Destabilizing Hegemony: Fostering Uncertainty to Sustain Russian Status with Multipolarity

Abstract

Since the commencement of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term, Russia has undergone a significant transformation in its foreign policy, becoming more globally active and regionally assertive. This study argues that central to this transformation is the strategic use of "unpredictability" to advance Russia's interests in an international environment where US hegemony is perceived to be declining. The strategy of unpredictability is primarily executed through cyberattacks and coercive military power, aimed at reshaping the international system to favor Russian interests. The research question examined by this paper is: What strategy underlies Russia's use of cyberattacks and coercive military power to challenge US hegemony? To answer the question, our study employs Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis in international relations: the individual, the state, and the system levels. At the individual level, we examine how Vladimir Putin's personal beliefs and strategic calculations shape Russian foreign policy. At the state level, we explore how Russia's internal political, economic, and social structures contribute to its foreign policy actions. At the systemic level, we analyze how Russia seeks to challenge the ideological foundations of the US-led international order and create a multipolar world. Russia’s cyber operations against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, alongside its military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, serve as examples of this strategy. This study evaluates the role of unpredictability in achieving Russia’s foreign policy objectives and its implications for the international system. Finally, the consequences of this strategy for global governance are discussed.

Keywords

• Russian Foreign Policy
• Russia-US relations
• Strategy
• International security
• Unpredictability.

Destabilizing Hegemony: Fostering Uncertainty to Sustain Russian Status with Multipolarity

Abstract

Vladimir Putin'in üçüncü başkanlık döneminden itibaren Rusya, dış politikasında belirgin bir dönüşüm sergileyerek küresel ölçekte daha aktif ve bölgesel olarak daha iddialı bir duruş sergilemiştir. Bu çalışmada, bu dönüşümün merkezinde, ABD hegemonyasının azaldığı bir uluslararası ortamda Rusya'nın çıkarlarını ilerletmek amacıyla "öngörülemezlik" stratejisinin kullanıldığı savunulmaktadır. Öngörülemezlik stratejisi, siber saldırılar ve zorlayıcı askerî güç kullanımı aracılığıyla yürütülmektedir ve Rusya'nın uluslararası sistemi kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda yeniden şekillendirmeyi amaçladığını göstermektedir. Araştırma sorumuz şu şekildedir: "Rusya'nın, siber saldırılar ve zorlayıcı askerî güç kullanımında ABD hegemonyasına meydan okuma stratejisi nedir?". Bu bağlamda, çalışmamız Kenneth Waltz'ın uluslararası ilişkilerde üç analiz düzeyine dayanan teorik çerçevesini kullanmaktadır: birey, devlet ve sistem düzeyleri. Birey düzeyinde, Vladimir Putin'in kişisel inançlarının ve stratejik hesaplamalarının dış politikaya etkisi incelenmektedir. Devlet düzeyinde, Rusya'nın iç siyasi, ekonomik ve toplumsal yapılarının dış politikaya katkıları ele alınmaktadır. Sistem düzeyinde ise Rusya'nın ABD liderliğindeki uluslararası düzenin ideolojik temellerine meydan okuması ve çok kutuplu bir dünya düzeni oluşturma çabaları incelenmektedir. Siber saldırılar (Estonya, Gürcistan, Ukrayna) ve zorlayıcı askeri güç kullanımları (Gürcistan, Ukrayna, Suriye), Rusya'nın bu stratejiyi nasıl uyguladığının örnekleridir. Çalışmamız, bu stratejinin Rusya'nın dış politika hedeflerine ulaşma sürecindeki rolünü ve uluslararası sistem üzerindeki etkilerini analiz etmektedir. Son olarak, bu stratejinin küresel yönetişim üzerindeki sonuçları tartışılmaktadır.

Keywords

• Rus Dış Politikası
• Rusya-ABD ilişkileri
• Strateji
• Uluslararası güvenlik
• Tahmin edilemezlik.

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