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OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ

Year 2012, Volume: 30 Issue: 1, 69 - 92, 30.06.2012
https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.103702

Abstract

 

Erişim ve arabağlantı kavramları telekomünikasyon sektörünün en önemli konularının başında gelmektedir. Özellikle arayan taraf öder prensibinin benimsendiği ülkelerde optimum arabağlantı ücreti konusunda önemli tartışmalar mevcuttur. Bu tartışmaların odağında ise işletmecilerce karşılıklı olarak belirlenen yüksek arabağlantı ücretleri ile monopolcü karın elde edilip edilmediği ve yerleşik operatörlerin arabağlantı ücreti yoluyla pazara girişleri engelleyip engellemedikleri bulunmaktadır. Bu yöndeki akademik yazında ise çeşitli pazar yapısına yönelik farklı sonuçlar elde edilmiştir. Genel kanı marjinal maliyete eşit arabağlantı ücretinin işletmeciler açısından en optimal seçenek olduğu olmakla birlikte, gerçekte işletmecilerin bunu neden benimsemedikleri halen açık bir soru olarak varlığını devam ettirmektedir.    

 

References

  • Armstrong, M. (1998) “Network Interconnection In Telecommunications”, The Economic Journal, 108(Mayıs), 545 – 564.
  • Carter, M. and J., Wright (2003) “Asymmetric network interconnection”, Review of Industrial Organization, 22(1), 27–46.
  • Comreg, (2004) “Response to Consultation and Notification to the European Commission-Whosale voice call termination on individual network” Comreg Doc., www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/publications/ComReg0551.pdf
  • Dessein, W (2003) “Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing”, RAND Journal of Economics, 34(1), 593 – 611. http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/wdessein/papers/competition.pdf
  • Elliott, D. (2008) “Two-Way Access Charges and On-Net/Off-Net Differentials: What are the Incentives on Operators and can Large MNOs Use High Access Charges to Foreclose the Market”, Moving the Debate Forward, The Policy Paper Series, Number 8, Vodafone Group Plc, 11-25.
  • ERG (2003) “Consultation Document on a Draft joint ERG/EC Approach on Appropriate http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg0330_draft_joint_approach_on_re medies.pdf in the New Regulatory Framework”.
  • Gabrielsen, T.M. and S. Vagstad (2008) “Why is On-Net traffic Cheaper than Off-Net Traffic? Access Markup as a Collusive Device”, Science Direct European Economic Review, 52, 99-115.
  • Gans, J.S. and S.P. King (2000) “Using Bill and Keep Interconnect Arrangements to Soften www.mbs.unimelb.edu.au/jgans. Competition”, University of Melbourne.
  • Hoernig, S. (2008) “Tariff-Mediated Network Externalities: Is Regulatory Intervention Any Good?, CEPR Discussion Paper, 6866, London.
  • Hoernig, S. (2007) “On-Net and Off-Net Pricing on Asymmetric Telecommunications Networks”, Information Economic and Policy, 19, 171 – 188.
  • Laffont, J.J., P. Rey and J. Tirole (1998) “Network Competition: Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 1- 37.
  • OECD, (2000); Mobile Phones: Pricing Structures and Trends, Information Society, Paris.
  • Sandbach, J. (2007) “Mobile Price Structure: Two sides of the Network”, Economics of Mobile Prices, Moving The Debate Forward, The Policy Paper Series, Number 7, Vodafone Group Plc, 1-3.
  • Schiff, A. (2008) “The Waterbed Effect and Price Regulation”, Review of Network Economics, 7(3), 392-414.
  • Schiff, A. (2001) “Two way Interconnection with Partial Consumer Participation”, Economics www.researchspace,auckland.ac.nz/ecwp/223 Papers, The University of Aukcland,
  • Valletti, T.M. and G. Houpis (2005) “Mobile Termination: What is the Right Charge”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 28(3), 235-258..
  • http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jmueller/its/conf/berlin04/Papers/Houpis_Valletti.pdf
  • Vogelsang, I. (2003) “Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks”, Journal of Economic Literature, 41(3), 830 – 862.
  • Veljanovski, C. (2007) “Networks Effects and Multi – Sided Markets”, Module 2 – Unit 7, Kings College, University Of London. www.ssrn.com/abstract=1003447
Year 2012, Volume: 30 Issue: 1, 69 - 92, 30.06.2012
https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.103702

Abstract

References

  • Armstrong, M. (1998) “Network Interconnection In Telecommunications”, The Economic Journal, 108(Mayıs), 545 – 564.
  • Carter, M. and J., Wright (2003) “Asymmetric network interconnection”, Review of Industrial Organization, 22(1), 27–46.
  • Comreg, (2004) “Response to Consultation and Notification to the European Commission-Whosale voice call termination on individual network” Comreg Doc., www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/publications/ComReg0551.pdf
  • Dessein, W (2003) “Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing”, RAND Journal of Economics, 34(1), 593 – 611. http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/wdessein/papers/competition.pdf
  • Elliott, D. (2008) “Two-Way Access Charges and On-Net/Off-Net Differentials: What are the Incentives on Operators and can Large MNOs Use High Access Charges to Foreclose the Market”, Moving the Debate Forward, The Policy Paper Series, Number 8, Vodafone Group Plc, 11-25.
  • ERG (2003) “Consultation Document on a Draft joint ERG/EC Approach on Appropriate http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg0330_draft_joint_approach_on_re medies.pdf in the New Regulatory Framework”.
  • Gabrielsen, T.M. and S. Vagstad (2008) “Why is On-Net traffic Cheaper than Off-Net Traffic? Access Markup as a Collusive Device”, Science Direct European Economic Review, 52, 99-115.
  • Gans, J.S. and S.P. King (2000) “Using Bill and Keep Interconnect Arrangements to Soften www.mbs.unimelb.edu.au/jgans. Competition”, University of Melbourne.
  • Hoernig, S. (2008) “Tariff-Mediated Network Externalities: Is Regulatory Intervention Any Good?, CEPR Discussion Paper, 6866, London.
  • Hoernig, S. (2007) “On-Net and Off-Net Pricing on Asymmetric Telecommunications Networks”, Information Economic and Policy, 19, 171 – 188.
  • Laffont, J.J., P. Rey and J. Tirole (1998) “Network Competition: Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 1- 37.
  • OECD, (2000); Mobile Phones: Pricing Structures and Trends, Information Society, Paris.
  • Sandbach, J. (2007) “Mobile Price Structure: Two sides of the Network”, Economics of Mobile Prices, Moving The Debate Forward, The Policy Paper Series, Number 7, Vodafone Group Plc, 1-3.
  • Schiff, A. (2008) “The Waterbed Effect and Price Regulation”, Review of Network Economics, 7(3), 392-414.
  • Schiff, A. (2001) “Two way Interconnection with Partial Consumer Participation”, Economics www.researchspace,auckland.ac.nz/ecwp/223 Papers, The University of Aukcland,
  • Valletti, T.M. and G. Houpis (2005) “Mobile Termination: What is the Right Charge”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 28(3), 235-258..
  • http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jmueller/its/conf/berlin04/Papers/Houpis_Valletti.pdf
  • Vogelsang, I. (2003) “Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks”, Journal of Economic Literature, 41(3), 830 – 862.
  • Veljanovski, C. (2007) “Networks Effects and Multi – Sided Markets”, Module 2 – Unit 7, Kings College, University Of London. www.ssrn.com/abstract=1003447
There are 19 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Journal Section Articles
Authors

İhsan Kulalı This is me

Hakan Bilir

Publication Date June 30, 2012
Submission Date April 14, 2015
Published in Issue Year 2012 Volume: 30 Issue: 1

Cite

APA Kulalı, İ., & Bilir, H. (2012). OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 30(1), 69-92. https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.103702
AMA Kulalı İ, Bilir H. OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. June 2012;30(1):69-92. doi:10.17065/huniibf.103702
Chicago Kulalı, İhsan, and Hakan Bilir. “OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ”. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 30, no. 1 (June 2012): 69-92. https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.103702.
EndNote Kulalı İ, Bilir H (June 1, 2012) OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 30 1 69–92.
IEEE İ. Kulalı and H. Bilir, “OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ”, Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 69–92, 2012, doi: 10.17065/huniibf.103702.
ISNAD Kulalı, İhsan - Bilir, Hakan. “OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ”. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 30/1 (June 2012), 69-92. https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.103702.
JAMA Kulalı İ, Bilir H. OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 2012;30:69–92.
MLA Kulalı, İhsan and Hakan Bilir. “OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ”. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, vol. 30, no. 1, 2012, pp. 69-92, doi:10.17065/huniibf.103702.
Vancouver Kulalı İ, Bilir H. OPTİMUM ARABAĞLANTI FİYATININ BELİRLENMESİ: OPERATÖRLER VE DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUMLAR AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 2012;30(1):69-92.

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