IRAQI TURKMEN’S LEGAL POSITION IN THE 2005 IRAQI CONSTITUTION AFTER THE US OCCUPIED IRAQ IN 2003

Year 2019, Volume: 1 Issue: 2, 1 - 12, 18.11.2019

Soner Doğan

Abstract

When the USA
occupied Iraq in 2003, it succeeded in demolishing Saddam Hussein’s Baathist
regime with an aim to establish a democratic political system. To attempt to
create a democratic and fair political system in Iraq was difficult for the USA
because Iraq had never experienced democracy or had a democratic society. The
Saddam regime was one of dictatorship, who governed with tribes, ethnic groups over
a long duration. The establishment of a democratic political system involves a
holistic integration of cultural, ethnic and religious bodies.  Hence, it is important for constitutional
writers and politicians to implement consociational theory for pluralization of
society. Consociational democracy is based on Lijphart’s theory which explains
power-sharing order in deeply divided ethnics society. It is a model of
democratic governance that transforms politically differentiated cultures and
groups into a stable democracy (Lijphart, 1969). However, the democratic system
has not provided equal rights among different society in Iraq. For example, the
Shiites have been given too much power in the federal government, the Kurds are
happy because they have taken regional authority, while the Sunnis rights were
neglected in current political orders.

            On the other hand, although Iraqi
Turkomans are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq, their rights have been
ignored significantly. According to UN Data (2018), currently the population of
Iraq is approximately 40 million, and Iraqi Turkomans are a community of around
3-3.5 million (%9-10), predominantly living in the Iraqi provinces of Kirkuk,
Baghdad, Mosul and Diya (Saatci, 2017). In fact, Iraqi Turkomans have a broad
background in Iraq’s history. When the Turkmens came to Iraq in 760(A.C), they had
administered Iraq until the end of World War I. Especially during the Ottoman
Empire, Iraqi Turkomans possessed an important role in Iraq. After the First
World War, when the Ottoman Empire lost power in Iraq, the Iraqi Turkomans lost
their priority and became a second-class citizen. King Faysal who was the first
king of Iraq, did not want to share his authority and he saw Turkmens as a
threat for his state, and his policy continued until 2012. After Iraq was
occupied, the US tried to establish a new democratic system, but Iraqi Turkomans
were not represented equally such as Kurds or Shiites. Iraqi Turkomans also
faced political and ethnic violence within both terms of office. When Iraq’s
constitution was written, Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry predicted that new
constitution would solve many problems among minorities, especially towards power
sharing in Iraq. However, in practicality it failed and led to many problems,
for example, many Sunnis or Turkmens were politically violated, and they
decided to boycott the general election. This study will analyse the Iraqi Turkomans
legal position to the 2005 Iraq Constitution by using Consociationalism theory,
and qualitative methodology. As a theoretical framework, Lijphart’s four
conditions of; power-sharing, the grand coalition, autonomy and minority veto
will be used. The final aim of this paper is to demonstrate the rights of Iraqi
Turkomans within previous Iraqi constitutions.

Keywords

Iraqi Turkomans, Iraq's Constitution

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