The Richness of Perceptual Content

Abstract

This study aims to present one of the most effective arguments given against conceptualism about perceptual content. Conceptualism is the view that perceptual content is wholly conceptual, so that a subject cannot undergo a perceptual experience unless he possesses concepts that properly characterize the content of his experience. The Argument from Richness of Perceptual Content states that perceptual content cannot be conceptual because it contains so many details that it is unlikely that a subject deploys so many concepts while having a perceptual experience.

Keywords

• Conceptualism,Perceptual Content,Richness of Perceptual Content

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