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“Two Faces of Science” in Émile Meyerson

Year 2009, Issue: 7, 163 - 172, 01.04.2009

Abstract

Émile Meyerson states that it must be kept in the mind that a research is always dominated by preconceived ideas, that is, by theories and hypotheses; in fact, these are vital in guiding our advance. Thus, we are never entirely free from them. Were we to search for our own beliefs, we should figure out that we ourselves are dependent upon these notions. Meyerson conceived the history of science as a continuing search for that which is conserved throughout change because the essential aim of science is explanatory, aiming at identity and also the history of science to which we appeal is especially for the history of the governing ideas in science. As Meyerson has it, science does have two correlative activities: the one descriptive and the other explanatory. The first of these activities he calls “legal science”, while to the second he gives the name explanatory or “causal science”. For him, “the positivist project” is truly mythical since the ontological character of scientific explanation is inevitable and what is more is that the positivist project seems to confound law and cause. Thus, this paper is an attempt to set forth in the philosophy of science of Meyerson that what science really seeks is, not “laws”, but “causes”

References

  • BOAS, George. (1968), A Critical Analysis of the Philosophy of Emile Meyerson, Greenwood Press, New York. Ibid., ss. 390-391. Ibid., s. 401.
  • BOCHENSKI, J.M. (1968), The Methods of Contemporary Thought, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York.
  • BOCHENSKI, J.M. (2008), Çağdaş Düşünme Yöntemleri, (Çev. Talip kabadayı-Mustafa Irmak), BilgeSu Yayıncılık, Ankara.
  • DUHEM, Pierre. (1954), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
  • DUHEM, Pierre. (1991), German Science, (trans. John Lyon), Open Court, La Salle.
  • KELLY, Thomas R. (1937), Explanation and Reality in the Philosophy of Emile Meyerson, Princeton University Press , Princeton.
  • KUHN, Thomas S. (1970), The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
  • LA LUMIA, Joseph. (1966), The Ways of Reason, Humanities Press, New York.
  • LOSEE, John. (1993), A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
  • MEYERSON, Emile. (1930), Identity & Reality, (Çev.) Kate Loewenberg, The Macmillan Company, New York.
  • O’HEAR, Anthony. (1990), An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

ÉMILE MEYERSON’DA “İKİ BİLİM”

Year 2009, Issue: 7, 163 - 172, 01.04.2009

Abstract

Émile Meyerson’a göre bir araştırmada hep peşin hükümler, eş deyişle, kuram ve varsayımlar egemendir ve aslında bunlar ilerlememize rehberlik eden onsuz olmaz şeylerdir. Şu halde, peşin hükümlerden asla tamamen azade değiliz. İnanç ve kanılarımızı incelediğimizde, bu kavramlara bağlı olduğumuzu açıkça görebiliriz. Meyerson bilim tarihini değişende değişmeden aynı kalan şeyin durmaksızın soruşturulması olarak tasarlar, zira bilimin asli hedefi açıklamadır, bu da özdeşliğe varmak demektir; bilim tarihi hem de bilimdeki egemen fikirlerin tarihinin incelenmesidir. Meyerson için bilim birbiriyle ilgili iki etkinlik olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır: bir yanıyla betimleyici; bir yanıyla açıklayıcı bir etkinlik. Meyerson bu etkinliklerden ilkine “yasalı bilim” derken ikincisini “nedensel bilim” olarak nitelendirir. Ona göre “pozitivist tasarı” aslında bir söylencedir çünkü bilimsel açıklamanın ontolojik özelliğinden kaçınılamaz; dahası, pozitivist tasarı yasa ile nedeni birbirine karıştırmaktadır. İşte bu çalışma, Meyerson’ın bilim felsefesinde bilimin asıl peşinde olduğu şeyin “yasalar” değil “nedenler” olduğunu gözler önüne serme çabasıdır

References

  • BOAS, George. (1968), A Critical Analysis of the Philosophy of Emile Meyerson, Greenwood Press, New York. Ibid., ss. 390-391. Ibid., s. 401.
  • BOCHENSKI, J.M. (1968), The Methods of Contemporary Thought, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York.
  • BOCHENSKI, J.M. (2008), Çağdaş Düşünme Yöntemleri, (Çev. Talip kabadayı-Mustafa Irmak), BilgeSu Yayıncılık, Ankara.
  • DUHEM, Pierre. (1954), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
  • DUHEM, Pierre. (1991), German Science, (trans. John Lyon), Open Court, La Salle.
  • KELLY, Thomas R. (1937), Explanation and Reality in the Philosophy of Emile Meyerson, Princeton University Press , Princeton.
  • KUHN, Thomas S. (1970), The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
  • LA LUMIA, Joseph. (1966), The Ways of Reason, Humanities Press, New York.
  • LOSEE, John. (1993), A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
  • MEYERSON, Emile. (1930), Identity & Reality, (Çev.) Kate Loewenberg, The Macmillan Company, New York.
  • O’HEAR, Anthony. (1990), An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
There are 11 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Journal Section Research Article
Authors

Talip Kabadayı This is me

Publication Date April 1, 2009
Published in Issue Year 2009 Issue: 7

Cite

Chicago Kabadayı, Talip. “ÉMILE MEYERSON’DA ‘İKİ BİLİM’”. FLSF Felsefe Ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 7 (April 2009): 163-72.

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