When Iraq attacked Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the international respond was immediate and enormous. In this international context, Germany could not stand irresponsive although its agenda was heavily preoccupied by the ongoing reunification negotiations. Additionally, another challenge for Germany in participating in such an international coalition was its post-World War II settlement which constrained Germany internally and externally from being a military power on world stage. Within this framework, this paper analyses German foreign policy during the First Gulf Crisis when 1990s made a fundamental reassessment about the scope and means of German foreign and security policy a necessity. This paper starts with a brief historical background of the international context and the Gulf War. Then, the paper focuses on the analysis of German foreign policy during the crisis in three periods. In doing so, this study mostly relies on secondary sources in its analysis by reviewing the relevant literature. In conclusion, the paper argues that, though it was comparatively limited, Germany’s participation in the international coalition responding the crisis is not a simple foreign policy choice but a strategic decision about reunified Germany’s role in the newly emerging international system, which will have greater implications as it substantially questioned a taboo on being an active international power including military means in world politics.