Research Article
BibTex RIS Cite

EVALUATION OF DESIRE THEORIES ABOUT PERSONAL GOOD

Year 2020, Issue: 29, 145 - 162, 16.05.2020

Abstract

What is the main thing that makes a life good or bad for a person living it? This is the personal good question. There are three basic theories in the history of philosophy regarding this question: Hedonistic theories, desire theories and objective list theories. The purpose of this study is to examine and evaluate desire theories. For this purpose, first, other theories about personal good will be examined. After that, the history of the desire theories, their claims and arguments in their favor will be briefly mentioned. Finally, the claims of the versions of these theories and the basic arguments against them will be evaluated. As a result of this evaluation, it will be claimed that desire theories are not reasonable enough.

References

  • Arneson, Richard J., “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction”, Social Philosophy and Policy 16, No. 1, Winter, 1999, s. 113-142.
  • Chappell, T. D. J., Understanding Human Goods, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1995, s. 43.
  • Crisp, Roger, “Well-Being”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/>
  • Crowe, Jonathan, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, s. 35.
  • Darwall, Stephen, Welfare and Rational Care, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.
  • Feldman, Fred, Pleasure and The Good Life, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2004.
  • Feldman, Fred, What Is This Thing Called Happiness?, New York, Oxford, 2010.
  • Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, s. 86-90.
  • Fletcher, Guy, “A Fresh Start for the Objective List Theory of Well-Being”, Utilitas 25:2, 2013, s. 206-220.
  • Fletcher, Guy, “Objective List Theories”, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, ed. Guy Fletcher, Oxon, Routledge, 2016, s. 148-160.
  • Fletcher, Guy, The Philosophy of Well-Being, Oxon, Routledge, 2016.
  • Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso, Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction to Natural Law Ethics, Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2002, s. 10-23.
  • Griffin, James, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986.
  • Haybron, D. M., The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008.
  • Heathwood, Chris, “Welfare”, The Routledge Companion to Ethics, ed. John Skorupski, London & New York, Routledge, 2010.
  • Heathwood, Chris, “Desire-Fulfillment Theory”, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being, ed. Guy Fletcher, Oxon, Routledge, 2006, s 135-147.
  • Heathwood, Chris, “Subjective Theories of Well-Being”, The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, ed. B. Eggleston ve D. Miller, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, s. 199‐219.
  • Murphy, M. C., Natural Law and Practical Rationality, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001, s. 96.
  • Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984.
  • Plato, Gorgias, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3, çev. W.R.M. Lamb, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.
  • Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971.
  • Rosati, Connie S., “Personal Good”, Metaethics After Moore, ed. Terry Horgan ve Mark Timmons, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, s. 107-131.
  • Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other?, Harvard, Belknap Press, 1999.
  • Shaver, Robert, “Egoism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism/>.
  • Sumner, L. W., Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.

KİŞİSEL İYİYLE İLGİLİ ARZU TEORİLERİNİN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Year 2020, Issue: 29, 145 - 162, 16.05.2020

Abstract

Onu yaşayan bir kişi için bir hayatı iyi ya da kötü yapan ana şey nedir? Bu kişisel iyi sorusudur. Bu soruyla ilgili felsefe tarihinde üç temel teori vardır: Hazcı teoriler, arzu teorileri ve nesnel liste teorileri. Bu çalışmanın amacı, arzu teorilerini incelemek ve değerlendirmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, öncelikle kişisel iyiyle ilgili diğer teorilere bakılacaktır. Daha sonra arzu teorilerinin tarihine, iddialarına ve onların lehine argümanlara kısaca değinilecektir. Son olarak bu teorilerin versiyonlarının iddiaları ve onların aleyhindeki temel argümanlar değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu değerlendirme sonucunda arzu teorilerinin yeterince makul olmadığı iddia edilecektir.

References

  • Arneson, Richard J., “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction”, Social Philosophy and Policy 16, No. 1, Winter, 1999, s. 113-142.
  • Chappell, T. D. J., Understanding Human Goods, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1995, s. 43.
  • Crisp, Roger, “Well-Being”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/>
  • Crowe, Jonathan, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, s. 35.
  • Darwall, Stephen, Welfare and Rational Care, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.
  • Feldman, Fred, Pleasure and The Good Life, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2004.
  • Feldman, Fred, What Is This Thing Called Happiness?, New York, Oxford, 2010.
  • Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, s. 86-90.
  • Fletcher, Guy, “A Fresh Start for the Objective List Theory of Well-Being”, Utilitas 25:2, 2013, s. 206-220.
  • Fletcher, Guy, “Objective List Theories”, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, ed. Guy Fletcher, Oxon, Routledge, 2016, s. 148-160.
  • Fletcher, Guy, The Philosophy of Well-Being, Oxon, Routledge, 2016.
  • Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso, Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction to Natural Law Ethics, Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2002, s. 10-23.
  • Griffin, James, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986.
  • Haybron, D. M., The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008.
  • Heathwood, Chris, “Welfare”, The Routledge Companion to Ethics, ed. John Skorupski, London & New York, Routledge, 2010.
  • Heathwood, Chris, “Desire-Fulfillment Theory”, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being, ed. Guy Fletcher, Oxon, Routledge, 2006, s 135-147.
  • Heathwood, Chris, “Subjective Theories of Well-Being”, The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, ed. B. Eggleston ve D. Miller, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, s. 199‐219.
  • Murphy, M. C., Natural Law and Practical Rationality, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001, s. 96.
  • Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984.
  • Plato, Gorgias, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3, çev. W.R.M. Lamb, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.
  • Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971.
  • Rosati, Connie S., “Personal Good”, Metaethics After Moore, ed. Terry Horgan ve Mark Timmons, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, s. 107-131.
  • Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other?, Harvard, Belknap Press, 1999.
  • Shaver, Robert, “Egoism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism/>.
  • Sumner, L. W., Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
There are 25 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Necati Murad Omay

Publication Date May 16, 2020
Submission Date February 27, 2020
Acceptance Date May 14, 2020
Published in Issue Year 2020 Issue: 29

Cite

Chicago Omay, Necati Murad. “KİŞİSEL İYİYLE İLGİLİ ARZU TEORİLERİNİN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ”. FLSF Felsefe Ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 29 (May 2020): 145-62.

Starting from 2024, our journal will be published in 3 issues as two regular and one special issues. These issues will be published In May (regular issue), September (special issue) and December (regular issue).

Acceptance of articles for our special issue and our regular issue in December will begin on March 15.

Only articles within the scope of the file will be included in our special issue. 

Thank you for your attention.