BELİRLİ ŞARTLARA BAĞLI TIBBİ BAKIM İLE SAĞLIK DURUM ARASINDAKİ AHLAKİ TEHLİKEDEKİ DEĞİŞİM

Year 2017, Volume: 4 Issue: 10, 207 - 235, 04.05.2017

Şevket Alper Koç , Çağatay Koç

Abstract

Bu makale ahlaki tehlikenin büyüklüğünün bireyin sağlık durumuna ve hekim
muayenehane ziyareti ile ilişkili tıbbi durumun türüne göre değişip değişmediğini
inceler. Genelleştirilmiş momentler yöntemi özel sağlık sigortasının içselliğini, hekim
hizmetlerinin negatif olmadığını ve süreksiz olduğunu irdelemek için uygulanmıştır.
Sonuçlar akut duruma bağlı hekim ziyaretleri için sağlıklı ve hasta gruplar arasında
ahlaki tehlike etkilerinde kayda değer bir farkı desteklemiyorken ahlaki tehlike
etkisinin kronik duruma bağlı hekim ziyaretlerinde sağlıklı olanlar için daha yüksek
olduğunu gösterir. Bu sonuçlar hekim bakımının homojen bir mal olmadığını ve
talepteki ahlaki tehlikenin nicel karakterizasyonunun muayahane ziyaretlerinin özel durumlara bağlı olmasına ve incelenmekte olan sağlık gurubuna bağlı olduğunu ortaya
koymaktadır.  

Keywords

ahlaki tehlike. Sağlığa özel harcamanın payı, şarta bağlı muayahane ziyareti, sayma verisi, GMM tahmini

THE VARIATION IN MORAL HAZARD ACROSS CONDITIONSPECIFIC MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH STATUS

Abstract

This paper examines whether the magnitude of moral hazard varies by the health status
of the individual and the type of medical condition associated with the physician office
visit. Generalized method of moments is implemented to address the endogeneity of
private health insurance, and the nonnegativity and the discreteness of physician
services use. The results indicate that the moral hazard effect is higher for the healthy
for chronic condition related physician visits, while they do not support an appreciable
difference in moral hazard effects between the healthy and sickly groups for acute
condition related physician visits. These results suggest that physician care is not a
homogenous good and the quantitative characterization of moral hazard in its demand
depends on the particular condition-specific component of the visit and the health
group under consideration.  

Keywords

moral hazard, health-specific cost sharing, condition-specific physician visits, count data, GMM estimation

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