Centilmen Kapitalizm ve Bağdat Demiryolu, 1888 –1914: ‘Kozmopolitanizme’ Karşı ‘Vatanseverlik’

Abstract

Cain ve Hopkins’in yorumuna göre İngiliz emperyalizmi, “centilmen kapitalistler” olarak adlandırdıkları bir toplumsal zümre tarafından gerçekleştirilen bir olguydu. Bu ibare Güneydoğu İngiltere merkezli bir mal ve hizmet sektörüne gönderme yapmaktadır. Elinizdeki makale, Cain ve Hopkins’in yaklaşımının Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Almanya’nın yürüttüğü Bağdat demiryolu projesine karşı İngiliz ticari ve siyasi elitlerinin takındığı tutumu ne ölçüde aydınlatabildiğini irdelemek suretiyle, söz konusu tartışmaya katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Deutsche Bank tarafından temsil edilen Alman girişimi, 1888’den itibaren Anadolu’da demiryolu inşaatına başlamış durumdaydı. 1903’e gelindiğindeyse Almanlar, Ankara’yı Basra Körfezi’ne bağlayacak olan Bağdat demiryolu projesi için gereken imtiyazı temin etmişlerdi. Bu durum İngilizler’i bu projeye katılmak ile ona muhalefet etmek arasında bir tercih yapmaya zorladı. Londra merkezli finans çevrelerinin oluşturduğu bir grup, projeye katılabilmenin peşine düştü. Fakat İngiliz demiryolu ve taşımacılığı sektörünün önde gelen temsilcilerinden oluşan rakip bir grup, Alman-Fransız-İngiliz ortak girişimi planına İngiltere’nin çıkarlarına aykırı olduğu gerekçesiyle sert biçimde karşı çıktı ve İngiliz hükümetini projeye verdiği desteği durdurmaya zorladı. Devam eden yıllar, sonuçsuz kalan İngiliz-Alman-Osmanlı görüşmelerine şahitlik etti. Nihayet 1913-1914’te bir uzlaşı sağlandı: İngiltere, Basra Körfezi’nin kontrolü, demiryolları, nakliye ve en önemlisi petrol gibi çeşitli alanlarda aldığı tavizler karşılığında Almanya’nın yürüteceği Bağdat demiryolu projesine rıza gösterdi. İngiltere tarafında bu anlaşmadan asıl kazançlı çıkanlar tam da önceki planı baltalayan demiryolu ve taşımacılık sektörü temsilcileriydi. Bu meseleyi teşkil eden demiryolu, taşımacılık ve finans sektöründeki çıkarların tümü, Cain ve Hopkins’in yaklaşımları zemininde gerçekten de “centilmen kapitalistler” olarak nitelendirilebilir. Gelgelelim bu makalenin ulaştığı sonuçlar, “centilmen kapitalistler”in Cain ve Hopkins’in sandığı kadar insicamlı bir grup olmadığını göstermektedir: Bazı finans çevrelerinin “kozmopolitanizmi” ile demiryolu ve taşımacılık sektörünün daha sınırlı çıkarlarının “vatanseverliği” arasında ciddi bir yarılma vardı.

Keywords

• İngiliz Emperyalizmi
• Centilmen Kapitalistler
• İngiliz-Alman İlişkileri
• İngiliz-Osmanlı İlişkileri
• Bağdat Demiryolu

Gentlemanly Capitalism and the Baghdad Railway, 1888 –1914: ‘Cosmopolitanism’ vs. ‘Patriotism’

Abstract

According to the interpretation of Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism was driven by a social stratum they dub ‘gentlemanly capitalists’. This refers to the financial and service sector based in south-eastern England. This article aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on Cain’s and Hopkins’s approach by exploring how far it can shed light upon the stance of British business and political elites towards the German-dominated Baghdad railway project in the Ottoman Empire. Represented by Deutsche Bank, German interests started to construct railway lines in Anatolia from 1888 onwards. In 1903, they secured a concession to build a railway connecting Ankara with the Persian Gulf (the Baghdad railway). For the British, this raised the question of whether it was better to oppose or participate in that project. The latter option was pursued by a group of London-based financial interests. However, a competing group consisting of British railway and shipping interests vociferously opposed the plan of a German-French-British joint venture as inimical to British interests, thereby forcing the British government to reverse its previous support for the project. This was followed by years of abortive British-German-Ottoman negotiations. In 1913-14, a compromise was found: The British traded their acceptance of a German-controlled Baghdad railway against a number of concessions involving the Persian Gulf, railways, shipping and, crucially, oil. On the British side, the main winners of this agreement were the very same railway and shipping interests that had wrecked the previous plan. All the financial, railway and shipping interests involved in this affair can indeed be characterized as ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ in the vein of Cain and Hopkins. However, the findings of this article also show that the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ were not as coherent a group as Cain and Hopkins would have it: There was a deep split between the ‘cosmopolitanism’ of some financial circles and the more narrow ‘patriotism’ of the railway and shipping interests.

Keywords

• British Imperialism
• Gentlemanly Capitalism
• British-German Relations
• British-Ottoman Relations
• Baghdad Railway

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