Çok Partili Başkanlık Sistemlerde Bölünmüş İktidar Oluşumunun Etki ve Sonuçları

Öz

Çok partili başkanlık sisteminde, başkanlık tek bir partinin elindeyken, yasama organını farklı partiler veya koalisyonlar kontrol ettiğinde bölünmüş hükümet ortaya çıkar. Bu bölünme, iki partili bölünmüş hükümet sistemlerinde görülenlere benzer şekilde yasama kilitlenmelerine yol açabilir. Yürütme ve yasama organları arasında iş birliği ve uzlaşma olmadan önemli yasaları geçirmek ve başkanın gündemini uygulamak zorlaşır. Bölünmüş hükümetin zorluklarının üstesinden gelmek için müzakereler ve uzlaşmalar elzem hale gelir. Başkanın önemli politikalar ve yasama girişimleri üzerinde uzlaşma sağlamak için yasama çoğunluğu ile birlikte çalışması gerekir. Bu genellikle pazarlık yapmayı, taviz vermeyi ve farklı tarafların çıkarları arasında ortak bir zemin bulmayı içerir. Ancak bazen uzlaşı yeterli olmaz ve anayasal sistemde bu kilitlenmeleri aşmak için bazı yöntemler ilave edilir. Yasama organında çoğunluğun bulunmaması nedeniyle, partiler ya da gruplar parlamentoyu etkin bir şekilde kontrol edebilmek için yeterli sandalye sayısına ulaşmak amacıyla genellikle koalisyonlar kurmak zorunda kalırlar. Koalisyonlar, birlikte çalışmayı ve gücü paylaşmayı kabul eden farklı partiler arasındaki ittifaklardır. Bunların haricinde seçimlerin eş zamanlı yapılması, başkana verilen anayasal yetkiler kilitlenmeleri önlemekte yardımcı olur. Bu makalede çok partili başkanlık sistemlerinde bölünmüş iktidar, bunun sonucunda oluşan azınlık başkanları ve kilitlenmeyi önleme araçları tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Çok Partili Başkanlık
• koalisyon
• Bölünmüş İktidar
• Azınlık Hükümetleri

EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDED POWER IN MULTI-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS

Öz

In the context of a multiparty presidential system, divided government refers to a situation where the legislature, such as parliament or congress, is controlled by different parties or coalitions, while the presidency is under the control of a single party. This division has the potential to result in legislative deadlocks akin to those observed in divided government systems of two-party systems. The absence of collaboration and concession between the executive and legislative branches poses challenges in the enactment of significant legislation and the execution of the president's policy objectives. The utilization of negotiations and compromises is imperative in order to address the challenges associated with a government that is divided. In order to effectively advance significant policies and legislative initiatives, it is imperative for the president to collaborate with the legislative majority and foster consensus. This frequently entails engaging in negotiations, reaching mutually agreeable solutions, and identifying shared objectives among diverse stakeholders. Occasionally, compromise may prove insufficient in resolving deadlocks within the constitutional system, prompting the implementation of additional mechanisms to address such impasses. When a single party or group fails to secure a majority in the legislative body, it is common for them to establish coalitions with other parties or groups. This strategic alliance is formed with the aim of attaining a satisfactory number of seats that would enable them to effectively govern and exert control over the parliament. Coalitions are strategic partnerships formed between distinct political entities, wherein they mutually consent to collaborate and distribute authority. Furthermore, the implementation of simultaneous elections and the allocation of constitutional powers to the president serve as effective measures to mitigate potential deadlocks. This article examines the phenomenon of divided power within multi-party presidential systems, focusing on the emergence of minority presidents and exploring potential strategies to prevent political deadlock.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• divided government
• coalition
• deadlock

Kaynakça

1. Anayurt, Ömer. Anayasa Hukuku: Genel Kısım: (Temel İlkeler, Kavram ve Kurumlar), 5.Basım, Ankara, Seçkin, 2022.
2. Anayurt, Ömer/Ekinci Ahmet. “Koalisyonlu Başkanlık Sistemi ve Latin Amerika Uygulaması”, içinde Ord. Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Başgil’in Anısına Armağan, editör Abuzer Kendigelen/Saadet Yüksel, s.227-332, İstanbul, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, 2019.
3. Aslan, Volkan. Karşılaştırmalı Anayasa Hukukunda ve Türkiye’de Devlet Başkanının Kararname Yetkisi, İstanbul, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, 2020.
4. Atar, Yavuz. Türk Anayasa Hukuku, 14.Basım, Ankara, Seçkin, 2022.
5. Bulmer, Elliot. “Presidential Veto Powers”. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2022.
6. Cameron, Charles M. “The Presidential Veto”, içinde The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency, editör George C. Edwards/William G. Howell, s.362- 82, Oxford University Press, 2009.
7. Cameron, Charles M. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
8. Chaisty, Paul/Cheeseman, Nic/Power, Timothy J. Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford University Press, 2018. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198817208.001.0001.

9. Cheibub, José Antonio. “Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems”, American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, 2006. doi:10.1017/s000305540606223x.
10. Cheibub, José Antonio, “Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies”. Comparative Political Studies 35, S.3, 01 Nisan 2002, s.284-312. doi:10.1177/0010414002035003002.
11. Cheibub, José Antonio/Limongi, Fernando. “Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered”, Annual Review of Political Science 5, S.1, 01 Haziran 2002, s.151-79. doi:10.1146/annurev. polisci.5.102301.084508.
12. Colomer, Josep M./Negretto, Gabriel L.. “Can Presidentialism Work Like Parliamentarism?” Government and Opposition. Cambridge University Press, 2005. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2005.00143.x.
13. Ekinci, Ahmet. Tek Başlı Karma Hükümet Sistemleri, Ankara, Yetkin Yayınları, 2020.
14. Elgie, Robert. Editör, Divided Government in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.
15. Elgie, Robert. “What Is Divided Government?”, içinde Divided Government in Comparative Perspective, editör Robert Elgie, Oxford University Press, 2001. doi:10.1093/0198295650.003.0001.
16. Franklin, Daniel P./ Caress, Stanley M./ Sanders, Robert M./Taratoot, Cole D. The Politics of Presidential Impeachment, Albany, 2020.
17. Ginsburg, Tom, Jose Cheibub, ve Zachary Elkins. “Still the Land of Presidentialism? Executives and the Latin American Constitution”, içinde New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices, editör Almut Schilling- Vacaflor/Detlef Nolte, 73-98. London, Routledge, 2012.
18. Gözler, Kemal. Anayasa hukukunun genel teorisi, Cilt II, Bursa, Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011.
19. Hamilton, Alexander/Jay, John/Madison, James, The Federalist Papers, 1787. Jones, David R. “Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock”, Political Research Quarterly 54, S.1, 2001, 125-41. doi:10.2307/449211.
20. Kim, Youngmi. The Politics of Coalition in Korea: Between Institutions and Culture, Routledge, 2014.
21. Laver, Michael/Schofield, Norman. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe, Comparative European Politics, Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1990. http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0637/89071133-d.html.
22. Lijphart, Arend. Demokrasi Modelleri: Otuz Altı Ülkede Yönetim Biçimleri ve Performansları, Çeviren: Güneş Ayas/Utku Umut Bulsun, 2014.
23. Mainwaring, Scott. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination”. Comparative Political Studies 26, S.2, 1993, s.198-228. doi:10.1177/0010414093026002003.
24. Mainwaring, Scott P. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1999.
25. Mainwaring, Scott/Shugart, Matthew Soberg. Editör, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge, New York, 1997.
26. Martínez, José Said Sánchez. “Coaliciones preelectorales, gobierno dividido y unificado a nivel estatal: 1998-2014”, Estudios políticos (México), S.32, Ağustos 2014, s.115-42.
27. Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia. “Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems?” Comparative Political Studies 45, S.1, 01 Ocak 2012, s.62-90. doi:10.1177/0010414011421306.
28. Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002, 2nd edition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2005.
29. McCarty, Nolan. “Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?” The Journal of Politics 71, S.2, Nisan 2009, s.369-84. doi:10.1017/S0022381609090331.
30. Mohan, Kerry. “Delegated Decree Authority in Contemporary South America: Comparative Study of the Radical Left and Their Threat to the Rule of Law”, Law and Business Review of the Americas 17, S.2, 26 Ekim 2017, s.231.
31. Montiel, Luis Enrique Concepción/Suárez, Martín/ Aranibar, Mónica Fernanda. “El impacto de los gobiernos divididos en la formulación y aprobación de las políticas públicas legislativas”, Institución Universitaria de Envigado, 31 Aralık 2018, s.4-20.
32. Negretto, Gabriel L. “Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina”. Comparative Political Studies 37, S.5, 01 Haziran 2004, s.531-62. doi:10.1177/0010414004263663.
33. Negretto, Gabriel L. “Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America”, Latin American Politics and Society 48, S.3, 2006, s.63-92.
34. Neto, Octavia Amorim. “Cabinet Formation in Presidential Regimes: An Analysis of 10 Latin American Countries”, Chicago, 1998.
35. Neto, Octavio Amorim. “The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas”, Comparative Political Studies 39, S.4, 2006, s.415-40.
36. Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal. Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America, Illustrated edition, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
37. Petracca, Mark P./Bailey, Lonce/Smith, Pamela. “Proposals for Constitutional Reform: An Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 20, S.3, 1990, s.503-32.
38. Power, Timothy J. “The Pen Is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil”, içinde Executive Decree Authority, editör John M. Carey/ Matthew Soberg Shugart, s.197-230, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511609305.008.
39. Rees-Evans, Laura/Carvosso, Rhys. “Legal Consequences of and Approaches to the Question of Recognition of a Government of a State: Disputes involving Venezuela”, ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 36, S.3, 01 Eylül 2021, s.563-91. doi:10.1093/icsidreview/siab022.
40. Reyes, Norman Wray, ve Jacob Hamburger. “The Constituent Process in Ecuador”, içinde Constitution Makers on Constitution Making: New Cases, editör Tom Ginsburg/Sumit Bisarya, s.212-52, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2022.
41. Sajó, András/Uitz, Renáta. The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2017.
42. Salazar, ““My power in the Constitution:” The perversion of rule of law in Ecuador”, https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/SELA15_Salazar_CV_Eng.pdf.
43. Saturno, James V./Heniff Jr., Bill/Lynch, Megan. “The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction”, Congressional Research Service, 30 Kasım 2016.
44. Shugart, Matthew Soberg. “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government”, The American Political Science Review 89, S.2, 1995, s.327-43. doi:10.2307/2082428.
45. Shugart, Matthew Soberg/Carey, John M.. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173988.
46. Shugart, Matthew Soberg/Mainwaring, Scott. “Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate”, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1997. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174800.002.
47. Tekin, Abdurrahman. “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sisteminde Yasamanın Güçlendirilmesi: Sözlü Soru ile Yürütme ve Bürokrasiden İzahat İstenmesi”, İstanbul Medipol Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 9, S.2, 30 Aralık 2022, s.297-334.
48. Tunç, Hasan. “Karşılaştırmalı Anayasa Hukuku Açısından Yasama ve Yürütme Organlarının Oluşumu ve Yetkileri Kapsamında Başkanlık Sistemi ve Türkiye”, Erciyes Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 14, S.2, 28 Ekim 2019, s.555-602.