GELİR GRUBU DAĞILIMLARININ POLİTİK VAATLERE ETKİSİ: GELİR DAĞITIM KARARLARI ÜZERİNE DENEYSEL BİR ANALİZ

Year 2018, , 162 - 173, 15.10.2018

Fehime Ceren Ay Bilge Öztürk Göktuna

https://doi.org/10.24954/JORE.2018.21

Abstract

Başkalarını etkileyen dağılım kararları verirken bireylerin kararlarını şekillendiren mekanizmalar iktisat, politika ve psikoloji literatürlerinin ortak alanında yer almış ve pek çok teorinin temelini oluşturmuştur. Önerilen sözler ve bu sözlerin tutulup tutulmadığı bu üç alanın her birinde farklı yönleriyle incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmada söz verme ve sonrasında gerçekleştirme/gerçekleştirmeme yönündeki tercihleri bir seçim oyununda incelemeyi amaçlıyoruz. Tasarladığımız oy verme deneyinde katılımcılar; seçmen ve politikacı rollerinde yer almaktadır. Politikacı katılımcılar, kendilerine verilen bütçe üzerinden seçmenlere yönelik gelir bölüşümüne dair seçim vaatlerinde bulunarak rekabet etmektedirler. Heterojen başlangıç gelirleri olan seçmenler, her politikacının değişik gelir gruplarına yönelik gelir dağılım önerilerini görerek oy kullanmaktadırlar. Seçim neticesinde kazanan politikacıdan seçmenlere yönelik gerçek bölüşüme karar vermesi istenmektedir. Bu deneyle cevaplamayı amaçladığımız iki temel soru var: Politikacı rolündeki bireyler vaatlerini nasıl bir strateji ile şekillendiriyor? Ve Kazanan politikacılar verdikleri sözleri tutuyor mu? Aldığımız sonuçlar bireylerin seçimleri kazanma yönünde vaatlerini şekillendirdiğini ancak yüksek gelir grubuna yönelik vaatlerin, düşük ve orta gelir grubuna verilen vaatlerden daha az tutulduğunu göstermektedir.

Keywords

Politika vaatleri, seçim oyunu, gelir dağılımı

IMPACT OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION ON POLICY PLEDGES: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS ON DECISIONS OF DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

Abstract

Mechanisms that shape decisions of individuals while making distribution decisions that affect others are at the intersection of economics, politics and psychology and form the basis of many theories. Policy promises made and the ways in which these promises were kept have been examined form different perspectives in each of the three areas. In this study, we aim to examine the preference in making and keeping promises in a political competition setup. Participants in the voting game that we have designed are either voters or politicians. Politician participants compete by making policy promises at the elections on the distribution of income for voters, over the budget given to them. Voters with heterogeneous initial revenues vote by referring to the income distribution proposals of each politician for different income groups. As a result of the election, the elected politician is asked to decide on his/her actual distribution of income for voters. There are two main questions that we aim to answer with this experiment: How do the participants in the role of politician shape their strategy of promises? And do the winning politicians keep their promises? Our results indicate that individuals shape promises to win elections, but promises of a high-income group are kept less than promises given to low and middle-income groups.

Keywords

Policy pledges, election game, income distribution

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