Kamu Mali Yönetiminde Yolsuzluğun Azaltılmasında Mali Yerelleşmenin Önemi: Türkiye İçin Bir Analiz

Year 2025, Volume: 10 Issue: 1, 59 - 86, 30.06.2025

Rıdvan Engin , Mehmet Öksüz

https://doi.org/10.30927/ijpf.1577735

Abstract

Yerel yönetimler kaynak dağılımında etkinliğin sağlanması, vatandaşların tercihleriyle uyumlu hizmetlerin sunulması, katılımcılığın yanı sıra şeffaflık ve hesap verebilirliği de artırarak vatandaşların devlete olan güveninin iyileştirilmesi gibi alanlarda sağladıkları faydalar dolayısıyla kamu yönetiminde stratejik öneme sahip anayasal kuruluşlardır. Sayılan faydaların sağlanmasında, yetki ve sorumlulukların yerelleşmesinin yanı sıra tahsis edilen kaynakların yeterliliği de kritik öneme sahiptir. Zira politikalarının gerçekleştirilmesindeki en önemli kısıtlardan birisi kamu kaynağıdır. Bu anlamda, yerel yönetimlerin öz gelir olarak görebilecekleri gelir kaynaklarının merkezi idare tarafından yeterli miktarda tahsis edilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu tahsis dolayısıyla yerel yönetimlerin gelirleri ve ekonomi içerisindeki payı da artmaktadır. Bu artışın beraberinde savurganlığı ve yolsuzluğu getirip getirmeyeceği literatürde sıkça tartışılan bir konudur. Bu çerçevede çalışmada, 1995-2023 dönemini kapsayan veriler kullanılarak Türkiye’de mali yerelleşmenin yolsuzluk üzerindeki etkisi araştırılmıştır. Yapısal değişimleri dikkate alan Fourier fonksiyonuyla genişletilmiş eşbütünleşme testi kullanarak gerçekleştirilen analiz sonucunda, Türkiye’de mali yerelleşmenin yolsuzluğu azalttığına ilişkin kanıtlara ulaşılmıştır.

Keywords

Mali yerelleşme, Yolsuzluk, Türkiye, Fourier ADL eşbütünleşme testi

The Importance of Fiscal Decentralization in Reducing Corruption in Public Fiscal Management: An Analysis for Türkiye

Abstract

Local governments are constitutional institutions of strategic importance in public administration due to the benefits they provide in areas such as ensuring efficiency in resource allocation, providing services in line with citizens' preferences, improving citizens' trust in the state by increasing transparency and accountability as well as participation. In providing the benefits listed, the adequacy of the allocated resources as well as the decentralization of authority and responsibilities are of critical importance. Because one of the most important constraints in the implementation of policies is public funding. In this sense, the central government should allocate sufficient amounts of revenue sources that local governments can consider as own revenues. Due to this allocation, the revenues of local governments and their share in the economy also increase. Whether this increase will lead to wastefulness and corruption is a frequently debated issue in the literature. In this context, the study investigated the effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption in Türkiye using data covering the period 1995-2023. Using an extended cointegration test with a Fourier function that takes into account structural changes, as a result of the analysis, we find evidence that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption in Türkiye.

Keywords

Fiscal decentralization, Corruption, Türkiye, Fourier ADL cointegration test

References

• Alfada, A. (2019). “Does Fiscal Decentralization Encourage Corruption in Local Governments? Evidence from Indonesia”. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 12(3), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030118.
• Aljebrin, M.A. (2012). “Labor Demand and Economic Growth in Saudi Arabia”. American Journal of Business and Management. 1(4), 271–277. https://doi.org/10.11634/216796061706216.
• Altunbaş, Y. & Thornton, J. (2012). “Fiscal Decentralization and Governance”. Public Finance Review. 40(1), 66-85. https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142111424276.
• Andvig, J. R. & Moene, K.O. (1990). “How Corruption May Corrupt”. Journal of Economic and Organization. 13(1), 63-76. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(90)90053-G.
• Arıkan, G.G. (2004). “Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?”. International Tax and Public Finance. (11), 175-195. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ITAX.00000 11399.00053.a1.
• Bahl, R. (2008). The Pillars of Fiscal Decentralization. CAF Working Paper. https://ikels-dspace.azurewebsites.net/bitstream/handle/123456789/257/200807Bahl.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, (Erişim: 14.08.2024).
• Banerjee, P., L. Arčabić & Lee, H. (2017). “Fourier ADL Cointegration Test to Approximate Smooth Breaks with New Evidence from Crude Oil Market”. Economic Modelling. (67), 114-124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.11.004.
• Barankay, I. & Lockwood, B. (2007). “Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence from Swiss Cantons”. Journal of Public Economics. 91(5-6), 1197-1218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.006.
• Besley, T. & Coate, S. (2003). “Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Approach”. Journal of Public Economics. 87(12), 2611-2637. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00141-X. Bird, R. M. & Vaillancourt, F. (1998). “Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: An Overview”. İçinde Bird R.M. & Vaillancourt F. (Ed.), Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries ( 1-48). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Bozdoğanoğlu, B. (2013). “Konaklama Vergisi Uygulaması ve Türkiye’de Uygulanabilirliği”. Maliye Dergisi. (164), 131-149.
• Çoban, H. (2014). “Mali Yerinden Yönetim Kavramı ve İçeriği”. İçinde Sakal M., Kesik A. & Akdemir T. (Ed.), Mali Yerinden Yönetim Teori, Kavramsal Açıklamalar ve Türkiye’ye İlişkin Değerlendirmeler (24-38). Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık Eğitim Danışmanlık Tic. Ltd. Şti.
• Çoban, H. & Balıkçıoğlu, E. (2022). “Devlete Güven ve Mali Yerelleşmenin Güven Üzerindeki Etkisi”. Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. (61), 437-452. https://doi.org/10.18070/erciyesiibd.1057538.
• Çukur, A. (2022).”Türkiye’de Mali Yerelleşme ve Kamu Kesimi Büyüklüğü: 2009-2020 Dönemi”. Maliye Dergisi. (182), 108-129.
• Demir, A. & Yüksel, C. (2019). “Türkiye’de Mali Yerelleşme Düzeylerinin Ölçülmesi”. Uluslararası Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi. 5(4), 13-28.
• Demirbaş, T. & Çetinkaya, Ö. (2010). “Belediye Gelir Türü Olarak Motorlu Taşıtlar Vergisi Önerisinin Tartışılması”. İçinde Altuğ F., Çetinkaya Ö. & İpek S. (Ed.), Mahalli İdareler Maliyesi Üzerine Yazılar (117-130). Bursa: Ekin Yayınevi.
• Devas, N. (2005). “The Challenges of Decentralization”. Global Forum on Fighting Corruption. Brasilia, June 2005, https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/eventos/anos-anteriores/2005/ iv-forum-global-de-combate-a-corrupcao-1/arquivos/nickdevas-2.pdf (Erişim: 14.08.2024).
• Dincer, O.C., Ellis, C.J. & Waddell, G.R. (2010). “Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition”. Economics of Governance. (11), 269-294. 10.1007/s10101-009-0067-x.
• Dong, B. & Torgler, B. (2013). “Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China”. China Economic Review. (26), 152-169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.09.005.
• Enders, W. & Lee, J. (2012). “The Flexible Fourier Form and Dickey–Fuller Type Unit Root Tests”. Economics Letters. 117(1), 196-199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet. 2012.04.081.
• Fiorino, N., Galli, E. & Padovano, F. (2012). “Do Fiscal Decentralization and Government Fragmentation Affect Corruption in Differen Ways? Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis”. International Center for Public Policy. Working Paper 12-17. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782544302.00009.
• Fiorino, N., Galli, E. & Padovano, F. (2015). “How Long Does It Take for Government Decentralization to Affect Corruption?”. Economics of Governance. (16), 273-305. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-015-0156-y.
• Fisman, R. & Gatti, R. (1999). Decentralization and Corruption: Cross-Country and Cross-State Evidence. World Bank, Washington, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document? repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi= 8ff693b9c504283c185221b9d32e3a 05e4839980, (Erişim: 05.06.2023).
• Fisman, R. & Gatti, R. (2002). “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries”. Journal of Public Economics. (83), 325-345. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0047-2727(00)00158-4.
• Gallant, A.R. (1981). “On The Bias in Flexible Functional Forms and an Essentially Unbiased Form”. Journal of Econometrics. 15(2), 211–245. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/0304-4076(81)90115-9.
• Gould, D.J. & Amaro-Reyes, J.A. (1983). The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance. World Bank Staff Working Paper, Number 580, Washington.
• Gurgur, T. & Shah, A. (2005). “Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?”. Annals of Economics and Finance. 15(1), 109-136.
• Huntington, S.P. (1989). “Modernization and Corruption”. İçinde Heidenheimer A.J. & Johnston M. (Ed.), Political Corruption Concepts & Contexts ( 253-264). New Brunswick: Routledge.
• Ivanyna, M. & Shah, A. (2011). “Decentralization and Corruption: New Cross-Country Evidence”. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. 29(2), 344-362. https://doi.org/10.1068/c1081r.
• İpek, S. (2010). “İdarelerarası Vergi Paylaşımına Farklı Bir Yaklaşım: Yerel Vergiler ve Vergi Uyumu”. İçinde Altuğ F., Çetinkaya Ö. & İpek S. (Ed.), Mahalli İdareler Maliyesi Üzerine Yazılar (31-62). Bursa: Ekin Yayınevi.
• Jain, A.K. (2001). “Corruption: A Review”. Journal of Economic Surveys. 15(1). 71-121. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00133.
• Karlström, K. (2015). Decentralization, Corruption and the Role of Democracy. Qog Working Paper Series, 14, https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/handle/2077/40204/ gupea_2077_40204_1.pdf?sequence=1&is Allowed=y, (Erişim: 02.06.2023).
• Kaufmann D. (2005). Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption. MPRA Paper No. 8089, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8089/1/MPRA_paper_8089.pdf, (Erişim: 23.05.2024).
• King, D. (1997). “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Concepts and Models”. İçinde Fisher R.C. (Ed.), Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (19-59). Dordrecht: Springer. Kolstad, I. (2005). Direct Budget Support and Corruption. Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. U4Issue 1, http://library. mstcdc.ac.tz:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/ 37/1/Budget%20Support%20and%20 Corruption.pdf, (Erişim: 23.05.2024).
• Kolstad, I., Wiig, A. & Somville, V. (2014). Devolutionary Delusions? The Effect of Decentralization on Corruption. CMI Working Paper, https://open.cmi.no/cmi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2475143/Devolutionary%20delusions%3f%20The%20effect%20of%20decentralization%20on%20corruption?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, (Erişim: 22.04.2024).
• Lambsdorff, J.G. (2007). The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• McMullan, M. (1961). “A Theory of Corruption”. The Sociolagical Review. 9(2), 181-201. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1961.tb01093.x.
• Meriem, M., El Hassan, T. & Ayman, B.M. (2016). “Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption in Emerging and Developing Countries”. International Journal of Economics. (4), 211-222. 10.11648/j.ijefm.20160404.17.
• Nazlioglu, S., Gormus, N.A. & Soytas, U. (2016). “Oil Prices and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs): Gradual-shift Causality and Volatility Transmission Analysis”. Energy Economics. (60), 168-175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.09.009.
• OECD (2024). Revenue and Spending Shares of State and Local Government, https://www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/fiscal-decentralisation-database/, (Erişim: 22.05.2024).
• Oates, W.E. (1999). “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”. Journal of Economic Literature. 37(3), 1120-1149.
• Oates, W.E. (2005). “Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism”. International Tax and Public Finance. (12), 349-373. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10797-005-1619-9.
• Oates, W.E. (2008). “On the Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions”. National Tax Journal. 61(2), 313-334.
• Öksüz, M. (2023). “Konaklama Vergisinin Belediyelere Tahsisi: Türkiye İçin Bir Değerlendirme”. İçinde Eroğlu Sevinç D. & Yüce Akıncı G. (Ed.), Ekonomi ve Finans Politikaları Üzerine Çalışmalar. (223-238). Gaziantep: Özgür Yayınları.
• Peixoto, S.G.D., Rocha, F.F., Niishijima, M. & Postali, F.A.S. (2012). “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from Primary Health-Care Programmes”. Applied Economics Letters. (19), 1885-1888. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.671918.
• Plaček, M., Ochrana, F., Půček, M.J. & Nemec, J. (2020), “Fiscal Decentralization Reforms and Local Government Efficiency: An Introduction”, İçinde Plaček M., Ochrana F., Půček M.J. & Nemec J. (Ed.), Fiscal Decentralization Reforms, (1-49). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3030-46758-6_1.
• Porcelli, F. (2009). “Fiscal Decentralisation and Efficiency of Government. A Brief Literature Review”. Polit. Sci. Econ. 1-12.
• Prud’homme, R. (1995). “The Dangers of Decentralization”. The World Bank Research Observer. 10(2), 201-220.
• Quah, J.S.T. (2010). “Combating Corruption”. İçinde Quah J.S.T. (Ed.), Public Administration Singapore-style (171-198). Bingle: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
• Rahim, F.U. & Parveen, R. (2018). “Corruption and Fiscal Decentralization: A Comparative Analysis for Developed and Developing Economies”. Pakistan Social Sciences Review. 2(1), 352-368.
• Seabright, P. (1996). “Accountability and Decentralisation in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model”. European Economic Review. 40(1), 61-89. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00055-0.
• Shah, A. (2007). “Introduction: Principles of Fiscal Federalism”. İçinde Shah A. & Kincaid J. (Ed.), The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives (3-42). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
• Siburian, M. E. (2022). “Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption: A Case of Indonesia”. Applied Economics Letters. 31(1), 87-90. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851. 2022.2128164.
• Tanzi, V. (1998). “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures”. IMF Staff Papers. 45(4), 559-594. https://doi.org/10.2307/3867585.
• Tanzi, V. (2000). “On Fiscal Federalism: Issues to Worry About”. Conference on Fiscal Decentralization, Vol. 1, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/ fiscal/tanzi.pdf, (Erişim: 14.08.2024).
• Tiebout, C. M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”. Journal of Political Economy. 64(5), 416-424.
• Transparency International (2024). Corruption Perceptions Index, https://www. transparency.org/en/cpi/ 2023, (Erişim: 22.05.2024).
• Triesman, D. (2000). “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study”. Journal of Public Economics. (76), 399-457. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4.
• Tumennasan, B. (2005). Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption in the Public Sector. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Atlanta: Georgia State University.
• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Manual on Corruption Surveys. Center of Excellence in Statical Information on Government, Crime, Victimization and Justice, Vienna, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime -statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_ web.pdf, (Erişim: 14.08.2024).
• Weingast, B. R. (1995). “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 11(1), 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036861.
• Wellisch, D. (2000). Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management the World Bank, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/799831538245192753/pdf/ Helping-Countries-Combat-Corruption-The-Role-of-the-World-Bank.pdf, (Erişim: 09.05.2024).
• Yüksel, H. (2013). “Türkiye’de Mali Yerelleşmenin Boyutları ve Ölçümü Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”. Yönetim ve Ekonomi. 20(2), 191-208.