Kamusal Karar Alma Süreci: Literatür İncelemesi

Tülin Altun

Kamusal Karar Alma Süreci: Literatür İncelemesi

Öz

Bu çalışmada kamusal karar alma modellerine ilişkin literatürün tarihsel süreçteki gelişimi incelenmiştir. İktisadi düşüncedeki, politik kurumlardaki, hükümetlerin politikalarındaki değişimler gibi koşulların bu modellere etkisi dikkate alınarak ilgili literatür üç ana başlıkta değerlendirilmiştir. Kamusal kararlarda etkinlik sonuçlarına odaklanan normatif modeller, erken dönem talep yönlü yaklaşımlar olarak ele alınmıştır. Politika yapıcıların davranışlarına odaklanan çalışmalar, Kamu Tercihi Teorisine bağlı olarak geliştirilen modeller bağlamında incelenmiştir. Kural ve kurumların etkisine odaklanan modeller, yasama ve yürütmenin yapısı, seçim kuralları, hükümet biçimleri, bütçe prosedürleri gibi kurumsal sınıflandırmalara göre incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

References

Abbott, A. & Jones, P. (2016). Fiscal illusion and cyclical government expenditure: State government expenditure in the United States. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 63(2), 77-193. google scholar
Acemoglu, D. (2005). Constitutions, politics and economics: A review essay on persson and Tabellini’s “The economic effect of constitutions”. NBER Working Paper,11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. google scholar
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2000). Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, ınequality, and growth in historical perspective. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1167-1199. google scholar
Alberto Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterty Journal of Economies, 102, s.651-78. google scholar
Alesina, A. & Drazen, A. (1991). Why are stabilizations delayed?. American Economic Review, 81(5), 1170-1188. google scholar
Alesina, A. & Perotti, R. (1996). Fiscal discipline and the budget proces. The American Economic Review, 86(2), 401-407. google scholar
Alesina, A. & Sachs, J. (1988). Political parties and the business cycle in the United States, 1948-1984. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20, 63-82. google scholar
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. & Trebbi, F. (2006). Who adjust sand when? On the political economy of reforms. NBER Working Paper,12049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. google scholar

Alesina, A.& Perotti, R. (1999). Budget deficits and budget institutions. . J. M. Poterba ve J. von Hagen (Eds.), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance (pp. 13-36). National Bureau of Economic Research. google scholar
Alt, J. & Chrystal, K. A. (1981). Electoral cycles, budget controls, and public expenditure. Journal of Public Policy, 1, 37-59. google scholar
Alt, J.E. & Lowry, R.C. (1994). Divided government and budget deficits: evidence from the states. American Political Science Review, 88, 811-828. google scholar
Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley. google scholar
Austen-Smith, D. (2000). Redistributing income under proportional representation. Journal of Political Economy, 108(6), 1235-1269. google scholar
Austen-Smith, D. & Banks, J. (1988). Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes. American Political Science Review, 82(2), 405-22. google scholar
Baron, D. P. (1989). A noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions. American Journal of Political Science, 33(4), 1048-1084. google scholar
Baron, D. P. & Ferejohn, J. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. The American Political Science Review, 83(4), 11811206. google scholar
Barta, Z. (2018). In the red: the politics of public debt accumulation in developed countries, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. google scholar
Bawn, K. & Rosenbluth, F. (2006). Short versus long coalitions: Electoral accountability and the size of the public sector. American Journal of Political Science, 50(2), 251-265. google scholar
Becker, G. S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), 371-400. google scholar
Becker, G. S. (1985). Public policies, pressure froups, and dead weight costs. Journal of Public Economics, 28(3), 329-347. google scholar
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. google scholar
Bradbury, J. C. & Crain, W. M. (2002). Bicameral legislatures and fiscal policy. Southern Economic Journal, 68(3), 646-659. google scholar
Brennan, G. & A. Hamlin (1992). Bicameralism and majority equilibrium. Public Choice, 74, 169-179. google scholar
Brennan, J. & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The reason of rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. google scholar
Buchanan J. M. (1979a). Politics without romance: A sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications. IHS Journal, 3, B1-B11. google scholar
Buchanan J. M. (1986). The constitution of economic policy, Nobel Prize Lecture, Erişim Adresi: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/lecture/ google scholar
Buchanan, J. M. (1979b). Public choice and public finance. J.M. Buchanan (Eds.), What should economists do?, (pp. 183-197). Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 183-197. google scholar
Buchanan, J. M. (1980). Rent seeking and profit seeking. J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison ve G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society (pp.3-15). College Station: Texas A&M University Press. google scholar
Buchanan, J. M. (1990). The domain of constitutional economics. Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), 1-18. google scholar
Buchanan, J. M. (1999). The logical foundations of constitutional liberty. The collected works of J. M. Buchanan Vol. 1, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. google scholar
Buchanan, J. M. & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. google scholar
Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11, 17-33. google scholar
Coleman, J. S. (1966). The possibility of a social welfare function. American Economic Review, 56, 1105-22 google scholar
Colomer, J. (2005). It’s parties that choose electoral systems (or, Duverger’s law upside down). Political Studies, 53, 1-21. google scholar
Condorcet, N. (2014). Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a laprobabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des voix. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. google scholar
Congleton, R. D. (2003). On the merits of bicameral legislatures: Policy stability within partisan polities. Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 22, 29-49. google scholar
Congleton, R. D. (2004). The median voter model. The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Springer, Boston, MA, 707712. google scholar
Cukierman, A. & Meltzer, A. H. (1986). A positive theory of discretionary policy, the cost of democratic government, and the benefits of a constitution. Economic Inquiry, 24, 367-88. google scholar
Dabla-Norris, E., Allen, R., Zanna, L-F., Prakash, T. Kvintradze, E., Lledo, V., Yackovlev, I., & Gollwitzer, S. (2010). Budget institutions and fiscal performance in low-ıncome countries. IMF Working Paper, 80. google scholar
Dollery, B. & Worthington, A. (1996). The empirical analysis of fiscal illusion. Journal of Economic Surveys 10(3), 261-297. google scholar
Downs, A. (1957a). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row. google scholar
Downs, A. (1957b). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 65(2), 135-150. google scholar
Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown google scholar
Drazen, A. & Grilli, V. (1993). The benefit of crises for economic reforms. The American Economic Review, 83(3), 598-607. google scholar
Duverger, M. (1974). Siyasal partiler (çev. E. Özbudun). Bilgi Yayınevi, İstanbul. google scholar
Frey, B. S. & Schneider, F. (1978). A politico-economic model of the United Kingdom. Economic Journal, 88, 243253. google scholar
Grofman, B. & Lijphart, A. (1986). Electoral laws and their political consequences. New York: Agathon. google scholar
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41, 617-631. google scholar
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248. google scholar
Heller, W. B. (1997). Bicameralism and budget deficits: The effect of parliamentary structure on government spending. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(4), 485-516. google scholar
Hibbs, D. A. Jr.(1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487. google scholar
Huntington, S. P. (1996). Üçüncü dalga: Yirminci yüzyıl sonlarında demokratlaşma (E. Özbudun, Çev.). Yetkin Yayınları, Ankara. google scholar
Inman, R. P. (2008). The flypaper effect. NBER Working Paper, 14579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. google scholar
Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143. google scholar
Krueger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. The American Economic Review, 64(3), 291-303. google scholar
Lindahl, E. (1919). Die gerechtigkeit der besteuering. Lund: Gleerup (çev. ve yeniden basan E. Henderson). R.A. Musgrave & A.T. Peacock (Eds.). Just taxation a positive solution in classics in the theory of public finance, 1958, London: Macmillan. google scholar
Lindbeck, A. (1976). Stabilization policy in open economies with endogenous politicians. The American Economic Review, 66(2), 1-19. google scholar
Lizzeri, A. & Persico, N. (2001). The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives. The American Economic Review, 91(1), 225- 239. google scholar
MacRae, D.C. (1977). A political model of the business cycle. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 239-263. google scholar
Marshall, A. (1893). On rent. The Economic Journal, 3(9), 74-90. google scholar
McCulloch, J.R. (1975). A treatise on the practical influence of taxation and the funding system. D.P. O’Brien (Eds.). Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press. google scholar
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., Perotti R. & Rostagno (2002). Electoral systems and public spending. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(2), 609-657. google scholar
Mill, J.S. (1909). Principles of political economy, Longman (Reprint 1973). New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley, Clifton. google scholar
Miller, N. R. (1977). Logrolling, vote trading, and the paradox of voting: A game theoretical overview. Public Choice, 30, 51-75. google scholar
Mueller, D. C. (1976). Public choice: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 14(2), 395-433. google scholar
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine Atherton. google scholar
Niskanen, W.A. (1975). Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 617-643. google scholar
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42, 169-190. google scholar
Oates, W. E. (1975). Automatic ıncreases in tax revenues - the effect on the size of the public budget. W.E. Oates (Eds.), Financing the New Fderalism: Revenue Sharing Conditional Grants and Taxation (pp.139-160). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. google scholar
Oates, W. E. (1979). Lump-sum ıntergovernmental grants have price effects. P. Mieszkowski ve W. Oakland (Eds.). Fiscal federalism and grants-in-aid. Washington DC: The Urban Institute. google scholar
Olson, M., Jr. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. google scholar
Özbudun, E. (1995). Seçim sistemleri ve Türkiye. Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 44(1), 521-539. google scholar
Padovano, F. & Venturi, L. (2001). Wars of attrition in Italian government coalitions and fiscal performance: 19481994. Public Choice, 109(1), 15-54. google scholar
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2003). The economic effect of constitutions. What do the data say?. MIT Press, Cambridge. google scholar
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2004a). Constitutions and economic policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(1), 75-98. google scholar
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2004b). Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes. American Economic Review, 94(1), 25-45. google scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. & Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political accountability. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1163-1202. google scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. & Tabellini, G. (2000). Comparative politics and public finance. Journal of Political Economy, 108(6), 1121-1161. google scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. & Tabellini, G. (2003). How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies?. NBER Working Paper, 10176, National Bureau of EconomicResearch, Cambridge, Mass. google scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. & Tabellini, G. (2006). Comparative politics and public finance. Journal of Political Economy, 108(6), 1121-1161. google scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. & Tabellini, G. (2007). Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2(2), 155-188. google scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. & we, G. (1998). Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance. European Economic Review, 42(3-5), 685-694. google scholar
Puviani, A. (1903). Teoria della illusione finanziaria, Remo Sandon, Milan. ) J. M Buchanan (çev. ve Eds.). The fiscal illusion: Chapter in public finance in democratic process: Fiscal institutions and individual choice, 1967, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. google scholar
Regenwetter, M. & Grofman, B. (1998). Approval voting, borda winners, and condorcet winners: Evidence from seven elections. Management Science, 44(4), 520-533. google scholar
Ricardo, D. (2008). Siyasal iktisadın ve vergilendirmenin ilkeleri (çev. B. Zeren). Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul. google scholar
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. google scholar
Riker, W. H. (1992). The justification of bicameralism. International Political Science Review, 13, 101-116. google scholar
Riker, W. H. & Brahms, S. J. (1973). The paradox of vote trading. American Political Science Review, 67, 1235-47. google scholar
Rogoff, K. & Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economic Studies, 60, 1.16. google scholar
Romer, T. (1988). Nobel laureate on James Buchanan’s contributions to public economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (4), 165-179. google scholar
Roubini, N. & Sachs, J. (1989). Government spending and budget deficits industrial economies. NBER, Working Paper, 2919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. google scholar
Rowley, C. K. (1984). The relevance of the median voter theorem. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of 'Institutional and Theoretical Economics, The New Institutional Economics: A Symposium (Mârz 1984), 104-126. google scholar
Rowley, C.K. (2008). Public choice and constitutional political economy (Chapter 1). C.K. Rowley ve F.G. Schneider (Eds.). Readings in public choice and constitutional political economy (pp. 47-73). Springer, Boston, M.A. google scholar
Samuelson, P. S. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 36, 387-89. google scholar
Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis, ECPR Press. google scholar
Schwartz, T (1975). Vote trading and pareto efficiency. Public Choice, 24, 101-109. google scholar
Sen, A. (2014). Arrow and the impossibility theorem. E. Maskin ve A. Sen (Eds.). The Arrow impossibility theorem (pp. 29-42). West Sussex: Columbia University Press. google scholar
Shepsle, K. A. (1986). Institutional equilibria and equilibrium institutions. H. Weisberg (Eds.). Political science: The science of politics (pp.51-81). New York: Agathon. google scholar
Shepsle, K. A. & Weingast, B. R. (1981). Political preferences for the pork barrel: A generalization. American Journal of Political Science, 25, 96- 111. google scholar
Sirkin, G. (1975). The anatomy of public choice failure. R.D. Leiter ve G. Sirkin (Eds.) Economics of public choice (pp.15-26). New York: : Cyro Press. google scholar
Stigler, G. J. (1961). The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 213-225. google scholar
Stratmann, T. (1992). The effects of logrolling on congressional voting. The American Economic Review, 82(5), 1162-1176. google scholar
Tollison R.D. (2004). Rent seeking. C.K. Rowley ve F. Schneider (Eds.). The encyclopedia of public choice. Springer, Boston, MA. google scholar
Tullock, G. (1965). The politics of bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press. google scholar
Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232. google scholar
Tullock, G. (1971). The cost of transfers. Kyklos, 24, 629-643. google scholar
Tullock, G. (1987). Public choice. The new palgrave dictionary of economics, London: The Mcmillan, 104-144. google scholar
Tullock, G. (1991). Duncan Black: The founding father. Public Choice, 71, 125-128. google scholar
Tullock, G. (1998). The fundamentals of rent-seeking. The Locke Luminary, 1(2), 93. google scholar
Voigt, S. (2011). Positive constitutional economics II: A survey of recent developments. Public Choice, 146, 205256. google scholar
Volkerink, B. & de Haan, J. (1999). Political and institutional determinants of thetax mix: An empirical ınvestigation for OECD countries. SOM Research Report, University of Groningen, Groningen google scholar
von Hagen, J. (1992). Budgeting Procedures and fiscal performance in the European Communities. Economic Paper, 96, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Commission of the European Communities. google scholar
von Hagen, J. (2002). Fiscal rules, fiscal institutions, and fiscal performance. The Economic and Social Review, 33(3), 263-284. google scholar
von Hagen, J. & Harden, I. J. (1995). Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline. European Economic Review, 39, 771-779. google scholar
Wagner, R. E. (1976). Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice. Public Choice, 25, 45-61. google scholar
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A. & Christopher J. (1981). The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 642-664. google scholar
Wicksell, K. (1896). Finanztheoretische untersuchungen, Jena, Germany: Gustav Fisher. J. Buchanan ve R. Musgrave (çev. ve Eds.). A new principle of just taxation. J. Buchanan, R. Musgrave ve A. Peacock (Eds.). Classics in the theory of public finance (1958), (pp. 72-118). New York: Macmillan and Company. google scholar

Details

Primary Language

Turkish

Subjects

Economics

Journal Section

Review

Authors

Tülin Altun ^*
0000-0003-2008-0039
Türkiye

Publication Date

November 22, 2022

Submission Date

August 15, 2022

Acceptance Date

September 6, 2022

Published in Issue

Year 1970 Number: 68

IZ

https://izlik.org/JA32XD68AG

Cite

RIS / Bibtex

APA

Altun, T. (2022). Kamusal Karar Alma Süreci: Literatür İncelemesi. Maliye Çalışmaları Dergisi, 68, 133-157. https://izlik.org/JA32XD68AG