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Gelişmiş Ülkelerde Ortanca Seçmen Hipotezi Geçerli mi?

Year 2025, Volume: 9 Issue: 1, 296 - 304, 25.02.2025
https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.1451286

Abstract

Ortanca seçmen hipotezine göre gelirin yeniden dağıtımı açısından kamu kesimi büyüklüğü, çoğunluk kuralı tarafından belirlenir. Bu hipotez, ortalama gelirin ortanca gelire göre artışının kamu büyüklüğünü artırdığını ileri sürer. Çünkü ortanca gelire sahip olan seçmen karar verici seçmendir. Burada kamu büyüklüğünden kasıt ise, sosyal harcamalar, vergi oranları ve kamu borçlarıdır. Bu çalışma da ortanca seçmen hipotezinin geçerliliğini, 24 gelişmiş ülke üzerinden 2004-2018 dönemi için araştırmayı amaçlar. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond İki Aşamalı Sistem Genelleştirilmiş Momentler Methodu ile yapılan analiz sonuçları; ortanca seçmen hipotezinin sosyal harcama, vergi oranları ve kamu borçlanması ile ilgili iddialarını güçlü bir şekilde desteklemektedir. Sonuçlar, kurulan ana modellerin kontrol değişkenlerini içeren farklı versiyonları açısından da geçerlidir.

References

  • Agranov, M. & Palfrey, T. R. (2015). Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study. Journal of Public Economics, 130, 45-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008
  • Alesina, A. & Rodrik, D. (1994). Distributive politics and economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 465-490. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118470
  • Barnes, L. (2012). Does median voter income matter? The effects of inequality and turnout on government spending. Political Studies, 61(1), 82-100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.0095
  • Barro, R. J. (1974). Are government bonds net wealth?. Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 1095-1117. https://doi.org/10.1086/260266
  • Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. https://doi.org/10.1086/256633
  • Borge, L.-E. & Rattsø, J. (2004). Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis. European Economic Review, 48(4), 805-826. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.09.003
  • Bowen, H. R. (1943). The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 58(1), 27. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885754
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1958). Public principles of public debt, a defense and restatement. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
  • Colagrossi, M., Karagiannis, S. & R. Raab (2019). The median voter takes it all: Preferences for redistribution and income inequality in the EU-28. Publications Office of the European Union. Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-01908-4.
  • Gouveia, M. & Masia, N.A. (1998). Does the median voter model explain the size of government?: Evidence from the states. Public Choice, 97, 159-177. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004973610506
  • IMF (2022). Public finance in modern history. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/FPP (14.12.2022).
  • Larcinese, V. (2007). Voting over redistribution and the size of the welfare state: The role of turnout. Political Studies, 55(3), 568-585. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.0065
  • Lindert, P. H. (1996). What limits social spending?. Explorations in Economic History, 33(1), 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1006/exeh.1996.0001
  • Meltzer, A. H. & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914-927. https://doi.org/10.1086/261013
  • Milanovic, B. (2000). The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: An empirical test with the required data. European Journal of Political Economy, 16(3), 367-410. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00014-8
  • Modigliani, F. (1961). Long-Run implications of alternative fiscal policies and the burden of the national debt. The Economic Journal, 71(284), 730-755. https://doi.org/10.2307/2228247
  • OECD. (2022). General statistics; Public sector, taxation and market regulation. https://stats.oecd.org/ (14.12.2022).
  • Our World in Data. (2022a). Mean vs. median income or consumption. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/mean-versus-median-monthly-per-capita-expenditure-or-income (14.12.2022)
  • Our World in Data. (2022b). Distribution of participatory democracy. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-participatory-democracy-vdem?time= 2004&country=EST~CZE (14.12.2022)
  • Persson, T. & G. Tabellini. (1994). Is inequality harmful for growth?. American Economic Review, 84(3), 600-621. https://doi.org/10.3386/w3599
  • Soto, M. (2009). System GMM estimation with a small sample. Barcelona Economics. Working Paper Series, 365.
  • Yerdelen Tatoğlu, F. (2020). İleri panel veri analizi (Stata uygulamalı). İstanbul: Beta
  • Wong, M. Y. H. (2017). Median voter and power resources Revisited: A composite model of inequality. European Political Science Review, 9(4), 607-628. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577391600014X
  • World Bank. (2022). World development indicators. https://databank.worldbank.org/ source/world-development-indicators (14.12.2022).

Is The Median Voter Hypothesis Valid in Developed Countries?

Year 2025, Volume: 9 Issue: 1, 296 - 304, 25.02.2025
https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.1451286

Abstract

According to the median-voter hypothesis, the size of the public sector in terms of the redistribution of income is determined by the majority rule. This hypothesis suggests that an increase in average income relative to median income increases the size of government, because voters that have the median income are the decision-making voters. The meaning of the size of the public sector here is social expenditures, tax rates, and public debts. This paper aims to analyze the validity of the median-voter hypothesis on the basis of 24 developed countries for the period 2004-2018. Results of the analysis conducted via the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Two-Stage System Generalized Method of Moments influentially support the claims of the median voter hypothesis about social expenditures, tax rates, and public debts. Results are also valid in terms of their different versions that include control variables of the constructed master patterns.

References

  • Agranov, M. & Palfrey, T. R. (2015). Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study. Journal of Public Economics, 130, 45-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008
  • Alesina, A. & Rodrik, D. (1994). Distributive politics and economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 465-490. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118470
  • Barnes, L. (2012). Does median voter income matter? The effects of inequality and turnout on government spending. Political Studies, 61(1), 82-100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.0095
  • Barro, R. J. (1974). Are government bonds net wealth?. Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 1095-1117. https://doi.org/10.1086/260266
  • Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. https://doi.org/10.1086/256633
  • Borge, L.-E. & Rattsø, J. (2004). Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis. European Economic Review, 48(4), 805-826. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.09.003
  • Bowen, H. R. (1943). The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 58(1), 27. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885754
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1958). Public principles of public debt, a defense and restatement. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
  • Colagrossi, M., Karagiannis, S. & R. Raab (2019). The median voter takes it all: Preferences for redistribution and income inequality in the EU-28. Publications Office of the European Union. Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-01908-4.
  • Gouveia, M. & Masia, N.A. (1998). Does the median voter model explain the size of government?: Evidence from the states. Public Choice, 97, 159-177. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004973610506
  • IMF (2022). Public finance in modern history. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/FPP (14.12.2022).
  • Larcinese, V. (2007). Voting over redistribution and the size of the welfare state: The role of turnout. Political Studies, 55(3), 568-585. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.0065
  • Lindert, P. H. (1996). What limits social spending?. Explorations in Economic History, 33(1), 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1006/exeh.1996.0001
  • Meltzer, A. H. & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914-927. https://doi.org/10.1086/261013
  • Milanovic, B. (2000). The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: An empirical test with the required data. European Journal of Political Economy, 16(3), 367-410. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00014-8
  • Modigliani, F. (1961). Long-Run implications of alternative fiscal policies and the burden of the national debt. The Economic Journal, 71(284), 730-755. https://doi.org/10.2307/2228247
  • OECD. (2022). General statistics; Public sector, taxation and market regulation. https://stats.oecd.org/ (14.12.2022).
  • Our World in Data. (2022a). Mean vs. median income or consumption. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/mean-versus-median-monthly-per-capita-expenditure-or-income (14.12.2022)
  • Our World in Data. (2022b). Distribution of participatory democracy. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-participatory-democracy-vdem?time= 2004&country=EST~CZE (14.12.2022)
  • Persson, T. & G. Tabellini. (1994). Is inequality harmful for growth?. American Economic Review, 84(3), 600-621. https://doi.org/10.3386/w3599
  • Soto, M. (2009). System GMM estimation with a small sample. Barcelona Economics. Working Paper Series, 365.
  • Yerdelen Tatoğlu, F. (2020). İleri panel veri analizi (Stata uygulamalı). İstanbul: Beta
  • Wong, M. Y. H. (2017). Median voter and power resources Revisited: A composite model of inequality. European Political Science Review, 9(4), 607-628. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577391600014X
  • World Bank. (2022). World development indicators. https://databank.worldbank.org/ source/world-development-indicators (14.12.2022).
There are 24 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Subjects Public Economy
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Yasin Karadeniz 0000-0003-3087-3729

Publication Date February 25, 2025
Submission Date March 11, 2024
Acceptance Date September 19, 2024
Published in Issue Year 2025 Volume: 9 Issue: 1

Cite

APA Karadeniz, Y. (2025). Is The Median Voter Hypothesis Valid in Developed Countries?. Fiscaoeconomia, 9(1), 296-304. https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.1451286

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