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IS SEXTUS EMPIRICUS’ EPİSTEMELOGICAL STRUGGLE AGAİNST DOGMATISM DEFENSIBLE?

Year 2020, Issue: 29, 369 - 389, 16.05.2020

Abstract

Sextus Empiricus, a follower of Pyrrhon, has argued that there are two types of philosophy, dogmatism and skepticism, and has conducted a general investigation on skepticism which is positioned as opposed to dogmatism. The main concern of his investigation is to reveal skepticism in every aspect and separate it from dogmatic philosophies, because dogmatism is the pseudo-philosophy that is said to be a philosophy while skepticism is a real philosophy. Sextus is in a skeptical struggle with such supposed philosophies. In this study, Sextus' skeptical arguments against dogmatism will be discussed and the epistemological foundations of the arguments he put forward during his struggle with dogmatism will be revealed. These are equipollence (isostheneia), suspension of judgment (epokhê), and tranquillity (ataraxia). After examining skepticism's attack on dogmatism with this epistemological foundations within the framework of the reality-appearance problem and the criteria problem, it will be argued that this attack has untenable sides.

References

  • Alican, Necip Fikri, “No more this than that: skeptical impression or Pyrrhonian dogma?”, ΣΧΟΛΗ (Schole): Anticient Philosophy and The Classical Tradition (Ed. Eugene V. Afonasin), Volume 11, Issue 1, 2017, 7-61.
  • Annas, Julia&Barnes, Jonathan, TheModes of Scepticism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997.
  • Barnes, Jonathan, “The Belief of a Pyrrhonist”, The Cambridge Classical Journal,Volume 28/January, 1982, 1-29.
  • Barnes, Jonathan, “Sextan Scepticism”, in Maieusis: Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, Ed. Dominic Scott, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, 322-335.
  • Beyaz Erkızan, Hatice Nur, Aristoteles Yazıları: Feminizm ve Aristotelesçi Feminizm Üzerine, Sentez, İstanbul, 2012.
  • Brennan, Tad, Ethics and Epistemology in Sextus Empiricus, Routledge, New York and London, 2015.
  • Eichorn, Roger E., “How (Not) To Read Sextus Empiricus”, Anticient Philosophy 34, 2014, 121-149.
  • Frede, Michael, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987.
  • Grgić, Filip, “Investigate and Suspensive Scepticism”, European Journal of Philosophy 22:4, 2012, 653-673.
  • Hegel, G. W. Friedrich, Felsefe Tarihi: Platon’dan Ortaçağ Felsefesine, Çev. Doğan Barış Kılınç, Cilt 2, Notabene Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019.
  • Iannone, A. Pablo, Dictionary of World Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 2001.
  • Liddell, Henry George & Scott, Robert, A Greek-English Lexicon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
  • Massie, Pascal, “Philosophy and Ataraxia in Sextus Empiricus”, Peitho/Examina Antiqua 1 (4), 2003, 211-234.
  • Öymen, Örsan K., “Kuşkuculuk Bağlamında Pironculuk-Hume-Nietzsche İlişkisi”, Baykuş, Sayı: 4, 2009, 290-304.
  • Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten, “Skeptisizm Epistemolojik Bir Çıkmaz mıdır?”, International Journal of Human Sciences, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2018, 1291- 1305.
  • Perin, Casey, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010.
  • Popkin, Richard H.,The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003.
  • Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonculuğun Esasları, Çev. C. Cengiz Çevik, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019.
  • Striker, Gisela, “Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquillity”, The Monist, Vol. 73, No.1,1990, 97-110.
  • Uçar, Semra, “Bilimsel Tanımların Özellikleri ve İşlemselci Tanımlara Empirik İçerik Bakımından Hempel’in Eleştirisi”, FLSF (Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi), Sayı: 28, 2019, 421-4

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS’UN DOGMATİZME KARŞI EPİSTEMOLOJİK MÜCADELESİ SAVUNULABİLİR Mİ?

Year 2020, Issue: 29, 369 - 389, 16.05.2020

Abstract

Pyrrhon’un takipçisi olan Sextus Empiricus dogmatizm ve skeptisizm olmak üzere iki felsefe türü olduğunu savunmuş; skeptisizmi, dogmatizme karşıt bir şekilde konumlandırdığı genel bir soruşturma yürütmüştür. Onun bu soruşturmasının temel kaygısı skeptisizmi her yönüyle ortaya koyup dogmatik felsefelerden ayırmaktır; çünkü skeptisizm sahici bir felsefeyken dogmatizm felsefe olduğu söylenen sözde felsefedir. Sextus bu türden sözde felsefelerle skeptik bir mücadele içindedir. Bu çalışmada Sextus’un dogmatizme yönelik skeptik düşünceleri ele alınacak ve dogmatizmle mücadelesi sırasında ileri sürdüğü argümanların epistemolojik dayanakları (eşgüçlülük (isostheneia), yargıyı askıya almak (epokhê) ve huzur (ataraxia) ortaya koyulacaktır. Skeptisizmin bu epistemolojik dayanaklarla dogmatizme saldırısı gerçeklik-görünüş sorunu ve ölçüt sorunu çerçevesinde incelendikten sonra bu saldırının savunulamaz yanları olduğu iddia edilecektir.

References

  • Alican, Necip Fikri, “No more this than that: skeptical impression or Pyrrhonian dogma?”, ΣΧΟΛΗ (Schole): Anticient Philosophy and The Classical Tradition (Ed. Eugene V. Afonasin), Volume 11, Issue 1, 2017, 7-61.
  • Annas, Julia&Barnes, Jonathan, TheModes of Scepticism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997.
  • Barnes, Jonathan, “The Belief of a Pyrrhonist”, The Cambridge Classical Journal,Volume 28/January, 1982, 1-29.
  • Barnes, Jonathan, “Sextan Scepticism”, in Maieusis: Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, Ed. Dominic Scott, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, 322-335.
  • Beyaz Erkızan, Hatice Nur, Aristoteles Yazıları: Feminizm ve Aristotelesçi Feminizm Üzerine, Sentez, İstanbul, 2012.
  • Brennan, Tad, Ethics and Epistemology in Sextus Empiricus, Routledge, New York and London, 2015.
  • Eichorn, Roger E., “How (Not) To Read Sextus Empiricus”, Anticient Philosophy 34, 2014, 121-149.
  • Frede, Michael, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987.
  • Grgić, Filip, “Investigate and Suspensive Scepticism”, European Journal of Philosophy 22:4, 2012, 653-673.
  • Hegel, G. W. Friedrich, Felsefe Tarihi: Platon’dan Ortaçağ Felsefesine, Çev. Doğan Barış Kılınç, Cilt 2, Notabene Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019.
  • Iannone, A. Pablo, Dictionary of World Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 2001.
  • Liddell, Henry George & Scott, Robert, A Greek-English Lexicon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
  • Massie, Pascal, “Philosophy and Ataraxia in Sextus Empiricus”, Peitho/Examina Antiqua 1 (4), 2003, 211-234.
  • Öymen, Örsan K., “Kuşkuculuk Bağlamında Pironculuk-Hume-Nietzsche İlişkisi”, Baykuş, Sayı: 4, 2009, 290-304.
  • Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten, “Skeptisizm Epistemolojik Bir Çıkmaz mıdır?”, International Journal of Human Sciences, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2018, 1291- 1305.
  • Perin, Casey, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010.
  • Popkin, Richard H.,The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003.
  • Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonculuğun Esasları, Çev. C. Cengiz Çevik, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019.
  • Striker, Gisela, “Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquillity”, The Monist, Vol. 73, No.1,1990, 97-110.
  • Uçar, Semra, “Bilimsel Tanımların Özellikleri ve İşlemselci Tanımlara Empirik İçerik Bakımından Hempel’in Eleştirisi”, FLSF (Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi), Sayı: 28, 2019, 421-4
There are 20 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Nurten Öztanrıkulu Özel

Publication Date May 16, 2020
Submission Date February 5, 2020
Acceptance Date April 29, 2020
Published in Issue Year 2020 Issue: 29

Cite

Chicago Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten. “SEXTUS EMPIRICUS’UN DOGMATİZME KARŞI EPİSTEMOLOJİK MÜCADELESİ SAVUNULABİLİR Mİ?”. FLSF Felsefe Ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 29 (May 2020): 369-89.

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