QUINE’IN FELSEFESİNDE SÜREKLİLİK TEZİNİN GERÇEK ANLAMI NEDİR?

Öz

Süreklilik tezi (ST); bilim, sağduyu ve felsefe arasındaki benzerliklerin, rakiplerinin iddia edebileceğinden çok daha fazla olduğunu öne sürmez. Quinecı motivasyon altında ST, felsefenin nasıl yapılacağına ilişkin normatif bir fikir önermek için kullanılır; ST felsefe, sağduyu ve bilim arasındaki gerçek ilişkiler hakkında, bunların tarihsel ve gelişimsel kökenleri dışında, tanımlayıcı bir tez değildir. ST, öncelikle bilim ve bilim dışı arasındaki benzerlikler üzerine tanımlayıcı bir tez değildir. Bununla birlikte, ST kendisiyle yakından ilişkili başka bir tanımlayıcı teze dayanmaktadır: ortadan başlamak. Bilimsel olsun ya da olmasın, insani ve hayvani tüm düşünceler, miras alınan bir bilgi yığınından, varsayımlardan ve onu çevreleyen genel bir çerçeveden başlar. Kozmik sürgün, Arşimet noktası ve "hiçbir yerden görüş" yoktur. Bu, Quine için bir gözlemdir ve onun analitik ve sentetik önermeler arasındaki ayrıma karşı saldırısının temelini oluşturur; holizm ve ampirizm savunması, kombinasyon halinde Quinecı natüralizmi bize verir. Bu nedenle ST, Quinecı natüralizminin nihai ifadesi olarak düşünülmelidir ve bilim, sağduyu ve felsefe arasındaki büyük farklılıkları, hatta bazen büyük karşıtlığı göstererek geçersiz kılınamaz. ST mevcut bilim anlayışında önemli bir değişiklik olmaksızın felsefenin bilime asimile edilmesi gerektiği anlamına da gelmez.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• süreklilik tezi
• ortadan başlamak
• kozmik sürgün
• sağduyu
• bilimin kapsamı

WHAT DOES THE CONTINUITY THESIS REALLY MEAN IN QUINE’S PHILOSOPHY?

Abstract

The continuity thesis (CT) does not suggest that the similarities between science, common sense, and philosophy are much more than its opponents might claim. Under its Quinean motivation, CT is used to suggest a normative idea concerning how to do philosophy; it is not a descriptive thesis about the actual relationships between philosophy, common sense, and science, except the historical and developmental origins of them. CT is not primarily a descriptive thesis on the similarities between science and non-science. It is, however, based upon another descriptive, closely related thesis: starting from the middle. All thought, human and animal, scientific or not, begins from an inherited mass of knowledge, assumptions, and a surrounding general framework. There is no cosmic exile, Archimedean point, and “view from nowhere.” This is an observation for Quine and underlies his attack against the analytic and the synthetic distinction; his defense of holism and of empiricism which in combination yields Quinean naturalism. Thus, CT should be considered as the ultimate expression of Quinean naturalism and cannot be invalidated by showing the vast differences, even occasionally outright opposition, between science, common sense, and philosophy. Neither does it imply that philosophy must be assimilated into science without a substantial shift in the present notion of science.

Keywords

• The continuity thesis
• Quine
• starting from the middle
• cosmic exile
• common sense
• scope of science

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