Sınırlı Özerklik: Rasyonel Seçimin Kantçı ve Evrimsel Temelleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Abstract

Bu çalışma, Kantçı ahlak felsefesi, evrimsel oyun teorisi ve mikro iktisadi rasyonel seçim kuramını birleştirerek rasyonaliteyi görev ile uyum arasındaki dinamik bir denge olarak yeniden tanımlamaktadır. Neoklasik iktisat fayda maksimizasyonunu, Kant etiği ise özerk ahlaki eylemi varsayarken, evrimsel oyun teorisi rasyonalitenin evrimsel baskılar altında ortaya çıkan bir özellik olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Makalede sınırlı özerklik kavramı geliştirilmiştir. Bireyler hem ahlaki ilkeler hem de uyarlanabilir güdüler altında hareket etmektedir. İki stratejili bir evrimsel modelde, ajanlar Kantçı (görev temelli) veya faydacı (araçsal) davranışı seçmektedir. Çoğaltan dinamikler, uzun vadeli iş birliği kazançları kısa vadeli cazibeleri aştığında ahlaki stratejilerin evrimsel olarak kararlı kaldığını göstermektedir. Böylece özerklik mutlak değil, bağlamsal bir denge haline gelmektedir. Model, ahlaki normların evrimsel olarak kalıcılığını vurgulayarak mikro ekonomiye ahlaki bir temel kazandırmaktadır.

Keywords

• Evrimsel Oyun Teorisi
• Davranışsal İktisat
• Sınırlı Özerklik

Bounded Autonomy: A Kantian-Evolutionary Approach to Rational Choice Theory

Abstract

This study synthesizes Kantian moral philosophy, Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), and microeconomic rational choice to redefine rationality as a dynamic balance between duty and adaptation. While classical economics assumes utility-maximizing agents and Kantian ethics posits autonomous moral actors, EGT views rationality as an emergent property shaped by evolutionary pressures. The paper introduces bounded autonomy, a condition where agents act under both moral principles and adaptive incentives. Using a two-strategy evolutionary model, agents choose between Kantian (duty-based) and utilitarian (instrumental) behavior. Replicator dynamics show that moral strategies remain evolutionarily stable when long-term cooperative gains exceed short-term temptations. Thus, autonomy emerges not as absolute freedom but as contextually constrained stability. The model challenges both neoclassical and behavioral assumptions by demonstrating that moral norms can evolve and persist as equilibria, offering a new philosophical foundation for microeconomics grounded in moral evolution and strategic adaptation.

Keywords

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics
• Bounded Autonomy

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