YÖNETİM KURULU DENEYİMİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI: BİST100 UYGULAMASI

Abstract

CEO ve icra kurulu firmanın günlük operasyonlarıyla ilgiliyken, yönetim kurulu firmanın uzun vadeli hedeflerine ulaşmasını sağlamaktan ve firmanın genel performansından sorumludur. Yönetim kurulunun tüm bu görev ve sorumluluklarını yerine getirebilmesi için mevcut firma ve sektör hakkında uzmanlaşmış ve deneyim sahibi yöneticilere sahip olması gerekir. Bu, yönetim kurulunun firma hakkında bilinçli kararlar vermek için gerekli bilgi ve deneyime sahip olmasını ve firmanın uzun vadeli başarısı için önemli olan istikrarı sağlar. Bu çalışmanın amacı, yönetim kurulu deneyiminin firma performansı üzerine etkisini araştırmaktır. Bu kapsamda, 2018-2020 yılları arasında BİST100’ de işlem gören finansal olmayan firmalardan elde edilmiş 220 adet gözlem kullanılarak regresyon analizi yapılmış ve yönetim kurulu deneyiminin firma performansı üzerine etkisi araştırılmıştır. Yönetim kurulu deneyimi, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin mevcut firmadaki ortalama görev süresi, mevcut firmanın yer aldığı sektördeki ortalama deneyimi ve ortalama yaşı ile ölçülmüştür. Firma performansı ise, aktif karlılığı, öz sermaye karlılığı ve hisse başına kar ile ölçülmüştür. Çalışmanın bulguları, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin mevcut firmanın yer aldığı sektördeki ortalama deneyiminin firma performansı ile pozitif, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin ortalama yaşının ise negatif ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu sonuçlar, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin deneyiminin firma performansını etkileyen önemli bir özellik olduğunu ve yönetim kurulu üyeleri belirlenirken bu özelliğin mutlaka göz önünde bulundurulması gerektiğini göstermektedir.

Keywords

• Yönetim Kurulu
• Deneyim
• Sektörel Deneyim
• Yaş
• Firma Performansı

BOARD TENURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: AN APPLICATION IN THE BIST 100

Abstract

While the CEO and executive board are involved with the day-to-day operations of the firm, the board of directors is responsible for ensuring the firm achieves its long-term goals and the overall performance of the firm. In order for the board of directors to fulfill all these duties and responsibilities, it should have managers who are specialized and tenured about the current firm and sector. This ensures that the board has the necessary knowledge and experience to make informed decisions about the firm, and ensures the stability that is essential to the long-term success of the firm. The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of board tenure on firm performance. In this context, a regression analysis was conducted using 220 observations obtained from non-financial companies traded in BIST100 between 2018-2020 and the effect of board of directors experience on firm performance was investigated. Board tenure is measured by the average tenure of board members at the current firm, their average tenure in the current firm's industry, and their average age. Firm performance is measured by return on assets, return on equity and earnings per share. The findings of the study show that the average board tenure in the industry in which the current firm is located is positively related to the firm performance, and the average age of the board members is negatively related. These results show that the board tenure is an important feature that affects the performance of the firm and this feature must be taken into account when determining the members of the board of directors.

Keywords

• Board of Directors
• Tenure
• Industry Tenure
• Age
• Firm Performance

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