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BİLİMSEL TANIMLARIN ÖZELLİKLERİ VE İŞLEMSELCİ TANIMLARA EMPİRİK İÇERİK BAKIMINDAN HEMPEL’İN ELEŞTİRİSİ

Year 2019, Issue: 28, 421 - 438, 29.12.2019

Abstract

Bilimsel kavramlar,
bilimsel açıklamaların yapılandırılmasında temel bir görev üstlenmektedirler.
Bilimsel açıklamalarda kavramları merkez alan en önemli sözcük bağlamlarından
biri tanım tümceleridir. Bu tanımlar, bilimde kavramların başlıca kullanış
özelliklerine göre sınıflandırılabilmektedir. Bu sınıflandırmada yorumlayıcı
tanım tümcelerinin bir başka yorumu ‘işlemselci tanımları’ Hempel, belli başlı
nedenlerden ötürü reddetmektedir. Bu çalışmada Hempel’e göre bilimsel
tanımların sınıflandırılmasının özellikleri ve işlemselci tanımlara özellikle
empirik içerik bakımından Hempel’in yaptığı eleştiriler değerlendirilmiştir.

References

  • Beiser, Arthur, Modern Fiziğin Kavramları, Çev. Gülsen Önengüt, İstanbul: Akademi Yayınları, 1997
  • Earman, John; Salmon, Wesley, “The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses” Introduction to Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999
  • Bridgman, P. W., The Logic of Modern Physics, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927
  • Einstein, A.; Infeld, L., Fiziğin Evrimi, Çev. S. Turgal, Ankara: Alter Yayıncılık, 2015
  • Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983
  • Heisenberg, Werner, Fizik ve Felsefe, Çev. Yılmaz Öner, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2000
  • Heller, Michael, Philosophy in Science, New York: Springer, 2011
  • Hempel, Carl, “A Note on Semantic Realism’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Apr., 1950), s. 169-173.
  • Hempel, Carl, Doğa Bilim Felsefesi, Çev. İ. Özkan; T. Kabadayı, Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2015
  • Hempel, Carl, “Two Models of Scientific Explanation”, Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 45-55.
  • Hempel, Carl and Oppenheim, Paul, “A Definition of Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 12, No. 2. (Apr., 1945), s. 98-115.
  • Kelvin W. T., "Electirical Units of Measurement" A Lecture to the Instition of Energineers, 3 May 1883 in Popular Lectures and Addresses (London, 1889) v. I, 73.
  • Kitcher, Philip, “Explanatory Unification and Causal Structure”, Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 71-91.
  • Kitcher, Philip, “Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change” Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 163-187.
  • McMullin, Ernan, “A Case for Scientific Realism”, Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 248-280.
  • Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten. “Hume’un Metafizik Eleştirisi: Safsata ve İllüzyona Karşı Metafiziğin Konumu”, Uluslararası İstanbul Felsefe Kongresi Bildiri Kitabı, Cilt 3, İstanbul: Mantık Derneği Yayınları, s. 77-87.
  • Poznański, Edward. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 23, no. 3, 1958, pp. 353–354. Rosenberg, Alex, Bilim Felsefesi, Çev. İ. Yıldız, Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2014
  • Rosenberg, Alex, Philosopy of Science, New York: Routledge, 2005
  • Yıldırım, Cemal, Ansiklopedik Çağdaş Felsefe Sözlüğü, İstanbul: Doruk Yayımcılık, 2004
  • Uygur, Nermi, Dil Yönünden Fizik Felsefesi, İstanbul: İ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1979

PROPERTIES OF SCIENTIFIC DEFINITIONS AND HEMPEL'S CRITIQUES OF OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS, IN TERMS OF EMPIRICAL CONTENT

Year 2019, Issue: 28, 421 - 438, 29.12.2019

Abstract

Scientific concepts play a fundamental role in structuring scientific
explanations. One of the most important word contexts centered on concepts in
scientific explanations are definition sentences. These definitions can be
classified according to the main usage properties of concepts in science. In this
classification, Hempel rejects ‘operational definitions’ which is another
interpretation of the operational definition phrases for certain reasons. This
study evaluates, the features of classification of scientific definitions according
to Hempel and Hempel's critiques of operational definitions, especially in terms
of empirical content. As a result of this assessment, we drew attention the
problems that arose in structuring scientific explanations through operational
definitions. Coming up with solutions to these problems addresses to the
necessity of a new theory of understanding in terms of the use of concepts in
theory by definition. 

References

  • Beiser, Arthur, Modern Fiziğin Kavramları, Çev. Gülsen Önengüt, İstanbul: Akademi Yayınları, 1997
  • Earman, John; Salmon, Wesley, “The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses” Introduction to Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999
  • Bridgman, P. W., The Logic of Modern Physics, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927
  • Einstein, A.; Infeld, L., Fiziğin Evrimi, Çev. S. Turgal, Ankara: Alter Yayıncılık, 2015
  • Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983
  • Heisenberg, Werner, Fizik ve Felsefe, Çev. Yılmaz Öner, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2000
  • Heller, Michael, Philosophy in Science, New York: Springer, 2011
  • Hempel, Carl, “A Note on Semantic Realism’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Apr., 1950), s. 169-173.
  • Hempel, Carl, Doğa Bilim Felsefesi, Çev. İ. Özkan; T. Kabadayı, Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2015
  • Hempel, Carl, “Two Models of Scientific Explanation”, Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 45-55.
  • Hempel, Carl and Oppenheim, Paul, “A Definition of Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 12, No. 2. (Apr., 1945), s. 98-115.
  • Kelvin W. T., "Electirical Units of Measurement" A Lecture to the Instition of Energineers, 3 May 1883 in Popular Lectures and Addresses (London, 1889) v. I, 73.
  • Kitcher, Philip, “Explanatory Unification and Causal Structure”, Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 71-91.
  • Kitcher, Philip, “Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change” Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 163-187.
  • McMullin, Ernan, “A Case for Scientific Realism”, Philosophy of Science Contemporary Readings, Edited by Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002, s. 248-280.
  • Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten. “Hume’un Metafizik Eleştirisi: Safsata ve İllüzyona Karşı Metafiziğin Konumu”, Uluslararası İstanbul Felsefe Kongresi Bildiri Kitabı, Cilt 3, İstanbul: Mantık Derneği Yayınları, s. 77-87.
  • Poznański, Edward. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 23, no. 3, 1958, pp. 353–354. Rosenberg, Alex, Bilim Felsefesi, Çev. İ. Yıldız, Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2014
  • Rosenberg, Alex, Philosopy of Science, New York: Routledge, 2005
  • Yıldırım, Cemal, Ansiklopedik Çağdaş Felsefe Sözlüğü, İstanbul: Doruk Yayımcılık, 2004
  • Uygur, Nermi, Dil Yönünden Fizik Felsefesi, İstanbul: İ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1979
There are 20 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Semra Uçar

Publication Date December 29, 2019
Submission Date August 21, 2019
Acceptance Date December 28, 2019
Published in Issue Year 2019 Issue: 28

Cite

Chicago Uçar, Semra. “BİLİMSEL TANIMLARIN ÖZELLİKLERİ VE İŞLEMSELCİ TANIMLARA EMPİRİK İÇERİK BAKIMINDAN HEMPEL’İN ELEŞTİRİSİ”. FLSF Felsefe Ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 28 (December 2019): 421-38.

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