RESISTANCE TO CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT: ACTORS AND FACTORS THAT HINDER REFORM IN GOVERNMENT

Year 2016, Volume: 8 Issue: 2, 226 - 245, 01.12.2016

İbrahim Demir Coşkun Can Aktan

Abstract

This study provides a review of the factors and actors that can hinder and resist to change or reform in economic and political system. lThe study reviews and explains the preference toward change or resistance within an expected costs expected benefits framework. Basically, individuals are assumed to resist to change and reform if they do not foresee specific net private benefits from the change or refom in question. In reviewing the resistance to change or reform, the study takes the welfare-improving change as benchmark and evaluates the position, attitudes, and characteristics of various decision-makers in the society around this benchmark. The study is expected to motivate additional discussions, organize thoughts, and prompt empirical tests of the assertions made regarding resistance to change or reform.

Keywords

change, reform, government reform, active resistance, passive resistance

References

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