William Alston on the Nature of Divine Knowledge and Time

Year 2019, Volume: 18 Issue: 36, 439 - 464, 30.12.2019

Abdulkadir Tanış

https://doi.org/10.14395/hititilahiyat.551691

Cited By: 1

Abstract

In the contemporary philosophy of religion,
William P. Alston has proposed one of the most important views on the nature of
divine knowledge. The basic reason for the view, which can be called as
intuitive conception of knowledge, is that it is the perfect way to explain the
nature of divine knowledge. According to the view, divine knowledge related to an entity or a
fact is simply the immediate awareness of that entity or fact. The basic
emphasis of intuitive conception of knowledge is that God knows all things with
absolute immediate awareness, even without God’s own mental representations.
Therefore, divine knowledge does not include any belief or proposition since it
implies indirectly knowing. It has been argued that these claims of Alston
about the nature of divine knowledge have important implications for the
relation between God and time. From this point of view, some thinkers have
claimed that intuitive conception of knowledge requires God’s timelessness,
while others have claimed the opposite. In this study, although intuitive
conception of knowledge seems more compatible with God’s timelessness, I will argue
that it is insufficient to explain the nature of divine knowledge. And I will
give two reasons for this claim. If intuitive conception of knowledge is
accepted, (i) it will limit the
extent of divine knowledge and (ii)
it cannot be preserved the different mode of being between God and temporal
beings. Thus, I will conclude that intuitive conception of knowledge as
described by Alston is not satisfactory in explaining the nature of God.

Summary

One of the most important views in the
contemporary philosophy of religion on the nature of divine knowledge has been
asserted by William Alston. The view, which can be called as intuitive conception
of knowledge, has been put forward in order to oppose the traditional view that
divine knowledge contains some beliefs, propositions and internal
representations, etc. According to intuitive conception of knowledge, God's
knowledge of a fact consists of direct awareness of the fact in question.
Direct awareness refers to the fact that the known entity or fact is bodily
present to God's consciousness directly. The most important reason underlying
Alston's use of intuitive conception of knowledge is that it is the perfect way
to explain the nature of divine knowledge. According to him, God’s knowing a
fact or an entity through a proposition, belief, or mental representation would
not mean perfection for him since his knowledge would have been mediated by
another means in such a case. Therefore, intuitive conception of knowledge,
which means absolute immediate awareness, is the model of knowledge that best
suits God's perfection.

The concept of intuitive knowledge advocated by
Alston can be seriously challenged in two respects. First of all, the claim
that the intuitive knowledge model is based, that the known fact or entity is bodily
present to the consciousness of the knowing subject will create significant
problems in terms of the classical assumptions of theism. The most fundamental
challenge is how to preserve the different mode of being presupposed between
God and temporal beings when intuitive conception of knowledge is accepted.
Accordingly, theism has a sharp ontological distinction between God and temporal
beings, assuming that they have very different modes of being in their
relations to time. But the assumption that the temporal being is bodily present
to God’s consciousness implies that the temporal being is present to God’s
consciousness with its temporal characteristics. In this way, the fact that the
temporal being is bodily present to God indicates either (i) that God is temporal with this being or (ii) that the temporal being is in fact timeless. Indeed,
philosophers like William Hasker try to justify God's temporality based on intuitive
conception of knowledge. Although Alston defends the idea that “a fact’s being
present to God directly or bodily does not mean that God shares the same mode
of being with this fact”, he is unable to show how it is possible. Moreover,
the idea that the known fact or entity is bodily present to God's consciousness
implies that the fact or entity in question is immanent to God. Especially, the
example of “self-awareness of one's own consciousness states” given to explain intuitive
conception of knowledge is remarkable. Because this example is generally
presented as a situation in which the knowing-known distinction is eliminated.
Given these considerations, how will the fundamental theistic idea that temporal
beings and God have ontologically different mode of being, be protected? We can
underline that the intuitive model of knowledge tries to eliminate the means such
as beliefs or propositions in divine knowledge and to bring the knowing subject
and the known object closer in order to explain the nature of divine knowledge
in a perfect way. However, it is so controversial how far the intuitive model
of knowledge can preserve the different mode of being between God and temporal
beings which theism presupposes.

Second, if we accept an intuitive conception of
knowledge, it seems inevitable to limit the extent of divine knowledge. For
example, consider counterfactual situations. Can God have knowledge of
counterfactual situations? God should not have such knowledge in terms of intuitive
conception of knowledge. For intuitive conception of knowledge assumes that the
known fact is present to the consciousness of the person who knows directly.
But counterfactuals do not exist actually. Thus, if God's knowledge consists only
of intuitive knowledge, then He will not know any counterfactual because there
is no being to be present to Him. For divine knowledge should consist of some
propositions or mental representations to know situations such as “Actual world
instead being as it is, it could have been such and such” or “if x had chosen b instead of a, it would
have been such and such”. Therefore, if the whole of divine knowledge is
interpreted as intuitive, it seems a necessity to limit his knowledge to the
actual situation. In other words, if the whole of divine knowledge is intuitive
direct knowledge, and this knowledge requires that the known fact is bodily
present to God, then divine knowledge will only cover the knowledge of the
facts which have already existed.

Keywords

Philosophy of Religion, Nature of God, Attributes of God, William Alston, Intuitive Conception of Knowledge

William Alston'da İlâhî Bilginin Doğası ve Zaman

Abstract

Çağdaş din felsefesinde ilahî bilginin doğası konusunda önemli görüşlerden
biri William P. Alston tarafından ortaya atılmıştır. Sezgisel bilgi anlayışı
olarak adlandırabileceğimiz bu bilgi anlayışının savunulmasının temel
gerekçesi, onun Tanrı’nın mükemmelliğiyle daha uyumlu olmasıdır. Bu bilgi
anlayışı, Tanrı’nın varlık ve olgulara dair bilgisinin O’nun bu varlık ve
olguların doğrudan farkındalığından oluştuğunu iddia eder. Bu bilgi anlayışının
temel vurgusu, arada Tanrı’nın kendi zihinsel temsilleri dahi hiçbir vasıta
olmaksızın O’nun her şeyi mutlak doğrudan bir farkındalıkla bildiğidir. Bu
yüzden, Tanrı’nın bilgisi, dolaylı olarak bilme anlamına geleceği için inanç
veya önerme şeklindeki öğeleri içermez. Alston’ın ilahî bilginin doğası
konusundaki bu görüşlerinin, Tanrı-zaman ilişkisi konusunda da önemli
imalarının olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Buna dayanarak bazı yorumcular sezgisel
bilgi anlayışının Tanrı’nın zamansızlığını gerektirdiğini iddia ederken, bazı
yorumcular da tam aksini iddia etmiştir. Bu çalışmada, sezgisel bilgi
anlayışının, Tanrı’nın zamansızlığı düşüncesiyle daha uyumlu görünmesine rağmen,
onun ilahî bilginin doğasını açıklama konusunda yetersiz olduğu iddia edilecek
ve bu iddia için temel olarak iki gerekçe ileri sürülecektir. Sezgisel bilgi
anlayışı kabul edilirse, ilk olarak, bunun Tanrı’nın bilgisinin kapsamı
konusunda bir sınırlılık yarattığı; ikinci olarak, Tanrı ve yaratılmış
varlıklar arasındaki farklı varlık modunun nasıl korunacağı probleminin ortaya
çıktığı gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu yüzden, Alston’ın savunduğu şekliyle
sezgisel bilgi anlayışının ilahî bilginin doğasını açıklama konusunda doyurucu
olmadığı söylenecektir.  

Keywords

Din Felsefesi, Tanrı’nın Doğası, Tanrı’nın Sıfatları, William Alston, Sezgisel Bilgi Anlayışı

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