Ukrayna'da Nükleer Silah Kullanımı Hayaleti: Nükleer Savaş Riskinin Nüansları

Year 2024, Volume: 20 Issue: 47, 1 - 17, 26.04.2024

Barış Çağlar

https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.1393162

Abstract

Rusya güvenlik politikasının özünü, hem savaşta hem barış zamanlarında, konvansiyonel ve konvansiyonel olmayan tehditlerin ve silah sistemlerinin bir arada kullanılması oluşturmaktadır. Özellikle nükleer savaş tehdidini sıklıkla savurarak, çatışmanın tırmandırılması sürecinde baskın olmaya çalışmaktadır. Barış zamanında bu şekilde elde ettiği stratejik girişim üstünlüğünü, çatışma ve krizlerin tüm aşamalarında korumaya çalışarak, düşmanlarını kendi kontrolü altında hareket etmeye zorlamaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle nükleer savaş korkusunu manipüle ederek, diğer devletlerin savaş alanına doğrudan müdahalesini engellemeye ve askeri yardımın stratejik hale gelmesini sınırlamaya çalışmaktadır. Rus askeri zihniyetinin kilit noktası budur. Etkisi psikolojiktir ve Ukrayna’da bugüne kadar kısmen başarılı olmuştur. Makalenin önemi ve yansımaları, irdelenen husus ve uyarıların sadece Ukrayna’da değil, olası Tayvan’a dair bir krizdeki gibi nükleer güçlerin dahil olacağı ilerideki çatışmalarda da muhtemel olmasında yatmaktadır. Metodolojik olarak, Rusya’nın Ukrayna’daki nükleer stratejisi bir örnek olay/vaka incelemesi olarak ele alınmıştır. Rusya’nın nükleer risk yoluyla gerilimi tırmandırma hakimiyeti kazanma çabası irdelenmiştir. Bu çaba, nükleer caydırıcılığın belirsizliğine dayanmaktadır. Nükleer saldırı riskine yol açan ve sıklıkla görmezden gelinen bu belirsizliğin nüansları açıklanmıştır. Bu belirsizliğin, nükleer savaş riski oluşturması nedeniyle, hem Ukrayna’daki hem de nükleer silahların gölgesinde oluşacak ilerideki çatışma ve krizlerin mutlak zaferle sonuçlanması mümkün değildir. Hiçbir taraf tüm isteklerini elde edemeyecektir. Bu şartlarda tek çözüm müzakerelerle gelecek diplomatik uzlaşıdır.

Keywords

Nükleer Caydırıcılık, Nükleer Silahlar, Tırmandırma Hakimiyeti, Rusya, Ukrayna

The Spectre of Nuclear Weapons Use in Ukraine: The Nuances of Nuclear War Risk

Abstract

The essence of Russian security policy is composed of the combined use of conventional and unconventional threats in both war and peacetime. Russia aims to dominate the process of escalation especially by frequently threatening nuclear war in Ukraine. It attempts to maintain the strategic initiative superiority, forcing its enemies to act under its control. Put differently, through the means of manipulating the fear of nuclear war in Ukraine, it tries to avert other states from directly intervening in the battlefield and to prevent military aid delivered to its enemies from becoming strategic. Methodologically, this article examines Russia’s effort to gain dominance in escalating tensions through nuclear risk as a case study. The nuclear risk hinges on the uncertainty of nuclear deterrence. The nuances of this often-ignored uncertainty are explained in this article. Since such a uncertainty poses credible risk of nuclear war, absolute victory is not possible. No party will get everything it wants; therefore, the only solution is diplomatic compromise through negotiation. The importance and implications of this article lie in the fact that the problems and warnings examined here are likely not only in Ukraine but also in a possible future crisis over Taiwan or future conflicts involving nuclear powers.

Keywords

Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons, Escalation Dominance, Russia, Ukraine

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