Abstract
İnsanlık tarihinin önemli dönüm noktaları
olan devrimler sosyal bilimlerin de önemli bir araştırma alanını
oluşturmaktadır. Bu makalede, devrimleri ortaya çıkaran güdüleri analiz eden yaklaşımlar özetlenmiş, bunlardan modern iktisadın
temel yaklaşımı olan metodolojik bireycilik yöntemiyle tahlil eden çalışmalara odaklanılmıştır. Bu
çerçevede, yanıt bulunması gereken en önemli sorunun rasyonel ve kendi çıkarını
düşünen bireyin devrimci olmaya nasıl kalkıştığı olduğu görülmektedir.
Keywords
References
- Arnsperger, C., P De Ville (2002) “Could Homo Oeconomicus become a Revolutionary?”, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, IRES Discussion Paper, No: 2002/37.
- Berejikian, J. (1992) “Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent Structure Porblem”, The American Political Science Review, 11(3), 647-657.
- Coleman, J.S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Davies, C.J. (1962) “Toward A Theory of Revolution”, American Sociological Review, 27(1), 5-19.
- Dudley, L. (2000) “Rationality of Revolution”, Economics of Governance, 1(1), 77-103.
- Grossman, H. (1999) “Kleptocracy and Revolution” in Oxford Economics Papers, 51, 267 – 283.
- Kurzman, C. (1996) “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opporunity in Social Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979”, American Sociological Review, 61(1), 153-170.
- Lichbach, M.I. (1995) The Rebel’s Dilemma, Ann Harbour: The University of Michigan Press.
- Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harward University Press.
- Popkin, S. (1979) The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Roemer, J. (1989) “Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology: A Tale of Lenin and Tsar” in M. Taylor (ed.), Rationality and Revolution, Cambridge, 229-244.
- Sen, A.K. (1977) “A Critique of Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4), 317-344.
- Skocpol, T. (1979) States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snijders, C., W. Raub (1998) “Revolution and Risk: Paradoxical Consequences of Risk Aversion in Interdependent Situations”, Rationality and Society, 10, 405-425.
- Taylor, M. (1989) “Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action”, in M. Taylor (ed.) Rationality and Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 63-97.
- Tripathi, R.C.; R. Srivastava (1981) “Relative Deprivation and Intergroup Attitudes”, European Journal of Social Pscyhology, 11(3), 313-318.
- Tullock, G. (1971) “The Paradox of Revolution”, Public Choice, 11(1), 89-99.
Abstract
Revolutions, which constitute turning
points in the human history, has long been a subject matter of social sciences.
In this article, we review the approaches that analyse the incentives that
bring about revolutions. While doing this, we focus on the works that uses the
basic method of the modern economics, methodological individualism. In this
contex, it is revealed that the most important question is on what conditions a
rational, self-interest seeking individual chooses to become a revolutionary,
References
- Arnsperger, C., P De Ville (2002) “Could Homo Oeconomicus become a Revolutionary?”, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, IRES Discussion Paper, No: 2002/37.
- Berejikian, J. (1992) “Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent Structure Porblem”, The American Political Science Review, 11(3), 647-657.
- Coleman, J.S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Davies, C.J. (1962) “Toward A Theory of Revolution”, American Sociological Review, 27(1), 5-19.
- Dudley, L. (2000) “Rationality of Revolution”, Economics of Governance, 1(1), 77-103.
- Grossman, H. (1999) “Kleptocracy and Revolution” in Oxford Economics Papers, 51, 267 – 283.
- Kurzman, C. (1996) “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opporunity in Social Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979”, American Sociological Review, 61(1), 153-170.
- Lichbach, M.I. (1995) The Rebel’s Dilemma, Ann Harbour: The University of Michigan Press.
- Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harward University Press.
- Popkin, S. (1979) The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Roemer, J. (1989) “Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology: A Tale of Lenin and Tsar” in M. Taylor (ed.), Rationality and Revolution, Cambridge, 229-244.
- Sen, A.K. (1977) “A Critique of Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4), 317-344.
- Skocpol, T. (1979) States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snijders, C., W. Raub (1998) “Revolution and Risk: Paradoxical Consequences of Risk Aversion in Interdependent Situations”, Rationality and Society, 10, 405-425.
- Taylor, M. (1989) “Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action”, in M. Taylor (ed.) Rationality and Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 63-97.
- Tripathi, R.C.; R. Srivastava (1981) “Relative Deprivation and Intergroup Attitudes”, European Journal of Social Pscyhology, 11(3), 313-318.
- Tullock, G. (1971) “The Paradox of Revolution”, Public Choice, 11(1), 89-99.
Details
| Journal Section | Articles |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | June 30, 2010 |
| Submission Date | May 9, 2017 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2010 Volume: 28 Issue: 1 |
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