The Limits of Knowledge as a Public Good: A Strategic Approach to Tacit Knowledge

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 17 Sayı: 65, 173 - 188, 31.01.2022

Erkan Gürpınar , Özgür Hakan Aydoğmuş

https://doi.org/10.19168/jyasar.902290

Cited By: 1

Öz

In this article, tacit knowledge, which is one of the factors that affects knowledge production and dissemination is examined by using game theory. Information as a public good approach advocates government intervention or intellectual property to achieve Pareto efficiency in information production. Under tacit knowledge, Pareto efficiency can be achieved without any intervention. As argued by researchers such as Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek, the entrepreneur‘s function is important in the production and dissemination of tacit knowledge. While discussing the assumptions of approaches that model tacit knowledge, we also summarize the policy implications of them. The article develops a game theoretic framework to understand the nature of tacit knowledge, and provides a strategic perspective to examine the relationships between actors and institutions (universities, firms, and entrepreneurs) involved in knowledge production.

Anahtar Kelimeler

tacit knowledge, game theory, Pareto efficiency, entrepreneur, institutions

Kamu Malı Olarak Bilginin Sınırları: Örtük Bilgiye Stratejik Bir Yaklaşım

Öz

Bu makalede bilgi üretimi ve yayılımını etkileyen örtük bilginin oyun teorisi kullanılarak incelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Kamu malı olarak bilgi yaklaşımı bilgi üretiminde Pareto etkinlik için devlet müdahalesi veya fikri mülkiyeti gerekli görmektedir. Örtük bilgi varsayımı altında Pareto etkinlik herhangi bir müdahale olmadan sağlanabilmektedir. Joseph Schumpeter ve Friedrich Hayek gibi düşünürlerin de belirttiği gibi örtük bilginin üretilmesi ve yayılmasında girişimci asıl rolü üstlenmektedir. Oyun teorisini kullanarak örtük bilgiyi modelleyen yaklaşımların temel varsayımları tartışılırken bu yaklaşımların bilgi üretimine ilişkin ne tür politika önerileri çıkarmakta kullanılabileceği tartışılmaktadır. Makale hem örtük bilginin doğasının anlaşılmasına ilişkin oyun teorisi temelli bir çerçeve geliştirmekte, hem de bilgi üretimi ile ilgili aktörler ve kurumlar (üniversiteler, firmalar, girişimciler) arası ilişkileri incelememize olanak sağlayan stratejik bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

örtük bilgi, oyun teorisi, Pareto etkinlik, girişimci, kurumlar

Kaynakça

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