11 Eylül Terör Saldırıları Sonrası ABD Gayrinizami Harp Anlayışının Değişimi

Year 2021, , 563 - 601, 27.09.2021

Emrah Özdemir

https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.1001283

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Gayrinizami harp tecrübesi anlamında ABD silahlı kuvvetlerinin kazanımları 18.yüzyıla kadar uzanmaktadır. Ancak dönemsel olarak Vietnam Savaşı gibi travmatik olaylar bu tür kıymetli tecrübelerin göz ardı edilmesine ve uzunca bir süre gayrinizami harbe temkinli bir şekilde yaklaşılmasına yol açmıştır. Bu çalışmada tarihsel süreçte ABD için en trajik tecrübelerin başında gelen 11 Eylül Saldırıları sonrası ABD Ordusunun gayrinizami harp doktrininin nasıl şekillendiği ve güncel stratejik düşüncede ne anlam ifade ettiği ortaya konulmaktadır. Resmî belgeler, askerî talimnameler ve literatürde yaşanan tartışmalar ışığında ABD’nin değişen güvenlik konsepti içerisinde, gayrinizami harbin ne derece önemli bir unsur olduğunu anlamak, çalışmanın temel amacını oluşturmaktadır. Bu anlamda çalışmanın yöntemi nitel doküman incelemesi olarak belirlenmiştir. Çalışmanın sonunda, konvansiyonel orduların politik hedeflere ulaşmak için gayrinizami yaklaşımlara yoğunlaştıkları ve konvansiyonel olanla gayrinizami olan arasındaki farkın giderek muğlaklaştığı bir dönemin yaşandığı ileri sürülmektedir.

Keywords

Gayrinizami Harp, Konvansiyonel Harp, Güvenlik Yaklaşımları, ABD, Hibrit Savaş

The Change of US Irregular Warfare Approach after the 9/11 Terror Attacks

Abstract

The experience of the US armed forces in terms of irregular warfare goes back to the 18th century. However, periodically, traumatic events such as the Vietnam War led to such valuable experiences to be ignored and to approach irregular war with caution. In this study, how the US Army’s irregular war doctrine was shaped after the September 11 attacks and what it means in current strategic thinking is presented. Understanding the importance of irregular warfare in the changing security concept of the USA in the light of official documents, military manuals and discussions in the literature constitutes the main purpose of the study. In this sense, the method of the study was determined as qualitative document analysis. At the end of the study, it is argued that a period, in which conventional armies focus on irregular approaches to achieve political goals, and the difference between the conventional and the irregular is blurred, is experienced.

Keywords

Irregular Warfare, Conventional Warfare, Security Approaches, USA, Hyrid Warfare

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