The Economy” Modern Political Economy, in Ed. by: Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek, Cambridge Uni., 145-170
• Alesina, Alberto, (1995b), “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game”, Monetary and Fiscal Policy, 2, Politics in Ed.by: Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The MIT Press, 71-98.
• Arnold, Lutz, G., (2002), Business Cycle Theory, Oxford Uni. Press.
• Baleiras, Rui Nuno ve Santos, Vaco, (2000), “Behavioral and Institutional Determinants of Political Business Cycles”, Public Choice,104, 121-147.
• Balke, Nathan S., (1991), “ Partisanship Theory Macroeconomic Outcomes and Endogenous Elections”, Southern Economic Journal, 57/4, 920-935.
• Barro, Robert ve Gordon David, (1983), “ A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Naturel Rate Model”, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589-610.
• Chappel Henry W. Ve Keech, William R.,(1986), “Party Difference in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes”, The American Economic Review, 76/2, 71-74.
• Chappel Henry W. ve Keech, William R.,(1988), “The Unemployment Rate Consequences of Partisan Monetary Policies”, Southern Economic Journal, 5/1, 107-122.
• Ellis, Christopher ve Thoma Mark A., (1991), “Partisan Effect in Economies with Variable Electoral Terms”, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 4,728- 74l.
• Garfinkel, Michelle R. ve Glazer, Amihai , (1994), “Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuation?”, The American Economic Review, 84, 169- 173.
• Heckelman, Jac C.,(2001), “ Partisan Business Cycles under Variable Election Dates”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 23/1, 261-275.
• Heckelman, Jac C., (2002), Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: Theory and Some Evidence”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 35/3, 2002, 568- 585.
• Heidhues, Paul ve Lagerlöf, Johan, (2003), “Hiding Information in Electoral Competition”, Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 48-74.
• Katsimi, Margarita, (1999), “Election and the Size of the Public Sector”, European Journal of Political Economy,15, 441-444.
• Klein, Michael, (1996), “Timing is All : Elections and the Duration of United States Business Cycles”, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 28/1, 84- 101.
• Kydland, Finn ve Prescot,Edward,(1977), “ RuIes Rather Than Discretion :The
• lnconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Journal of Political Economy, 85,473-492.
• Lohmann, Susanne, (1998), “Rationalizing The Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model”, Economics and Politics, 10/1, 1-17.
• Özkan, GüIçin F., (1998), “Partisan Business and Budget Cycles with Separate Fiscaland Monetary Authorities”, The Manchester School, 66/2, 178-195.
• Palmer, Harvey D. ve Whitten Guy D., (2000), “Government Competence Economic Performance and Endogenous Election Dates”, Electoral Studies, 19, 413-426.
• Persson, Torsten ve Tabellini, Guido, (1999), “Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy”, Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1, Ed. by:John B.Taylor and Michael Woodford, Elsevier, 1397-1482.
• Rogoff, Kenneth ve Sibert, Anne,(1988), “Election and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles”, Review of Economic Studies, 1-16.
• Rogoff, Kenneth, (1990), “Equilibrium Political Budget Cyles”, The American Economic Review, March ,21-36.
• Stein, Ernesto H. and Streb, Jorge M., (1998), “ PoliticaI Stabilization Cycles in High-Inflation Economies”, Journal of Development Economics, 56,159- 180.
• Stein, Ernesto H. Ve Streb, Jorge M., (2004), “Elections and the Timing of Devaluations”, Journal of International Economics, 63, 119-145.
• Snowdon, Brian ve Vane, Howard R., (1999), “The New Political Macroeconomics: An Interview with Alberto Alesina”, American Economist, 43/1, 19-34.
• Tabellini, Guido ve Alesina, Alberto, (1990), “Voting on the Budget Deficit”, The American Economic Review, 80/1, 37-49.
• Veiga, Linda Gonçalves ve Chappell, JR., (2002), “Politics and Unemployment in Industrialized Democracies”, Public Choice, 110, 261-282.