Conciliationism as Epistemic Concession in Religious Peer Disagreement

Abstract

This paper examines religious disagreements between epistemic peers—individuals with equal cognitive capacities—focusing on the two dominant responses: conciliationism and steadfastness. While conciliationism advocates for a moderate attitude towards epistemic peers and revising one’s beliefs in case of disagreement, steadfastness argues that it is rational for an individual to maintain their current beliefs. I argue that conciliationism faces serious epistemic challenges, rendering it an unsustainable position. Building on a novel account of steadfastness, this study contends that retaining one’s belief in religious peer disagreement is rational if the following four conditions are met: (i) the believer’s evidence continues to support their belief within their interpretive and epistemic framework (independent justification); (ii) no genuine defeater undermines the belief either by rebutting it directly or undercutting the reliability of the evidence (absence of genuine defeat); (iii) the believer’s confidence remains above a rational threshold appropriate to the stakes of inquiry (confidence threshold);, and (iv) the believer holds a higher-order judgment affirming that their justification remains at least as strong as their peer’s (meta-belief endorsement). By integrating these conditions, the paper demonstrates that conciliationism (a) has a restrictive effects on religious and philosophical inquiry, (b) is internally inconsistent, (c) carries the risk of widespread epistemic uncertainty by opening the way to skepticism, and finally (d) carries the risk of weakening or even eliminating the function of evidence. Consequently, this study argues that this revised steadfastness framework offers a more defensible and epistemically responsible alternative to conciliationism, preserving the integrity of religious, inquiry while upholding the demands of epistemic rationality.

Keywords

• Philosophy of Religion
• Religious Peer Disagreement
• Epistemic Rationality
• Epistemic Concession
• Conciliationism
• Steadfastness

Dini İhtilafta Epistemik Taviz Olarak Uzlaşımcılık

Abstract

Bu makale, eşit bilişsel kapasitelere sahip epistemik denkler arasındaki dini ihtilafları ele almakta ve bu ihtilaflara yönelik iki baskın yaklaşım olan uzlaşmacılık ve kararlılık görüşlerini incelenmektedir. Uzlaşımcılık çeşitli epistemik problemler barındırır ve ortaya çıkardığı şüpheci sonuçlara bağlı olarak rasyonel bir pozisyon olarak sürdürülebilir olup olmadığı tartışmalıdır. Kararlılık tutumuna dair yeni bir yaklaşım sunan bu çalışma, denk ihtilafında kişilerin inancını korumasının şu dört koşulun sağlanması şartıyla rasyonel olduğunu savunmaktadır: (i) bireyin elindeki kanıtların kendi epistemik çerçevesi çinde inancını desteklemeye devam etmesi (bağımsız gerekçelendirme); (ii) inancı doğrudan ürüten veya kanıtın güvenilirliğini zedeleyen ihtilaftan bağımsız bir çürütenin bulunmaması (hakiki çürüten eksikliği); (iii) bireyin inancına yönelik güveninin, ilgili konunun epistemik önemine uygun bir rasyonel değerin üzerinde kalması (güven eşiği); ve (iv) bireyin, kendi gerekçesinin denginin gerekçesinden en az onun kadar güçlü olduğuna dair meta bir yargıya sahip olması (ikinci dereceden inanca dayanan tasdik). Çalışmamız, bu ilkelerden haraketle uzlaşımcı yaklaşımın (a) araştırmayı kısıtlayıcı bir etki doğurduğunu, (b) kendisiyle tutarsız olduğunu, (c) şüpheciliğe kapı aralayarak geniş çaplı bir epistemik belirsizlik riski taşıdığını ve son olarak (d) kanıtın işlevini zayıflatma ve hatta ortadan kaldırma riski taşıdığını savunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, sunduğumuz kararlılık yaklaşımının, uzlaşımcılığa kıyasla daha savunulabilir, tutarlı ve epistemik açıdan sorumlu bir alternatif sunduğunu; hem dini sorgulamanın özerkliğini hem de epistemik rasyonalitenin gereklerini koruduğunu ileri sürmektedir.

Keywords

• Din Felsefesi
• Dini İhtilaf
• Epistemik Rasyonalite
• Epistemik Taviz
• Uzlaşımcılık
• Kararlılık

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