Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance

Year 2017, Issue: 37, 7 - 34, 15.12.2017

Ömer Mahir Alper

Abstract

The issue of ignorance (jahl), which has been dealt with by many Islamic
philosophers in the history of Islamic philosophy, is related to not only
epistemology but also logic, psychology, and ethics. We can say that the most
elaborate account of “ignorance” in the early Islamic philosophy appears in the
works of Avicenna (d. 429/1037). However, it seems that Avicenna’s idea of
ignorance has not yet been extensively studied. The purpose of this article is
to study and present Avicenna’s view of ignorance, focusing on its important
aspects.

In his Kitāb al-Burhān of al-Shifā, which is one of the logical books of
the Shifā compilation, Avicenna defines ignorance as the soul’s illness (maraḍun nafsāniyyun). Knowledge is not inherent in humans; however, it is gained
over time, and is added to human soul. With the attachment of knowledge to the
soul, humans achieve perfection. Thus, we can say that humans are potentially
knowledgeable and actively ignorant at birth. This active ignorance, in other
words, simple ignorance, is not what is described as an illness by Avicenna.

Avicenna describes another type of ignorance that is not simple, but is
rather added to the soul. In other words, this type of ignorance is not
inherent to the soul and, in this respect, is additional to the soul in the
same way as knowledge is. This ignorance, which is also called composite
(murakkab) ignorance, is temporally posterior to or comes after the the the
soul comes into existence.

While simple ignorance is a state of pure deficiency of knowledge,
composite ignorance is the deficiency attached with a belief that is contrary
to the popular meaning of knowledge. Its combined nature is what causes its
ill-nature.

Another difference between simple and composite ignorance is that of awareness;
it is possible for someone with simple ignorance to be aware of his/her lack of
knowledge and to eventually seek knowledge as a result of this awareness. At
this point, simple ignorance opens a passage to knowledge. It can be claimed
that awareness of one’s own ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.

Avicenna exemplifies, through many examples, how composite ignorance is
related to mistakes made in syllogistic forms. Examples of synonymous middle
terms and mistakenly distributed middle terms, also demonstrate that the art of
logic is critical to avoid composite ignorance.

It is, thus, no surprise that his evaluation also addresses dialectical
debate (jadal) and regards the mentioned-method as an explicit source of
combined ignorance. As per Avicenna, using misused and ambiguous terminology
and mistakes in the form of syllogism are in the very essence of dialectical
debate. Burhān (demonstration), on the other hand, represents perfection in the
form and content of syllogism.

Another classification of ignorance is due to the conceptuality (tasawwurī)
and assertiveness (tasdīqī) of ignorance. Some philosophers claim that
conceptual ignorance can take only the simple form. And, only composite
ignorance is obtained in the assertive form.

Avicenna also speaks of the idea of particularity about ignorance. The
particular ignorance maintains that something which is potentially known can be
actively unknown as well.

The ethical dimension of the issue of ignorance is more explicit when we
reach the discussions in the Adhawiya where Avicenna connects the types of
ignorance to degrees and stages of humans in afterlife. In this respect,
ignorance is connected to the level of a human being’s self-realization in
terms of practical and theoretical dimensions, and this ignorance is a defining
factor for the future life of humans.

In conclusion, Avicenna’s theory of ignorance is developed in relation to
epistemology, logic and ethics. Ignorance is defined as an illness of the soul,
an illness which is to be treated by logic. Additionally, composite ignorance
when not treated, causes one to be subject to eternal punishment even if the
human achieves some level of ethical perfection. When a human is aware of the
ways to reach his or her perfection, and ,still chooses ignorance over
perfection, despite possession of this awareness, then this human will be
punished in afterlife.

Keywords

Avicenna, Knowledge, Ignorance, Soul, Happiness

İbn Sînâ'nın Cehâlet Teorisi

Abstract

İslâm felsefe geleneğinde birçok filozof tarafından ele alınıp tartışılan
“cehâlet (cehl) sorunu”, bilgi teorisi kadar mantık, psikoloji ve ahlâk
felsefesi gibi alanlarla da yakından irtibatlı önemli bir meseledir. Klasik
dönem İslâm filozofları (felâsife) arasında –pek çok meselede olduğu gibi- bu
mesele hakkında da en kapsamlı açıklamalarda bulunan filozofun İbn Sînâ (ö.
429/1037) olduğu söylenebilir. Bununla birlikte İbn Sînâ’nın cehâlet görüşünün
bütüncül bir biçimde ortaya konulması, bugüne kadar İslâm felsefe tarihçileri
tarafından ihmal edilmiş görünmektedir. Bu makale, İbn Sînâ’nın cehâlet
görüşünü çeşitli boyutlarıyla ele almayı ve analiz etmeyi amaçlamakta ve onun
bu meseleyle ilgili yaklaşımının bütüncül bir resmini ortaya koymayı
hedeflemektedir.

Keywords

İbn Sînâ, Bilgi, Cehâlet, Nefs, Mutluluk

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