From Decoupling to De-Risking: A New Era in Trade Between the West and China

Year 2024, , 277 - 303, 28.01.2024

Veli Ahmet Çevik

https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.1381106

Abstract

Since the Second World War, the welfare level of world societies has increased with the peace period brought by economic interdependence and the acceleration of globalization. However, the 2008-09 financial crisis, strained relations between the USA and China, the global pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine War and geopolitical tensions continue to negatively affect international trade and the global economy. Western and allied countries have experienced the effects of their dependence on the supply chains of countries with which they have bad diplomatic relations, in major shocks. Governments and policymakers of Western developed countries, especially the US, stated that it would be in line with national security interests for companies to move their production to allied -friendshoring- countries. Decisions taken by policy makers in the world’s developed economies have also prompted businesses to take new steps.
In this study, which was prepared using secondary data, the economic decoupling of the US and allied countries from China was examined and concluded that the complete decoupling of economies will disrupt the world's economic stability and lead to a loss of global welfare.

Keywords

Decoupling, De-Risking, Globalization, Geopolitics, International Trade

Ayrışma’dan Risk Azaltma’ya: Batı ile Çin Arasındaki Ticarette Yeni Dönem

Abstract

İkinci dünya savaşından bu yana ekonomik karşılıklı bağımlılığın getirdiği barış dönemi ve küreselleşmenin hızlanmasıyla dünya toplumlarının refah düzeyi artmıştır. Ancak 2008-09 finansal krizi, ABD Çin arasındaki gerilen ilişkiler, küresel salgın, Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı ve jeopolitik gerilimler uluslararası ticareti ve küresel ekonomiyi olumsuz etkilemeye devam etmektedir. Batı ve müttefik ülkeleri, diplomatik olarak ilişkilerinin kötü olduğu ülkelerin tedarik zincirlerine bağımlı olmalarının etkilerini, yaşanan büyük şoklarda tecrübe etmişlerdir. Başta ABD olmak üzere Batılı gelişmiş ülkelerin yöneticileri işletmelerin üretimlerini dost ülkelere taşınmasının ulusal güvenlik çıkarlarıyla uyumlu olacağını ifade etmişlerdir. Dünyanın gelişmiş ekonomilerindeki politika yapıcıların aldığı kararlar işletmeleri de yeni adımlar atmaya sevk etmiştir.
İkincil veriler kullanılarak hazırlanan bu araştırmada, ABD ve müttefik ülkelerin Çin’den ekonomik olarak ayrışması incelenmiş ve ekonomilerin tamamen ayrışmasının dünyanın ekonomik istikrarını bozacağı ve küresel refah kaybına yol açacağı sonucuna varılmıştır.

Keywords

Ayrışma, Riski Azaltma, Küreselleşme, Jeopolitik, Uluslararası Ticaret

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