Nonlinear Effects of Ownership Concentration and Board Structure on Tobin’s Q in Banks

Abstract

The performance of banks, which stand out with their financial intermediary role, varies depending on many factors and the importance of corporate governance practices has been emphasized in recent years. The findings show that the performance levels of banks in the current period are positively affected by their previous performance levels. The bank's performance is affected by its board of directors and ownership structure. The relationship between board scale and Tobin q is not linear. It has been determined that the relationship between the ownership right of the large shareholder and Tobin q in banks is not linear. The nonlinear relationship indicates the existence of an optimal level in terms of corporate governance practices. The increase in the ratio of independent and expert members in the board of directors affects the bank performance negatively. Also, it has been determined that the performance of the bank increases in case of duality in the board of directors of the bank. When the financial structure of the bank was evaluated, it was determined that the increase in the bank's non-performing loan ratio decreased the bank's performance.

Keywords

• Banking
• Board Size
• Tobin's Q
• System GMM

Effets non linéaires de la concentration de la propriété et de la structure du conseil d'administration sur le Q de Tobin dans les banques

Abstract

La performance des banques, qui se distinguent par leur rôle d'intermédiaire financier, varie en fonction de nombreux facteurs et l'importance des pratiques de gouvernance d'entreprise a été soulignée ces dernières années. Les résultats montrent que les niveaux de performance des banques au cours de la période actuelle sont positivement affectés par leurs niveaux de performance antérieurs. La performance de la banque est affectée par son conseil d'administration et sa structure de propriété. La relation entre l'échelle de la planche et le Tobin q n'est pas linéaire. Il a été déterminé que la relation entre le droit de propriété du grand actionnaire et Tobin q dans les banques n'est pas linéaire. La relation non linéaire indique l'existence d'un niveau optimal en termes de pratiques de gouvernance d'entreprise. L'augmentation du ratio de membres indépendants et experts au sein du conseil d'administration affecte négativement la performance de la banque. En outre, il a été déterminé que la performance de la banque augmente en cas de dualité au sein du conseil d'administration de la banque. Lors de l'évaluation de la structure financière de la banque, il a été déterminé que l'augmentation du ratio de prêts non performants de la banque diminuait la performance de la banque.

Keywords

• Bancaire
• taille du conseil d'administration
• Q de Tobin
• Systeme GMM

Bankalarda Sahiplikteki Yoğunlaşma ve Yönetim Kurulu Yapısının Tobin Q Üzerindeki Doğrusal Olmayan Etkileri

Abstract

Finansal aracı rolüyle ön plana çıkan bankalarda performans, birçok faktöre bağlı olarak değişmektedir ve son yıllarda kurumsal yönetim uygulamalarının önemine dikkat çekilmektedir. Bu çalışmada bankaların sahiplik yapısı, yönetim kurulunun özellikleri ve performans arasındaki ilişkiler gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki ticari bankalar açısından araştırılmıştır. Elde edilen bulgular, bankaların cari dönemdeki performans düzeylerinin bir dönem önceki performans düzeylerinden pozitif yönde etkilendiğini göstermiştir. Banka performansı, yönetim kurulu ve sahiplik yapısı bileşiminden etkilenmektedir. Yönetim kurulu ölçeği ile Tobin q arasındaki ilişki doğrusal değildir. Bankalarda büyük ortağın sahiplik hakkı ile Tobin q arasındaki ilişkisinin doğrusal olmadığı saptanmıştır. Doğrusal olmayan ilişki, kurumsal yönetim açısından optimal bir düzeyin varlığına işaret etmektedir. Yönetim kurulundaki bağımsız üye ve uzman üye oranlarının artması banka performansını negatif yönde etkilemektedir. Buna karşın, banka yönetim kurulunda ikilik olması halinde banka performansının arttığı belirlenmiştir. Bankanın finansal yapısı değerlendirildiğinde, bankanın takipteki kredi oranının artmasının banka performansını düşürdüğü saptanmıştır.

Keywords

• Bankacılık
• Yönetim Kurulu Ölçeği
• Sistem GMM
• Tobin’s Q

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