Ön Seçim, Sosyalleşme ve Stabil Ağlar

Öz

İnsanlar tercihler yaparken veya davranışlarına karar verirken arkadaşlarının karar ve tercihlerinden etkilenirler. Öte yandan insanlar arkadaşlık kararlarını verirken de arkadaşlarının tercih ve kararlarından etkilenirler. Kandel (1978) araştırmasında bu iki yönlü etkinin var olduğunu ampirik olarak göstermiş ve bu etkilere sosyalleşme ve ön seçim olarak adlandırmıştır. Bu makalede biz insanların arkadaşlıklarına karar verdikleri bir sosyal ağ modeli öneriyoruz. Sosyalleşme etkilerini çalışabilmek için bireylerin tercih ve kararlarını arkadaşları ile koordine ettiği bir ağ oyunu modelliyoruz. Ön seçim etkilerini çalışabilmek içinse bireylerin ağ oyununda tek olduğunu gösterdiğimiz Nash Dengesine dayalı olan fayda fonksiyonuna göre arkadaşlık kararlarını verdiklerini varsayıyoruz. Belli bazı sosyal ağların da stabil ağ olduğunu gösteriyoruz.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Ön Seçim
• Sosyalleşme
• Sosyal Ağlar Teorisi

Selection, Socialization and Stable Networks

Öz

When individuals make decisions or choose behaviors, they are affected by the decisions or behaviours of their friends. In turn, individuals often choose their friend based on similarities in these decisions and behaviours. Kandel (1978) provide emprical evidence that these aspects are present in friendship networks and refers them as socialization and selection, respectively. In this paper, we consider a model of friendship network which reflects both aspects. To capture socialization, we consider a network game where agents with different types choose an action on a certain behaviour to coordinate their action both with their type and actions of friends in network. Agent, then, decide their friends based on the utility of network game under unique Nash equilibrium. We show certain class of networks are pairwise stable.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Selection
• Socialization
• Social Network Theory

Kaynakça

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