Abstract
The concept of object has been referred to existents until the last century. An existent object does not have to be spatio-temporal. The objects of logic and mathematics are included in the concept of object, although they are abstract. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that all these abstract concepts have relations to spatio-temporal objects. Abstract concepts or descriptions other than logical and mathematical are not considered legitimate objects, such as Pegasus or round square. One of the basic reasons for this is that there is no logical ground to make it possible to speak properly about these objects that we take as non-existent objects. In Meinong's Theory of Objects, non-existent objects were included in the legitimate object category for the first time, as he did not consider "existence" as a necessary condition of being an object and included impossible objects in his theory, but this theory was pushed to the background after Russell criticized it for violating basic logic principles. The development of modal logic by Kripke and subsequent developments in mathematics and logic have made it possible to include non-spatio-temporal objects that are not present in this world as legitimate objects in the theory of objects. In this study, the subject is tried to be illustrated with an holistic approach to the nonexistent object discussion.
References
- Barker, F. Stephen. (2017). Matematik Felsefesi. (Çev.:Yücel Dursun) Ankara:İmge Kitabevi.
- Berto, Franz. (2017). “Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination”. Erkenntnis, 82(6), 1277–1297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9875-5.
- Brentano, Franz. (2009). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge; Taylor & Francis e-Library: London-New York.
- David, Marian. (1985). “Nonexistence and Reid’s Conception of Conceiving”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):585-599.
- Fitting, Melvin, Richard L.Mendelsohn. (1998). First Order Modal Logic. Kluwer Academic Publisher: London.
- Frege, Gottlob. (1951). “On Concept and Object”, Minds New Series, Vol.60, No.238 (ss.168-180).
- Jacquette, Dale. (1996). Meinongian Logic The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence, W. de Gruyter: Berlin: New York.
- Jago, Mark. (2014). The Impossible an Essay on Hyperintentionality. Oxford University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel: Arı Usun Eleştirisi, Çev. Aziz Yardımlı, İdea Yayınları, İstanbul. 2015
- Kripke, Saul A. (2005). Adlandırma ve Zorunluluk. (Berat Açıl, Çev.) Litera Yayıncılık: İstanbul.
- Lewis, David. (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Meinong, Alexius. (1960). “The Theory of Objects”, From Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. (ed. R. Chisholm).(1904).
- Parmenides. (2015). Doğa Hakkında. (Y. Gurur Sev, Çev.) Pinhan Yayınları: İstanbul.
- Platon. (1991). Metin Okuma Platon: Sofist. (Ömer Naci Soykan, Çev.) Ara Yayıncılık:İstanbul Russell, Bertrand. ( 2013). Anlam ve Doğruluk Üzerine, (Ezgi Ovat, Çev.). İtalik Yayınları: Ankara:2013.
- Priest, Graham, (2008). An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic From If to Is. Cambridge University Press.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1905). “On Denoting”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 56. (ss.: 479-493).
- Russell, Bertrand. (1904). “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions I”. Mind 13 (1):204-219.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1904). “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions II”. Mind 13 (1): 336-354.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1904). “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions III”. Mind 13(1): 509-524.
- Russell, Bertrand. (2013). Mantıksal Atomculuk Felsefesi (1918) Russell’ın Wittgenstein’den Öğrendiği Belli Fikirleri Anlatan Sekiz Ders. (Dilek Arlı Çil, Çev.). Alfa Yayınları: İstanbul.
- Swanson, Carolyn. (2011). Reburial of Nonexistents Reconcidering the Meinong-Russell Debate. Rodopi B.V.: Amsterdam-New York.
- Thierren, Valéri Lynn. (2012). “Inventing Logic:The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and First and Second-Order Logic”. Canadian Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy, Volume 10 (ss.26-52).
- Yagisawa, Takashi. (1988). “Beyond Possible Worlds”. Philosophical Studies 53 (ss.175-204).
Abstract
Nesne kavramı, son yüzyıla kadar hep bir varolana (İng. existent) gönderimde bulunmuştur. Varolan her zaman zorunlu olarak uzam-zamansal olan anlamına gelmez. Matematiğin ve mantığın nesneleri soyut kavramlar olmakla birlikte nesne kavramına dahil edilir. Yine de, bu soyut kavramların, uzam-zamansal olanla ilişkiselliği dikkat çekicidir. Mantıksal ve matematiksel olanın dışındaki soyut kavramlar ya da betimlemeler, Pegasus veya yuvarlak kare gibi, meşru birer nesne olarak kabul edilmezler. Bunun temel nedenlerinden biri, varolmayan nesne (İng. non-existentobject) olarak anacağımız bu nesnelerden uygun bir şekilde bahsetmeyi mümkün kılacak mantıksal bir zeminin olmayışıdır. Meinong’un Nesneler Kuramında “varolmayı” nesne olmanın zorunlu bir koşulu olarak görmemesi ve imkansız nesneleri kuramına dahil etmesiyle, varolmayan nesneler ilk kez meşru nesne kategorisine alınmış ancak Russell’ın, temel mantık ilkelerini ihlal etmekle eleştirmesi üzerine bu kuram geri plana itilmiştir. Kripke’yle birlikte modal mantığın geliştirilmesi ve sonrasında matematikte ve mantıkta yaşanan gelişmeler, uzam-zamansal olmayan, bu dünyada bilfiil bulunmayan nesnelerin de meşru nesneler olarak nesneler kuramında içerilmesine olanak tanır hale gelmiş, Meinong yeniden önem kazanmıştır. Bu gelişmeler sayesinde, bu dünyada olmayan ancak mümkün bir dünyada varolduğu düşünülen ve hatta hiçbir mümkün dünyada varolamayacak olan nesnelerin meşru nesne olarak tanımlanabilmesinin zemini hazırlanmıştır. Bu çalışmada, varolmayan nesne tartışmasına bütünlükçü bir bakışla yaklaşarak konu ana hatlarıyla resmedilmeye çalışılmıştır.
References
- Barker, F. Stephen. (2017). Matematik Felsefesi. (Çev.:Yücel Dursun) Ankara:İmge Kitabevi.
- Berto, Franz. (2017). “Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination”. Erkenntnis, 82(6), 1277–1297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9875-5.
- Brentano, Franz. (2009). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge; Taylor & Francis e-Library: London-New York.
- David, Marian. (1985). “Nonexistence and Reid’s Conception of Conceiving”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):585-599.
- Fitting, Melvin, Richard L.Mendelsohn. (1998). First Order Modal Logic. Kluwer Academic Publisher: London.
- Frege, Gottlob. (1951). “On Concept and Object”, Minds New Series, Vol.60, No.238 (ss.168-180).
- Jacquette, Dale. (1996). Meinongian Logic The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence, W. de Gruyter: Berlin: New York.
- Jago, Mark. (2014). The Impossible an Essay on Hyperintentionality. Oxford University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel: Arı Usun Eleştirisi, Çev. Aziz Yardımlı, İdea Yayınları, İstanbul. 2015
- Kripke, Saul A. (2005). Adlandırma ve Zorunluluk. (Berat Açıl, Çev.) Litera Yayıncılık: İstanbul.
- Lewis, David. (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Meinong, Alexius. (1960). “The Theory of Objects”, From Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. (ed. R. Chisholm).(1904).
- Parmenides. (2015). Doğa Hakkında. (Y. Gurur Sev, Çev.) Pinhan Yayınları: İstanbul.
- Platon. (1991). Metin Okuma Platon: Sofist. (Ömer Naci Soykan, Çev.) Ara Yayıncılık:İstanbul Russell, Bertrand. ( 2013). Anlam ve Doğruluk Üzerine, (Ezgi Ovat, Çev.). İtalik Yayınları: Ankara:2013.
- Priest, Graham, (2008). An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic From If to Is. Cambridge University Press.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1905). “On Denoting”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 56. (ss.: 479-493).
- Russell, Bertrand. (1904). “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions I”. Mind 13 (1):204-219.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1904). “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions II”. Mind 13 (1): 336-354.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1904). “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions III”. Mind 13(1): 509-524.
- Russell, Bertrand. (2013). Mantıksal Atomculuk Felsefesi (1918) Russell’ın Wittgenstein’den Öğrendiği Belli Fikirleri Anlatan Sekiz Ders. (Dilek Arlı Çil, Çev.). Alfa Yayınları: İstanbul.
- Swanson, Carolyn. (2011). Reburial of Nonexistents Reconcidering the Meinong-Russell Debate. Rodopi B.V.: Amsterdam-New York.
- Thierren, Valéri Lynn. (2012). “Inventing Logic:The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and First and Second-Order Logic”. Canadian Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy, Volume 10 (ss.26-52).
- Yagisawa, Takashi. (1988). “Beyond Possible Worlds”. Philosophical Studies 53 (ss.175-204).
Details
| Primary Language | Turkish |
|---|---|
| Subjects | Philosophy |
| Journal Section | Articles |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | December 10, 2020 |
| Submission Date | August 21, 2020 |
| Acceptance Date | October 11, 2020 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2020 Issue: 30 |
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Acceptance of articles for our special issue and our regular issue in December will begin on March 15.
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