Electoral Coalitions To Exit From Hybrid Regimes: A Research on The Hungary 2019 Local Election

Year 2020, , 26 - 50, 31.01.2020

Mustafa Cem Oğuz

https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.2020.01.002

Cited By: 1

Abstract

The success of electoral coalition has long been acknowledged for the peaceful exit from hybrid regimes. According to this, the opposition that goes to alliance in the repressive regimes first makes the field of competition more fair and then ensures the democratization of the regime. Although democratization literature focuses on general elections, local elections have gained importance since 1990s with increasing importance of local governments. In this study, we will discuss the electoral coalitions in local elections and argue that the local elections won by this strategy are effective in the exit from hybrid regimes. We will try to prove this claim through the 2019 local elections in Hungary.

Keywords

Hybrid Regimes, Competitive Authoritarian Regimes, Local Elections, Electoral Coalitions, Fidesz, Karacsony

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