Gerilla Savaşının Stratejisini Anlamak: Tet Saldırısı Örneği, 1968

Year 2023, , 181 - 212, 27.04.2023

Mustafa Özveren , Kaan Kutlu Ataç

https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.1202285

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Bu çalışma, Vietnam Savaşı’nın dönüm noktası olan Kuzey Vietnam Ordusu ve Viet Kong’un 1968’de gerçekleştirdiği Tet Saldırısı’nın askeri bir mağlubiyete rağmen politik zafere nasıl ulaştığını analiz etmektedir. Genelde savaş, özelde ise gerilla mücadelesi, politik hedefler içeren şiddet olayları sürecidir. Bu anlamda silahlı mücadelenin önemli hedeflerden biri, irade üstünlüğünün, en az kayıp ile hasma kabul ettirilmesidir. Psikoloji ise, bu meydan okumanın en önemli değişkenleri arasındadır. Nitekim savaşta en büyük başarı, zararı en alt düzeyde tutarak hasmın mücadele azmini ve direncini kırmaktır. Bu bağlamda gerilla savaşı, gayri nizami harp yöntemlerini içeren bir yıpratma savaşı olarak, psikolojik unsurları da açığa çıkaran bir araştırma alanıdır. Bu çalışma, 1968’de gerçekleştirilen Tet Saldırısı örneği üzerinden gerilla savaşının stratejik yapısını açıklamayı hedeflemektedir. Literatürde Vietnam Savaşı’nın dönüm noktası olduğuna yönelik bir fikir birliği bulunan Tet Saldırısı, askeri başarısızlığın politik anlamda başarıya nasıl ulaşabileceğini anlamak açısından önemlidir. Viet Kong gerillalarının hasımlarından yedi kat daha fazla zayiat verdiği bu saldırı, hasımlarını Vietnam Savaşı hakkında bir umutsuzluğa sürüklemiştir. Çalışmanın tarihsel sınırlılığı 1967-1975 tarihleri arasındadır. Çalışma, Türkçe literatüre, gerilla savaşı konusunu Tet Saldırısı üzerinden inceleyerek katkı sunmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu analiz, savaşın psikolojik unsuru gibi soyut boyutlarının yarattığı etki ile kapasite açısından savaşın belirleyici unsurlarından birisi olabileceğini de göstermektedir.

Keywords

Gerilla Savaşı, Tet Saldırısı, Strateji, Vietnam Savaşı, Viet Kong

Thanks

Sayın editör ve hakemlere emekleri için şimdiden teşekkürleri borç biliriz.

Understanding the Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare: The Case of the Tet Offensive, 1968

Abstract

This study analyses how the Tet Offensive of the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong in 1968, the turning point of the Vietnam War, achieved political victory despite a military defeat. War, in general, and guerrilla struggle, in particular, is a process of violent events involving political goals. In this sense, one of the most important goals of the armed struggle is to impose the superiority of the will on the opponent with the least loss of life. Psychology is among the most important variables of this challenge. As a matter of fact, the greatest success in war is to break the resistance of the opponent by keeping the damage to a minimum. In this context, guerrilla warfare, as a war of attrition that includes unconventional warfare methods, is a field of study revealing psychological elements. This study aims to explain the strategic nature of guerrilla warfare through the example of the Tet Offensive in 1968. The Tet Offensive, which has been widely accepted in the literature to be the turning point of the Vietnam War, is essential in understanding how a military defeat can achieve political success. This military attack, in which the Viet Kong guerrillas suffered seven times more damage than their adversaries, drove the adversaries of Viet Kong guerrillas into despair about the Vietnam War. This study analyses how the Tet Offensive achieved political victory despite a military defeat. The historical limitation of the study is between 1967 and 1975. The study is expected to contribute to Turkish literature by examining the issue of guerrilla warfare through the Tet Offensive. The analysis shows that the intangible dimensions of the war such as psychological aspects can be one of the determining factors of the war in terms of its capacity and the impact it creates.

Keywords

Guerrilla Warfare, Tet Offensive, Strategy, Vietnam War, Viet Cong

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