POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS: A REVIEW

Year 2018, , 1081 - 1101, 01.09.2018

İbrahim Yılmaz

https://doi.org/10.17130/ijmeb.2018445671

Abstract

The issue of politically connected firms has recently become one of the hot topics in management and financial studies. The aim of this review is to present the theories used in this topic and assesses the empirical studies. To do so first, we present the definition of politically connected firms. Subsequently, the paper introduces the theoretical approaches, namely; the resource dependence theory and the theory of privatization that aim to explain the reasons of political connection. Furthermore, the paper reviews existing empirical studies discussing the impacts of political connection on several issues: namely, impact of political connection on firm performance, impact of political connection on accessing bank credit, impact of political connection on accessing preferential treatments and finally impact of political connection on employment

Keywords

Politically Connected Firms, Resource Dependence Theory, Theory of Privatization, Accounting Performance

POLİTİK BAĞLANTILI FİRMALAR: DEĞERLENDİRME

Abstract

Politik bağlantılı firmalar konusu son dönemlerde yönetim ve finans alanlarının en gözde çalışma konularından birisi haline geldi. Bu değerlendirmenin amacı, bu konuyla ilgili teorileri sunmak ve ampirik çalışmaları değerlendirmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda ilk olarak, politik bağlantılı firmanın tanımı yapılmıştır. Akabinde, politik bağlantının gerekçelerini açıklamaya yönelik olan teoriler; kaynak bağımlılığı teorisi ve özelleştirme teorisini ele almıştır. Sonrasında, makale politik bağlantıların çeşitli konular üzerine etkilerini şöyleki; politik bağlantının firma performansı üzerine etkisi, politik bağlantının banka kredilerine ulaşmada etkisi, politik bağlantının ayrıcalıklı uygulamalara ulaşmada etkisi ve son olarak politik bağlantının istihdama etkisi, var olan ampirik çalışmalar bağlamında tartışarak incelenmektedir

Keywords

Politik Bağlantılı Firmalar, Kaynak Bağımlılığı Teorisi, Özelleştirme Teorisi, Muhasebe Performansı

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