JOHN RAWLS AHLAKI DUYGULAR ÜZERINE: SUÇLULUK VE UTANÇ

Abstract

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, John Rawls’un suçluluk ve utanç hakkındaki görüşlerini incelemek ve ahlaki gelişim teorisi ile istikrar sorunu arasındaki ilişkiyi kısaca gözden geçirmektir. Öncelikle konunun tam olarak ortaya konabilmesi için Etik’te ahlaki duygular üzerine geliştirilen temel görüşlerin ana hatlarıyla ortaya konması önemlidir. Bu nedenle, çalışmanın ilk bölümünde Jonathan Haidt tarafından geliştirilen dört ahlaki duygu ailesi ve utanç ile suçluluk arasındaki temel farklılıklar incelenecektir. İkinci bölümde John Rawls’ın ahlaki suçluluk duygusunun gelişimine ilişkin teorisi ve utanç üzerine düşünceleri incelenecektir. Çalışmanın son bölümünde ise Rawls’un bireylerin ahlaki gelişimine ilişkin teorisi ve istikrar sorunuyla bağlantılı olarak adalet duygusu edinmenin önkoşulları ana hatlarıyla incelenecektir.

Keywords

• John Rawls
• ahlaki duygular
• suçluluk
• utanç
• ahlaki gelişim
• adalet duygusu
• istikrar sorunu

JOHN RAWLS ON MORAL EMOTIONS: GUILT AND SHAME

Abstract

The main purpose of this work is to examine John Rawls’ views on guilt and shame, as well as briefly review the relationship between his theory of moral development and the problem of stability. First of all, in order to fully reveal the subject, it is important to outline the central views on moral emotions developed in Ethics. So, in the first part of the work, four families of moral emotions developed by Jonathan Haidt and the principal differences between shame and guilt will be studied. The second part will examine John Rawls’ theory of the development of the moral sense of guilt, as well as his reflections on shame. In the final part of the work, Rawls’ theory of the moral development of individuals and the prerequisites for acquiring a sense of justice in conjunction with the problem of stability will be studied in main terms.

Keywords

• John Rawls
• moral emotions
• guilt
• shame
• moral development
• the sense of justice
• the problem of stability

References

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