Iran’s Proxy Networks as Instruments of Regional Power: Ideology, Strategy, and Consequences in the Middle East

Abstract

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has strategically co-opted a network of non-state armed actors across the Middle East. While existing scholarship itemizes these linkages, multifariously termed “proxy forces” or “the axis of resistance”, the constitutive logic underlying such alliances is undertheorized. This article maintains that Iran’s proxy networks are not opportunistic but establish a comprehensible grand strategy constituted by ideological affinity, emphasized threat perception, and asymmetric deterrence calculus. Based on multi-case study methodology including Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and proceeding from foreign policy analysis and proxy warfare theory, the study scrutinizes the political, ideological, and financial mechanisms reinforcing these ties within Iran’s post-revolutionary security doctrine and its rivalry with the United States and Israel. The findings reveal that proxy deployment represents an asymmetric advantage authorizing power projection while diminishing direct military contact.

Keywords

• Proxy warfare;
• Middle Eastern security;
• Axis of Resistance;
• asymmetric deterrence;
• non-state armed actors;
• IRGC Quds Force

Supporting Institution

No funding was received for this study.

Ethical Statement

The author has no competing interests to declare.

Iran’s Proxy Networks as Instruments of Regional Power: Ideology, Strategy, and Consequences in the Middle East

Abstract

1979 İslam Devrimi'nden bu yana İran, Ortadoğu genelinde devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerden oluşan bir ağı stratejik biçimde bünyesine katmaktadır. Mevcut literatür bu bağlantıları çok yönlü bir şekilde "vekil güçler" ya da "direniş ekseni" olarak nitelendirerek belgelemekle birlikte, söz konusu ittifakların altında yatan kurucu mantık yeterince kuramlaştırılmamıştır. Bu makale, İran'ın vekil ağlarının fırsatçı bir nitelik taşımadığını; aksine ideolojik uyum, belirginleştirilen tehdit algısı ve asimetrik caydırıcılık hesabından müteşekkil, anlaşılır bir büyük stratejinin tezahürü olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Lübnan, Irak, Suriye ve Yemen'i kapsayan çok vakıalı bir metodolojiye dayanan ve dış politika analizi ile vekil savaş kuramından hareket eden bu çalışma, söz konusu bağları İran'ın devrim sonrası güvenlik doktrini ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve İsrail ile sürdürdüğü rekabet çerçevesinde pekiştiren siyasi, ideolojik ve finansal mekanizmaları irdelemektedir. Bulgular, vekil güç konuşlandırmasının doğrudan askeri teması en aza indirirken güç yansıtmaya olanak tanıyan asimetrik bir avantajı temsil ettiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Keywords

• Vekil savaş;
• Ortadoğu güvenliği;
• Direniş Ekseni;
• asimetrik caydırıcılık;
• devlet dışı silahlı aktörler;
• IRGC Kudüs Gücü

Supporting Institution

Bu çalışma için herhangi bir finansman desteği alınmamıştır.

Ethical Statement

The author has no competing interests to declare.

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