DDSA’larda (Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler) Özerklik ve Çatışmalarda Üstlenilen Role Etkisi: Hizbullah ve Fatımi Tugayı Örnekleri

Year 2024, Volume: 8 Issue: 2, 215 - 243

Ömer Behram Özdemir

https://doi.org/10.33201/iranian.1537044

Abstract

Devlet dışı silahlı aktörler (DDSA) Ortadoğu’daki çoğu çatışma bölgesinde diğer DDSA’lara veyahut devletlere karşı savaşta rol almaktadırlar. Bölgedeki pek çok çatışmaya müttefiki DDSA’lar üzerinden dahil olarak bölgedeki nüfuzunu arttıran İran ise DDSA’lar ve sponsor devletler üzerine yapılan çalışmalarda ön plana çıkan bir vaka konumundadır. Irak, Lübnan, Yemen ve Suriye’de İran destekli DDSA’lar çatışmaların ve bölge politikalarının önemli aktörleri haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada odaklanılacak Suriye iç savaşında ise İran bölgeye yönlendirdiği onlarca DDSA üzerinden savaş sahasına müdahil olmuştur. Bu çalışmada Suriye’deki İran destekli milisler içerisinden Hizbullah ve Fatımi Tugayı’nın İran ile ilişkileri özerklik ve savaşta üstlenilen rol bağlamında ele alınacaktır. DDSA’lar ve DDSA’ların özerkliğine dair literatür ışığında her iki örgütün tarihi arka planına, Suriye iç savaşındaki rollerine ve özerklik kapasitelerine odaklanılacaktır. Vakaların özerklik kapasiteleri insani, mali ve askeri kaynakları üzerinden analiz edilecektir. Örgütlerin İran ile ilişkilerde sahip oldukları özerkliğin Suriye iç savaşında üstlendikleri roller üzerindeki etkisi çalışmanın bir diğer çıktısı olacaktır.

Keywords

İran, Suriye İç Savaşı, Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler, Hizbullah, Fatımi Tugayı

Autonomy of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) and Its Impact on the Role Undertaken in Conflict: The Cases of Hezbollah and the Fatemiyoun Brigade

Abstract

Violent non-state actors (VNSA) play a role in the wars against other VNSAs or states in most conflict zones in the Middle East. Iran, which has increased its influence in the region by involving itself in many conflicts through allied VNSAs, stands out as a prominent case in studies on VNSAs and their sponsor states. In Iraq, Lebanon, Yemenessential, and Syria, Iranian-backed VNSAs have become important actors in conflicts and regional politics. In the Syrian civil war, which will be the focus of this study, Iran intervened in the battlefield through dozens of VNSAs directed to the region. In this study, the relationships of Hezbollah and the Fatemiyoun Brigade with Iran will be examined in the context of autonomy and the roles undertaken in the Syrian civil war. The focus will be on the historical background of both organizations, their roles in the Syrian civil war, and their capacities for autonomy in light of the literature on VNSAs and their autonomy. The autonomy capacities of the cases will be analyzed through the manpower, financial, and military resources. Another outcome of the study will be the impact of the autonomy these organizations possess in their relationships with Iran on the roles they have undertaken in the Syrian civil war.

Keywords

Iran, Syrian Civil War. Violent non-state actors, Hezbollah, Fatemiyoun Brigade

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