China’s Policy on Iran Nuclear Issue: The Balance Between National Interest and “Responsible Great Power”

Year 2018, Volume: 2 Issue: 2, 11 - 35, 29.12.2018

Ümit Alperen

https://doi.org/10.33201/iranian.510584

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Abstract

 

The importance of
China’s policy toward Iran’s Nuclear Program has gradually increased because of
China’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the
increase of interest areas in the Middle East, and being one of the biggest
challenging countries to the global position of the US. Besides, an active
diplomacy of China in the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA), the
increase in interest areas in the international system, and rise of its
political position shows that China pursues a more active diplomacy. While
China defends the nuclear program of Iran for the use of civilian purposes, it
also prioritizes the regime of the continuation of nuclear weapons. China also
aims to improve its mutual relationship with Iran, which is subject to
international sanctions, in the field of energy and economy. On the other hand,
it not only aims to protect the image of “responsible great power”, but also
continue its positive relationship with the US. After unilaterally the
withdrawal of the USA from the JCPOA, China’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear
program based on the balance between national interests and the image of
“responsible great power” has gained much more importance.  In this paper, I analyze the impact of the
parameters of China’s changing position in international system, the
relationship between China and the US, national interests at the level of local
/global and the image of “responsible great power” on China’s policy toward
Iran’s nuclear program. This article argues that China’s policy toward Iran’s
nuclear program is determined by the balance between national interests and the
image of “responsible great power” of the rising actor. China’s relationship
with Iran remains limited because China prioritizes the relationship with the
US, and aims to protect the image of “responsible great power”. 

Keywords

China, Iran, Nuclear Programme, National Interest, Responsible Great Power

Çin’in İran Nükleer Politikası: Ulusal Çıkar ve “Sorumlu Büyük Güç” Arasında Denge

Abstract

Öz

Çin’in Birleşmiş
Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nin (BMGK) daimî üyesi olması, Ortadoğu’da çıkar
alanlarının artması ve uluslararası sistemin mevcut başat aktörü ABD’nin
küresel konumuna en büyük meydan okuyucu ülkelerden birisi olması nedeniyle
İran Nükleer Programı’na yönelik politikasının önemi gün geçtikçe artmaktadır.
Ayrıca Çin’in “Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı Antlaşması” (KOEP) sürecindeki
politikası, uluslararası sistemde çıkar alanlarının artması ve siyasi konumunun
yükselmesi ile daha aktif bir diplomasi izlediğinin ve izleyeceğinin
işaretidir. Çin, sivil amaçlı nükleer programın İran’ın hakkı olduğunu
savunurken, aynı zamanda nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesi rejiminin
sürdürülmesine önem vermektedir. Ayrıca uluslararası yaptırımlara maruz kalan
İran ile ikili enerji ve ekonomik ilişkilerini geliştirmek isterken, diğer
yandan da hem “sorumlu büyük güç” imajını hem de ABD ile ilişkilerini korumak
istemektedir. ABD’nin KOEP’den tek taraflı olarak çekilmesinden sonra, Çin’in
ulusal çıkarları ile sorumlu büyük güç imajı arasında nasıl bir denge
sağlayacağı daha fazla önem kazanmıştır. Bu çalışmada, Çin’in İran Nükleer
Programı politikasında uluslararası sistemdeki değişen konumunun, Çin-ABD
ilişkilerinin, bölgesel/küresel düzeydeki ulusal çıkarlarının ve “sorumlu büyük
güç” imajı parametrelerinin etkileşimi sonucunda nasıl belirlendiği analiz
edilmektedir. Bu makale, Çin’in İran Nükleer Politikasını ulusal çıkarları ve
yükselen aktörün “sorumlu büyük güç” imajı arasındaki dengeyi gözeterek
belirlediğini savunmaktadır. Çin’in ABD ile ilişkilerini daha öncelikli görmesi
ve “sorumlu büyük güç” imajının zarar görmemesi için İran ile ilişkileri
sınırlı kalmaktadır.

Keywords

Çin, İran, Nükleer Program, Ulusal Çıkar, Sorumlu Büyük Güç

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