ON THE DEFENSIBILITY OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS IN CRITICAL THEORIES OF BEARDSLEY AND ISENBERG

Year 2022, , 443 - 461, 21.05.2022

Nil Avcı

https://doi.org/10.53844/flsf.1066599

Abstract

In the 20th century one of the most controversial questions in aesthetics for American philosophers is the question of the defensibility of aesthetic judgments. The main reason is that its answer determines whether aesthetic criticism can be a well-founded intellectual enterprise or not. Monroe C. Beardsley is one of the American philosophers who believe that aesthetic evaluations are defensible and he proposes a rationalist theory of objective criticism. According to him, there are normative principles governing aesthetic evaluations and critics can justify their critical verdicts on the artworks by inferring their evaluations from these principles. With regard to this proposal, the questions are as follows: Can such a rationalist theory maintain the essential feature of the aesthetic judgment which demands an internal response, a particular feeling, in addition to its cognitive aspect? If not, can there be an alternative theory for the defensibility of aesthetic evolutions which saves its essential emotive ingredient? In this paper, these questions will be responded to by examining Beardsley’s theory and its critical rejection by Arnold Isenberg. As a result, it will be demonstrated that Isenberg formulates the alternative theory which gives equal weight in aesthetic criticism both to the internal emotive aspect and to the validity of an aesthetic judgment.

Keywords

Aesthetic criticism, Aesthetic judgment, Aesthetic value, Critical communication, Community of feeling

BEARDSLEY VE ISENBERG’İN ELEŞTİREL KURAMLARINDA ESTETİK YARGILARIN SAVUNULABİLİRLİĞİ ÜZERİNE

Abstract

Yirminci yüzyılda estetik alanında Amerikan filozofları arasında en çok anlaşmazlığa sebep olan sorulardan biri estetik yargıların savunulabilirliğine dair sorudur. Bunun asıl sebebi, sorunun cevabının estetik eleştirinin sağlam zeminli bir entelektüel faaliyet olup olmadığını belirleyecek olmasıdır. Monroe C. Beardsley estetik değerlendirmelerin savunulabileceğine inanan, nesnel ve rasyonel bir estetik eleştiri kuramı öne süren Amerikan filozoflarından biridir. Ona göre estetik değerlendirmeleri kapsayan normatif ilkeler vardır ve eleştirmen sanat eserinin değerine dair estetik kararını bu ilkelerden çıkarsayarak gerekçelendirebilir. Bu iddiaya dair sorulması gereken sorular şunlardır: Böylesi bir rasyonel kuram estetik yargıların bilişsel boyutuna eklenen ve onun ayırt edici asli özelliğini oluşturan belirli bir duygu ya da içsel bir tepki gerekliliğini muhafaza edebilir mi? Eğer edemezse, estetik yargıları duygusal içeriğinden, yani estetik değerin hissedilmesi gerekliliğinden koparmayacak ama buna rağmen onların rasyonel savunulabilirliğini ileri sürecek başka bir kuram mümkün müdür? Bu makalede bu soruların cevapları Beardsley’in kuramı incelenerek ve kuramın Arnold Isenberg tarafından sunulan eleştirel reddi çözümlenerek verilecektir. Netice itibarıyla Isenberg’in, estetik yargıların hem duygusal boyutuna hem de geçerlilik talebine eşit ağırlık veren bir estetik eleştiri kuramı ortaya koyduğu gösterilecektir.

Keywords

Estetik eleştiri, Estetik yargı, Estetik değer, Duygu ortaklığı, Eleştirel iletişim

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