Rational Economic Decision Making: The Relevance Among The Axioms of The Theory of Expected Utility

Year 2019, , 535 - 548, 22.01.2019

Gelengül Koçaslan

https://doi.org/10.21547/jss.433199

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Abstract

The theory of expected utility which is suggested by
John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern in 1944 has had great currency since it
was first suggested in 1944 because of its solid and consistent axiomatic
structure.  The theory explains economic
behavior, decision making process, economic preference and choice using axioms.
Although it still prevents its popularity; it has been seriously questioned by
several behavioral and experimental research from 1950 because of  the apparent difference between reality and
the theory. The huge gap between economic behavior in real life situations and
the way that the theory suggests it have been revealed and economists’ view has
been often citicisized for falling short of reality.

This paper provides a detailed
description of all of the axioms of the theory of expected utility, reveals the
relevance among them  and presents a
guidance for economic and interdisciplinary research. 

Keywords

Expected utility theory, economic decision making, axioms, rationality

Rasyonel İktisadi Karar Alma:Beklenen Fayda Teorisi Aksiyomları Arasındaki İlişki

Abstract

John Von Neumann ve Oscar Morgenstern tarafından 1944 yılında önerilen
beklenen fayda teorisi  ilk defa
önerildiği 1944 yılından beri sağlam ve tutarlı aksiyomatik yapısı nedeniyle
büyük rağbet görmüş, geçerlilik kazanmıştır. Bu teori iktisadi davranışı, karar
alma süreçlerini, iktisadi tercih ve seçimi aksiyomları kullanarak
açıklamaktadır. Her ne kadar popülaritesini korusa da; realite ve teori
arasındaki bariz farklılık nedeniyle 1950 yılından sonra çeşitli davranışsal ve
deneysel araştırmalarla ciddi biçimde sorgulanmıştır. Gerçek hayattaki iktisadi
davranış ve teorinin öngörüsü arasındaki büyük boşluk açıklanmış ve
iktisatçıların görüşü sıklıkla gerçeklikten uzak olmakla eleştirilmiştir.

Bu makale beklenen fayda teorisinin aksiyomlarının tamamının detaylı
tanımını sağlamakta, aralarındaki ilişkiyi ortya çıkarmakta ve iktisadi ve
disiplinlerarası araştırmalar için bir kılavuz sunmaktadır.

Keywords

Beklenen fayda teorisi, iktisadi karar alma, aksiyomlar, rasyonalite

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