Duygular ve Değer Biçen Yargılar

Year 2018, , 42 - 56, 30.10.2018

Zeynep Talay Turner

https://doi.org/10.20981/kaygi.472918

Abstract

Birçok çağdaş
filozof duyguların değer biçen yargılar ile kurulduğunu ve bu sebeple de
bilişsel olduklarını iddia etmektedir. Her ne kadar bu iddia duyguların doğası
hakkında bize zengin tartışma alanları açıyor olsa da, böyle bir
genelleştirmeye ulaşma kaygısı aynı zamanda duyguların etik boyutunu göz ardı
etmektedir. Bunu engellemek adına spesifik duygulara odaklanmamız gerektiğini
iddia ediyorum. Bu yazıda merhamet duygusunu inceleyerek, duygular ve değer
koyan yargılar arasında içkin bir ilişki olduğunu ama bu ilişkinin her zaman
tek taraflı olmayabileceğini, duyguların da yargılarımızı
biçimlendirebileceğini savunuyorum. Son olarak, eğer duygular ve yargılar
arasında içkin bir ilişki varsa, yargının askıya alınması durumunun (Arendt’in
Eichmann analizi) aynı zamanda duygusal anlamda kayıtsızlık halini de
beraberinde getireceğini ve özellikle
bu kayıtsızlık ya da duyguların askıya alınması (emotion-free state) halinin kişinin ahlaki eylemden ve sorumluluk
alma yetisinden uzaklaşmasını kolaylaştıracağını iddia ediyorum.  

Keywords

Duygular, Değer Biçen Yargılar, Merhamet, Etik

Emotions and Evaluative Judgments

Abstract

There has been an
ongoing debate on whether emotions are evaluative judgments, and as such
cognitive. Though philosophers, who commit themselves to the idea that emotions
are constituted or structured by evaluative judgments, provide us with very
rich accounts of the nature of emotions, they downplay its ethical dimension.
In order to correct this we should focus on particular emotions. Here I focus
on compassion and conclude that though there is an intrinsic relationship
between emotions and evaluative judgments this is not necessarily a one-sided
one. Finally, I claim that any suspension of judgment (Arendt on Eichmann) can
lead to a state of indifference, or an emotion-free state. And here I am
interested in the ethical consequences of such a state, namely that with the
suspension of judgment and accordingly of emotions, it is much easier for
someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly any sense of accountability.

Keywords

Emotions, Evaluative Judgments, Compassion, Ethics

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