SOYUT GÖNDERME PROBLEMİ

Year 2015, Issue: 61, 106 - 126, 15.07.2015

Ahmet Eyim

Abstract

Soyut gönderme problemi tümeller probleminin içerdiği problemlerden
biri ve soyut tekil terimlerin gönderimini nasıl anladığımızla ilgilidir.
“Kırmızı” ve “üçgen” gibi soyut tekil terimler doğru önermelerde yer
aldıklarında nesnelere işaret ediyor gibi görünürler. Soyut tekil terimlerin
gönderimi neyedir? Soyut gönderme problemine ilişkin yeterli görüş, soyut
tekil terimlerin gönderimlerinin ne olduğunu açıklamak zorundadır.
Adcılar, Metafiziksel Gerçekçiler ve Trop Adcıları arasında bu konuda bir
uzlaşım yoktur. Gerçekçilik soyut tekil terimlerin tümellere işaret ettiğini
iddia ederken, Trop Kuramı onların trop kümelerine işaret ettiğini kabul
eder. Diğer taraftan, Adcılık soyut gönderme problemine çözüm sunmakta
bazı güçlükler içindedir.
Bu çalışmada soyut gönderme problemi Adcılık, Trop Kuramı ve
Gerçekçilik açısından incelenecek ve kendi konumları açısından geçerli
argümanlar sunan bu yaklaşımlar tartışılacaktır.

Keywords

Soyut tekil terim, Adcılık, Trop Kuramı, Gerçekçilik, Tümeller Problemi

The Problem Of Abstract Reference

Abstract

The problem of abstract reference is one of the problems which the
problem of universals involve and is related to how we understand the
reference of ‘abstract singular terms’. Abstract singular terms like ‘red’
and ‘triangularity’ appear within true sentences and they seem to denote
objects. What abstract singular terms will denote? Any adequate theory of
abstract reference must explicate what abstract singular terms will denote.
There is no consensus on this question between Nominalist, Metaphysical
Realist and Trope Nominalist. Realists claim that abstract singular terms
stand for universals, and for Trope theory, they designate class of tropes.
On the other hand, Nominalism will be in a difficulty to provide an answer
to the problem of abstract reference.
In this study, it is examined the problem of abstract reference from
perspectives of Nominalism, Trope theory and Realism and also is discussed
these accounts which all have valid arguments for their own position.

Keywords

Abstract Singular Term, Nominalism, Trope Theory, Realism and Problem of Universals

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